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Abstract
Participation is at the core of democratic society. However, studies have shown that participation is
biased toward those who are better educated, more affluent, and in greater possession of civic skills.
Scholars have pointed to the Internet as a possible remedy for the disparity in participation for its
potential to lower barriers and increase access to those who lack the time, money, and/or necessary civic
skills. Research has been mixed about whether the Internet mobilizes new or marginalized participants to
the electoral process, simply reinforces those who are active in that process already, or does both. In the
2008 U.S. presidential election campaign, all major presidential candidates utilized the Internet and email
as a tool for mobilizing, recruiting, communicating and raising money. New media, especially the Internet
and other Information Communication Technologies (ICTs), played a significant role in extending and
perhaps even supplanting more traditional methods of political participation. Because of the greater role
played by the Internet and ICTs in 2008, the ability to test the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses
was much greater than in previous elections. My research adds to the general debate by 1) testing the
reinforcement versus mobilization theories related to the impact of the Internet on political participation;
2) refining these theories by testing whether mobilization or reinforcement occurs differently in online
versus offline participation; and 3) exploring the extent to which mobilization and reinforcement are
contingent on activities of individual campaigns. The 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey is the data
source for this research.
This dissertation provides evidence to support each of the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses I
proposed. However, the mobilized groups varied across the campaign by activity. No single group either
advantaged or disadvantaged in the past, was mobilized consistently throughout the primaries and
general election campaigns. While this study offers evidence of mobilization and reinforcement in a
number of instances and among a number of demographic groups, it raises additional questions which
cannot be easily resolved with the available data. Nevertheless, the results do illustrate that Internet
usage in certain instances is more likely to motivate certain groups to engage in participation activities.
Further, online campaign contact is a strong predictor for most participation activities.
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ABSTRACT
ONLINE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE 2008 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION: MOBILIZING OR REINFORCING?
Kenneth M. Winneg
Michael X. Delli Carpini
Dissertation Supervisor
Participation is at the core of democratic society. However, studies have shown
that participation is biased toward those who are better educated, more affluent, and in
greater possession of civic skills. Scholars have pointed to the Internet as a possible
remedy for the disparity in participation for its potential to lower barriers and increase
access to those who lack the time, money, and/or necessary civic skills. Research has
been mixed about whether the Internet mobilizes new or marginalized participants to the
electoral process, simply reinforces those who are active in that process already, or does
both. In the 2008 U.S. presidential election campaign, all major presidential candidates
utilized the Internet and email as a tool for mobilizing, recruiting, communicating and
raising money. New media, especially the Internet and other Information
Communication Technologies (ICTs), played a significant role in extending and perhaps
even supplanting more traditional methods of political participation. Because of the
greater role played by the Internet and ICTs in 2008, the ability to test the mobilization
and reinforcement hypotheses was much greater than in previous elections. My research
adds to the general debate by 1) testing the reinforcement versus mobilization theories
related to the impact of the Internet on political participation; 2) refining these theories by
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testing whether mobilization or reinforcement occurs differently in online versus offline
participation; and 3) exploring the extent to which mobilization and reinforcement are
contingent on activities of individual campaigns. The 2008 National Annenberg Election
Survey is the data source for this research.
This dissertation provides evidence to support each of the mobilization and
reinforcement hypotheses I proposed. However, the mobilized groups varied across the
campaign by activity. No single group either advantaged or disadvantaged in the past,
was mobilized consistently throughout the primaries and general election campaigns.
While this study offers evidence of mobilization and reinforcement in a number of
instances and among a number of demographic groups, it raises additional questions
which cannot be easily resolved with the available data. Nevertheless, the results do
illustrate that Internet usage in certain instances is more likely to motivate certain groups
to engage in participation activities. Further, online campaign contact is a strong
predictor for most participation activities.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF PROBLEM

In their seminal work, Participation in America, Verba and Nie (1972) write:
If democracy is interpreted as rule by the people, then the question of who
participates in political decisions becomes the question of the nature of
democracy in society. Where few take part in decisions there is little democracy;
the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is (p. 1).
Although most scholars grant that participation is at the core of a democratic society,
Verba and Nie’s (1972) research and studies by others (Campbell et al., 1960. Rosenstone
and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995, Conway, 2000) show that some segments of
society are more likely to participate, specifically the better educated and affluent, and
those in greater possession of civic skills. While this would have satisfied the founding
fathers, it does not satisfy democratic theory. Thus, the decisions Verba and Nie write
about are influenced most strongly by a relatively limited and advantaged segment of
society.
The type of participation I focus on in this dissertation relates directly to engaging
in electoral process activities leading up to, but not including voting, the ultimate act of
political participation. The activities leading up to voting, including persuading,
discussing, campaign volunteering, contributing are as important in bringing the more
disadvantaged and newer participants into the democratic process.
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With the rise of the Internet in the mid-1990s, its potential role for opening up the
process of political participation to a wider and more diverse range of citizens has drawn
much speculation:
The Internet could have a significant impact on broadening political participation
by lowering the cost of involvement, creating new mechanisms of organizing
groups and opening up new channels of information that bypass traditional media
gatekeepers. (Di Gennaro & Dutton, 2006, p. 299)
Contrary to these optimistic predictions,1 others argue that the Internet is unlikely to
bring in those who have not traditionally participated. For example, Margolis and
Resnick (2000) argue that cyberspace is not the utopian democratic meeting ground some
have envisioned:
It will not empower the powerless because those who are powerful outside of
cyberspace are taking those advantages with them in the Internet. Direct
democracy will not happen nor is it desired. Representative democracy is more
realistic. Most people neither have the time, inclination, nor aptitude to be aware
of the myriad of policy issues. Public policy issues are too complicated and
citizens too distracted to devote the time and effort to public affairs that such a
society would require. (p. 205)

1

In the grand scheme of communication, the Internet has been characterized by some as having the
potential to bring people together to form communities of either common interests or diverse backgrounds
and viewpoints (Rheingold, 1995). Were the Internet to do so, it might expand the public sphere as
envisioned by Habermas (1989). This utopian view is very deterministic, assuming that the Internet
technology is an unassailable democratic force (Coleman & Gotze, 2001; Coleman, 2006). However, some
like Putnam (2000) say the Internet will decrease the public sphere and decrease rather than increase
participation.
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Taking a related view, Bimber and Davis (2003) argue that while the Internet is
indispensible for campaigns and the electoral process, its campaign messages are aimed
primarily at niche audiences which actively seeks the online tools relevant to their
political interests. As more people become connected to the Internet, the effects will
become even smaller as the Internet audience would change from one that is more
purposive and interested to one that is more like a mass audience. Unlike television
viewers, the Internet users are not a captive audience and cannot do as television and
newspapers do and “saturate a large audience with messages that interrupt citizens’ focus
and direct it toward the campaign and, more specifically, a candidate’s message” (Bimber
and Davis, 2003, p. 147). Rather, the interactive nature of the medium allows them to
become both direct and indirect participants in the political process.
Simplifying somewhat, the likely impact of the Internet on the amount and
diversity of political participation has created two camps: Mobilization theorists and
Reinforcement theorists. Mobilization theorists believe the Internet will enfranchise
those who have been traditionally marginalized by bringing them into the political
process and thereby enhancing democracy. In Weare’s (2002) summary of mobilization
and reinforcement, he asserts that such theorists predict that the “the open, decentralized
and interactive nature of Internet communications will enfranchise marginalized sectors
of the electorate by making political information more easily accessible and more
germane to their concerns and improve the openness of government by equalizing access
to information” (Weare, 2002, p. 679). Lower communications and networking costs will
make it easier for citizens to enter the political process and perform such activities as
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learning candidate stands on issues, contacting elective officials, or organizing networks
with others on local issues (Norris, 2001; DiGennaro and Dutton, 2006).
According to summaries by Weare (2002) and Norris (2001), reinforcement
theory argues that while the Internet may expand and decentralize communication
patterns, making information accessible to more people, it will continue to primarily
benefit those who are already participants, namely “elites” who have greater access to the
technology and who are already highly politically interested (e.g., Bimber and Davis,
2003). The technology offers just another resource for the most motivated, active, and
informed members of society (Norris, 2001), at best allowing existing biases in who
participates to remain, and at worst exacerbating these disparities.2
Results from the relatively limited but growing number of empirical studies
testing the mobilizing versus reinforcing effects of the Internet have been mixed and
inconclusive. Some studies have shown evidence of mobilization (e.g., see Weaver,
Loumakis and Bergman, 2003, Tolbert and McNeal, 2003, Shah et al., 2001, Gibson,
Lusoli, and Ward, 2005; Best and Krueger, 2005; Mossbacher, Tolbert and McNeal,
2008). Others tend to support the reinforcement hypothesis. (e.g., see Bimber, 1999;
Kaye, 1998; Johnson and Kaye, 1998; Bimber, 2001; Norris, 2001; Scheufele and Nisbet,
2000; Bimber and Davis, 2003; Johnson and Kaye, 2004; Polat, 2005; Xenos and Moy,
2007; Shah et al. 2007). Most recently, a meta-analysis (Boulianne, 2009) has also
shown equivocal results.

2

There is also a body of literature which argues that both reinforcement and mobilization can occur (see
Norris, 2001). Some prior research sets up a false dichotomy between mobilization and reinforcement,
when both could occur simultaneously by mobilizing some groups and reinforcing others.
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One limitation of most of the earlier studies is their exclusive focus on traditional
forms of campaign participation as measured by Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba et al.
(1995). These activities include attending political campaign rallies, contributing money
to a campaign, and/or working for a campaign, with no attention to whether these and
other activities are done “offline” or “online.” Ignoring or failing to distinguish “online
participation” may hamper our ability to uncover the mobilizing and/or reinforcing
effects of Internet use (Gibson, Lusoli, and Ward, 2005).
In one of the more recent studies to address this issue, Gibson et al. (2005)
describe a more contextualized model of online participation as one that “takes into
account a wider range of online participatory behaviors and incorporates the various new
forms of stimuli present in the new media that can kick-start those behaviors.” (p. 10)
Examples of online participation include, discussing politics online in a chat group or via
email, forward campaign emails or video to others, viewing campaign ads and other
video on sites like YouTube, visiting a campaign website to learn about the issues, and
volunteer or donate online. Using these measures, they found some evidence of
mobilization among those previously disengaged in the 2002 British elections. Since the
publication of their work, others have measured participation using online and offline
variables, but again with mixed results (e.g., Best and Krueger, 2005; Shah et al. 2007;
Xenos and Moy, 2007).
Two additional shortcomings of the extant research are the under-theorizing of the
role played by campaign organizations themselves, and the rapidly changing and growing
use of the Internet by both citizens and campaign organizations. First, as work by
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Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and others (Kramer, 1970; Cain and McCue, 1985;
Caldeira, Clausen and Patterson, 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1993 as cited in
Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeil, 2008) make clear, contact by political campaign
organizations is an important predictor of actual campaign participation.
Second, access and use of the Internet by citizens has increased dramatically in
recent years. So too has the frequency and innovativeness of Internet use by candidates
for office, since even the 2004 presidential election cycle. For example, during the 2008
presidential election campaign the mainstream media often pointed to the Internet’s role
in the campaign, particularly as a fundraising tool, especially among small donors, as a
tool for mobilizing and recruiting supporters, and as a means of communicating
campaign messages (e.g., see USA Today, May 2, 2008; New York Times, July 17, 2008
and March 22, 2008, and the Washington Post, January 1, 2008). The Internet was
integral to the campaigns of all the major presidential candidates in 2008. During the
primaries and caucuses, some attributed Sen. Barack Obama’s success over Sen. Hillary
Rodham Clinton and the other Democratic candidates to his campaign’s greater
effectiveness with using the technology to contact and activate new and younger voters to
build a strong and successful base of support.
In short, findings examining earlier elections may not be a good indication of the
current or future impact of the Internet. Based on, but not a replication of, Gibson et al.’s
(2005) contextual model of political participation, Verba et al.’s (1995) Civic
Voluntarism Model of political participation, and Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) work
on campaign contact and mobilization, and drawing on data from the 2008 presidential
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campaign, my dissertation is intended to add to our understanding of the mobilizing
and/or reinforcing effects of the Internet by specifically addressing the following
questions: 1) Overall did Internet use by candidates and voters in the 2008 presidential
election lead to the political mobilization of previously under-represented citizens or the
reinforcement of existing biases? 2) Did mobilization or reinforcement occur differently
for different kinds of participation (e.g., campaign giving, volunteering, voting) and/or
for different modes of participation (i.e., “offline” vs. “online” activities)? 3) Did
mobilization or reinforcement vary by different demographic groups (e.g., young adults,
women, minorities)? And 4) is mobilization or reinforcement contingent on the extent
and ways in which candidates used the Internet and other Information Communication
Technologies (ICTs) in their campaigns?
The data source for my dissertation is the 2008 National Annenberg Election
Survey (NAES) rolling cross-sectional national probability telephone survey and the
NAES post-election telephone panel survey. NAES was in the field continuously from
mid-December, 2007 until Election Day. On November 5, 2008 the day following the
general election, NAES conducted a post-election telephone panel study. In this
dissertation, I analyzed data the NAES collected during four distinct periods: February 1
through March 10, 2008—a period when 39 primaries and caucuses took place; July 2,
2008 through August 4, 2008, the post-primary period, where I retrospectively measured
respondents primary season participation activities; August 8 through October 2, 2008,
the first two months of the general election period; and November 5 through November
12, 2008, a retrospective panel of individuals interviewed from August 8 through
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November 3, 2008. In each of these periods I was able to place questions specifically
designed to help answer the four research questions listed above on the surveys, after
consultation with and approval by the senior directors of the survey.
1-1: Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation is organized in the following way. In the remainder of this
chapter I describe two major models of political participation developed before the
Internet became a widely used medium. I then relate these models to the Internet,
detailing how attributes and processes of the Internet act as parts of these models. .
Chapter 2 contains both a review of the empirical research related to the
mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses and a discussion placing the dissertation in
the context of the very unique 2008 presidential election. This chapter shows that the
studies in these areas, taken in their totality, provide mixed conclusions about whether the
Internet leads to mobilization, reinforcement, or both. These studies offer a rationale for
my study as a way to contribute to clarifying the debate. The discussion of the Internet
and participation within the context of the 2008 election revolves around the uniqueness
of that election and presents descriptive data from the NAES on Internet usage, political
interest, and comparative measures of participation throughout the 2008 campaign and to
the 2004 presidential election.
Chapter 3 is the methods chapter. I present my hypotheses and research
questions. In addition, this chapter contains the details about the methodology and the
data used to test the hypotheses and answer the research questions. This chapter includes
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the sample frame, data collection methodology, survey question design, and the analytical
techniques.
I present the findings of my research in chapters 4 through 8. Chapters 4 and 5
focus on the data from the primaries related to mobilization and reinforcement (Cases 1
and 2), while chapters 6 and 7 concentrate on the general election data (Cases 3 and 4). In
Chapter 8, I present the findings from the test of the activation hypothesis—Hypothesis
3—which examines the role of communication of the campaigns themselves on
mobilization and reinforcement. Finally, this dissertation concludes with a discussion of
the implications of my study for the political process and, more broadly, for the field of
political communication. Finally, I will conclude with what I believed this research has
contributed to the field and what should be the next steps.
In this dissertation, I provide evidence to support each of the mobilization and
reinforcement hypotheses I have proposed. However, and this is an important point, the
groups that were mobilized varied by case and activity. No single group either
advantaged or disadvantaged in the past, was mobilized consistently throughout the
primaries and general election campaigns. One can argue that a stronger case for the
Internet as a mobilizing mechanism would be made if a pattern of mobilized groups
emerged across the four cases. This lack of consistency could be due to the methodology,
question wording, or time of interview. The data reveal that while much had been made
of the increased amount of participation among some segments of the population, relative
to the 2004 campaign, participation levels, excluding voting, remained about where they
were for all adults and within most demographic segments, except for African
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Americans, where there was an increase compared to 2004. It is unclear what factors
may have contributed to the limited amount of mobilization, but the data are suggestive
that low levels of participation across the population combined with a continued digital
divide may be the major contributors. Without a further narrowing between those who
have and those who do not have access to the Internet, we may not see wholesale
movements toward mobilization. Therefore, while this study offers evidence of
mobilization and reinforcement in a number of instances and among a number of
demographic groups, it raises additional questions which cannot be easily resolved with
the available data. Nevertheless, the results do illustrate that Internet use in certain
instances is more likely to motivate certain groups to engage in participation activities.
In short, there is ample evidence that the advantaged are most likely to benefit from what
the Internet has to offer, however, there is evidence that heretofore disadvantaged groups
like African Americans and the young were mobilized by the Internet to participate, but
the mobilization was relatively low. More optimistically, this research found evidence
that online campaign contact was more likely than offline campaign contact to lead to
political participation. Therefore, online targeting by campaigns may be an effective way
to encourage participation.
Before moving to a more specific review of the literature related to mobilization
and reinforcement, it is necessary to present the foundation of traditional political
participation, weaving in how the Internet relates to and connects with the traditional
methods. To make the relationship and connections clearer, I discuss specific methods of
participation found online.
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1-2: Traditional Models of Political Participation
Emerging from rational choice theory (Downs, 1957), noteworthy studies (Verba
et al., 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) are built upon the assumption that citizens
participate when they see potential benefits outweighing the costs. In turn, political elites
mobilize citizens to participate by providing them with benefits and reducing the costs,
with the expectation of their support in return. While voting is the most common form of
such support, political participation and more broadly, civic participation can involve
multiple activities. Traditional forms of political participation include working or
volunteering on electoral campaigns or for political or civic organizations, contributing
money to those entities, contacting government officials, attending protests, marches, or
demonstrations, placing a candidate’s sign on a lawn, and wearing a button in support of
a candidate.
Prior research consistently finds inequities in who participates and, therefore, who
benefits from such activities. These disparities are drawn across demographic and
attitudinal lines and result from a lack of resources, insufficient psychological
engagement or political interest, and being outside the recruitment network (Verba and
Nie, 1972; Verba et al.,1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Those more likely to
participate are generally better educated, more affluent, possess more developed civic
skills, have a greater interest in politics, and generally have increased levels of
engagement. As a result, they are more advantaged and more successful in ultimately
pushing for policy change.
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In their landmark work, Verba et al. (1995) describe a participation model focusing
on three things: resources, engagement, and recruitment. Their Civic Voluntarism Model
(CVM) attempts to explain and predict political participation. Verba et al. categorize
participation into four types of acts: time-based acts, political contributions, voting, and
political discussion. The elements which have the greatest impact on fostering time-based
acts include education and free time. Income is the best predictor for making political
contributions. Political interest, knowledge/education, and partisanship are the best
predictors for voting, and political interest is the strongest predictor for political
discussion (see also Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995).
Citizens need more than just these resources to participate. There must also be
external mechanisms at work, such as recruitment. Institutionally-based political
recruitment is also a significant predictor of political participation when placed in the
CVM. When those who are members of organizations are asked to participate by other
members of their organizations they are likely to do so. The types of activities developed
in religious and voluntary non-political civic organizations provide a wealth of benefits to
the citizenry—civic skills, social networking opportunities, and is a fertile ground for
recruitment. Members of these networks are more likely to know each other.
In Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) theory of political activation, recruitment plays
a central role. Candidates, political parties, the media and other contributors (groups and
activists) induce citizens to participate. Rosenstone and Hansen point to two types of
activation: direct and indirect. Direct activation takes place in the form of meetings,
door-to-door canvassing, petition signing, and media appeals for money by the candidate
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directly. These are the methods which the Obama campaign asserted was the key to their
primary and general electoral victories (Jamieson, 2009). Indirect activation can occur
through family, friends, co-workers, and social networks making people responsive to
activation from these sources. Social networks help get the word out, therefore
multiplying the effects of activation. The strategy of political motivation consists of
targeting and timing of the activation.
The conclusions reached by the authors in these works on recruitment indicate
participation does not occur in a vacuum. There needs to be a mechanism to motivate
citizens to become engaged and a method by which they can participate. These works
have shown that participation has been biased towards those equipped with the most
resources and motivations to participate. Those most potentially in need of policy change
are either unwilling or unable to press for it because of the barriers to traditional
participation. These works also suggest recruitment tend to focus on those who are most
likely participate, thus reinforcing the current cycle of political participation.
As noted above, the development of the Internet and its growing use by citizens and
political elites raises both the possibility that this “vicious cycle” could be turned into a
“virtuous” one (Norris, 2000) by bringing formerly marginalized citizens into the
process, or that it simply provides new means for those already engaged to maintain or
increase their participatory advantages. Determining which of these viewpoints (or more
accurately what combination of them) is the more accurate depends in part on
conceptualizing how the Internet fits into or revises the traditional models developed by
Verba et al. and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). The foundations of their work are based
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on the importance of having the resources of time, money, and civic skills, a certain level
of political engagement, and the susceptibility for recruitment. I argue in the next section
that while these models can be applied to Internet-based politics, the conclusions one
draws about this new technology’s likely effect on the amount and distribution of
citizens’ political participation are potentially quite different than those drawn in the preInternet era.
1-3: Relating Online Participation to the Established Models
1-2.1: Online participation activities and resources and engagement
Many forms of traditional participation can be performed online in a more
efficient manner because of the technology. Further, the convenience of performing
these acts online is high but the costs are low. According to a study by the Pew Internet
and American Life Project, people cite convenience as the top reason for going online
(Rainie et al., 2005). There are many election-related online participation activities that
parallel traditional participation models. Persuading, recruiting, volunteering, and
contributing can be performed both online and offline. However, the Internet also creates
new forms of participation such as viewing or posting political videos on YouTube or
other peer-to-peer (P2P) sites, or passing along emails or videos to others. While each of
these activities requires a certain level of resources such as time, civic skills, or money, or
levels engagement such as political interest, political efficacy, or need for political
information, these requirements may be lower than for offline participation.
For instance, visiting a campaign/party/political website may be, by itself, a form
of information-seeking. However, if one visits the site in order to sign-up to volunteer or
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to contribute money, then it becomes an active form of participation. This action is an
extension of traditional activities of volunteering to work for a campaign and contributing
money. Necessary for this activity is time and the best engagement predictor is political
interest.
Another activity, signing up for a campaign e-mail/bulletin provides an advantage
to both the citizen and the campaign. The citizen signs up and becomes informed about
the campaign/candidate, possibly leading to further action. The campaign builds up a
database which can be used for future mobilization, i.e., fundraising efforts aimed at a
maximum number of potential donors in a fairly quick amount of time. This method
extends traditional methods because of the ability to build up a large database and
maximize fundraising efforts efficiently. This is akin to contacting a campaign and
requesting information about the candidate’s stance.
Sending an email to, or receiving an email from, a politician, campaign, candidate
or organization is a potentially effective means of pushing a policy issue. Officials place
differing weights on what they perceive to be mass-mailings from organizations rather
than an individual note or email (Bimber, 2000; Williams and Trammell, 2005). This
activity requires time, civic skills, political interest and a level of political efficacy.
Discussing politics online in a chat group or joining an email discussion group is
an extension of the traditional activity of discussing politics with friends and family at
home, school, work, or the local watering hole. This activity has changed dramatically
online as the social network extends beyond real friends and family to online “friends”
who may never meet face-to-face, but engage in political discussion and, more
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importantly, persuasion. This activity requires the resources of time and civic skills,
along with a level of political interest and need for political information.
Viewing online political advertising and videos on sites like YouTube is an active
form of political participation since once you enter a candidate’s web site, you must
actively click to view the video. The campaign’s desired outcome is for the citizen to take
action. The ability to view the videos/ad on demand is unique to the technology. Ad
viewing, traditionally has been a passive activity. In the 2008, campaign, YouTube
played a major role. For example, Senator Hillary Clinton’s boasts of her foreign policy
experience including references to arriving “under sniper fire” in Bosnia were debunked
initially by CBS News, but subsequent video on YouTube was viewed nearly two million
times in a week. Senator Barack Obama’s erstwhile pastor/advisor, the Reverend
Jeremiah Wright’s sermons have also had a multitude of views on YouTube. The ability
to upload video quickly on file sharing sites like YouTube can bypass mainstream media
and have an impact on a campaign. While viewing this video is not active political
participation, passing it on to a friend may be considered a form of persuasion.
Donating money online to a campaign or political organization is an extension of
one of the most critical elements of any successful campaign—raising money and making
contributions. Using the Internet for this effort has shown in prior presidential campaigns
to be highly effective. The campaigns of the 2008 presidential candidates raised millions
of dollars from via the Internet, allowing smaller contributions by more donors. Highend donors are continued to be reached by traditional fund-raising efforts. Online
solicitation for campaign contributions reaches millions of small donors. Rather than
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making separate efforts to send out fund-raising letters or telephone calls, the Internet can
link contributors to donation pages via multiple pathways—email, blog, and campaign
web site.
Volunteering online to help with a political campaign/cause is an extension of
traditional volunteering activities. One can now sign up online to work for a campaign or
campaigns can recruit potential volunteers via the Internet, using email databases.
Campaigns can use these databases to mobilize people to travel to different areas of need,
be it within the area or out of state (as the Kerry campaign did in Ohio in 2004). This
method of mobilizing can be more efficient than traditional methods.
Posting to a political blog is akin to engaging in political discussion in a chat
room/forum. Web blogs became most prominent in 2004 and continue to play a role
today. Blogs claimed credit for Ned Lamont’s Democratic primary win in the 2006
Connecticut Senate race, but were unsuccessful during the general election campaign.
Nevertheless, blogs can help mobilize people to action as seen in 2004 when a number of
liberal blogs helped stop a conservative owned television group (Sinclair) from airing
what Democrats considered biased propaganda against John Kerry’s Vietnam war record
(Benkler, 2006).
1-2.2: Online participation and recruitment
In the prior section, I described how online participation activities can parallel
traditional offline activities and how some activities extend the definition of participation
because of the uniqueness of the technology. In this section, I discuss how campaigns and
civic organizations can use the Internet to recruit and mobilize citizens to participate. In
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Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba et al. (1995), recruitment takes place both
directly and indirectly. Therefore, the traditional direct forms of mobilization including
in-person meetings, door-to-door canvassing, petition signing, and media appeals for
money by the candidate directly, can now be performed, perhaps more effectively and
efficiently through the Internet. Campaigns can utilize the Internet to reach a maximum
number of potential voters, supporters, or contributors via email recruiting using
databases, links from their own web sites, links from other web sites and blogs. Through
these sites, and through the sophisticated methods of microtargeting, campaigns can
focus on those most susceptible to recruiting, the “low hanging fruit.” (If campaigns or
advocates for a particular policy wish to mobilize fundraising to buy media or engage in a
mass emailing campaign they can do so without much more effort than creating a
message on their server and sending it out to those on their email list with the added
request to pass it on to others.) In this way, online recruitment accomplishes two things.
First, it gets the message out to the strongest supporters, with hope of spurring them into
action. Second, it helps expand this message to those who may be interested but up until
the point of contact were unsure how to act. The financial cost to the campaign is
significantly lower than engaging in a more traditional mailing campaign. This method
was foreseen by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba et al. in their discussion of
effective recruiting among ones social network. In these times of the Internet, social
networks have expanded. This ease of mobilization at a significantly reduced cost can
help more grass roots organizations make their voice be heard and push their policy.
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The traditional resources found in Verba et al.’s (1995) CVM and Rosenstone and
Hansen’s (1993) work should facilitate online participation (Krueger, 2002). While
commitments of time and money limit participation in traditional non-voting forms of
political participation, the Internet could work to neutralize these barriers due to the
medium’s ease of access and convenience of use. However, constraints to effective
online political participation to which I alluded earlier include the digital divide where
those who are more likely to become politically engaged—those with greater educational
and income levels—are more likely to participate online.
Scholars have debated the role and the benefits of the Internet in encouraging
participation, deliberation, and community with some empirical studies supporting the
arguments. However, the argument over whether the Internet is a mobilizing or
reinforcing mechanism has yet to be settled. The next section of this proposal reviews the
extant literature centering on the debate about the Internet as either a mobilizing or
reinforcing mechanism. As Internet technology became more diffuse, scholars began
investigating its impact on the political participation process.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW—ONLINE PARTICIPATION:
REINFORCEMENT AND MOBILIZATION
There have been a limited number of empirical studies to prove either the
reinforcement or mobilization theories. In the few studies undertaken and published thus
far no consensus emerges among the scholars as to the impact of the Internet on political
participation. A recent meta-analysis conducted by Boulianne (2009) bears this out. In
her fairly comprehensive review, Boulianne provides evidence that the Internet neither
negatively affects political engagement, nor significantly increases it. Her analysis of the
studies finds, perhaps logically, that the effect of the Internet is greater for the most
recent studies. As is the problem with any meta-analysis and most literature reviews, for
that matter, the studies she examines generally lack a consistent single unit of
measurement, making comparability of the studies difficult. She does create a common
measure by essentially averaging the coefficients of the regression models the studies
produce. She concludes that the Internet does not contribute to civic decline, and perhaps
may positively impact engagement, but the effect sizes are generally small and therefore
puts into question how significant a contributor the Internet is to increasing civic
engagement. Boulianne also suggests from the meta-analysis that measuring Internet by
including online news in the operationalization the likelihood for political engagement
increases. In my dissertation, I do not include Internet media use in the
operationalization, but rather as a control variable. Within that framework, the following
sections review the major studies published to this point most relevant to addressing my
hypotheses on reinforcement and mobilization.
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2-1: The Case for Reinforcement: A Review of the Literature
The studies I review in this section echo the argument that online technology
applied to the political process advantages those with the most resources and highest
level of engagement. Yet, in many cases, the studies suffer from limited samples and
poor designs. Another issue is that among the many studies conducted, there is no single
unit of measurement for Internet use and therefore comparability is difficult. Further,
some argue that Internet skills and level of civic skills go hand-in-hand (Bimber, 1999;
Best and Krueger, 2005; di Gennaro and Dutton, 2006) but do not necessarily lead to
mobilization (Johnson and Kaye, 2002). I detail these and other studies below.
Bimber (1999) found evidence of reinforcement in his study of citizens’
engagement with government services. Those more likely to contact government
agencies either offline (phone or letter) or online (email) in this study conducted in 1996
and 1997 were those who fit the reinforcement profile—better educated, older, male, and
more politically connected. However, there were small effects suggesting mobilization in
one of Bimber’s models which showed that younger people were more likely than older
people to use email to contact government officials. However, when looking at those
who have contacted government officials at least one time, the age effect reversed itself.
That is, once older citizens tried contacting by email, they are more likely than younger
people to do so frequently. Bimber used both an RDD telephone survey and a largesample on-line survey that ran for a year on selected political and government web sites.
This study was conducted at a time when familiarity with the Internet was lower than it is
today, but it is one of the first conducted on the effects of the medium. He attributes the

22
findings to a “transition effect” caused by the medium moving from an exclusive
technology to a mass medium.
In a more recent study, Bimber and Davis (2003) found further evidence of
reinforcement. While acknowledging that no campaign can succeed without the Internet,
their research shows that the Internet attracted very few new or marginalized participants
to the campaigns. They looked at how candidates presented themselves on line, how it
compared to traditional media, and the influence of Internet-based political campaigns on
voter knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. Methods included a series of randomized
sample telephone surveys conducted nationally and in Missouri. In addition, Bimber and
Davis conducted controlled experiments in four cities among those who visited campaign
Web sites. They argue that as the Internet becomes more diffuse, then effects will become
even smaller as the Internet audience will change from one that is more purposive and
interested to one that is more like a mass audience. Unlike television, the Internet is not a
captive audience and cannot do what television and newspapers can which to “saturate a
large audience with messages that interrupt citizens’ focus and direct it toward the
campaign and, more specifically, a candidate’s message” (p. 147). They argue while
advertising can capture an audience in an unsuspecting state, the Internet is more
directed. The Internet is most successful at mobilizing activists, the most politically
interested, to volunteer, donate, communicate with others, and ultimately, though not
assuredly, vote. Further, they found that people will use the Internet to satisfy their
campaign information needs, but will not produce mobilization. Thus, they conclude that
rather than narrowing the digital political divide, the Internet will expand it.
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Scheufele and Nisbet (2002) concluded that while Internet use leads to an increase
in personal perceptions of political efficacy, it does not lead to “objectively measurable
changes in political involvement or information” (p.70). Looking at Internet users and
non-Internet users, they find no evidence that Internet use led to traditional political
participation. Scheufele and Nisbet examined three types of Internet use, political
information seeking, entertainment use, and nonpolitical information seeking. None of
these types of online usage had any impact on traditional forms of participation (attended
a neighborhood meeting, writing a letter to a local candidate, working for a political
campaign, contacting a local public official, and contributing money to a local
organization). Consistent with Verba et al., the authors found that the SES variables
explains much of the variance but newspaper reading is the strongest predictor of
traditional participation. Other media variables, viewing television for news or
entertainment, had no impact on traditional participation.
Jennings and Zeitner (2003) showed that while Internet had positive effects on
several indicators of civic engagement, the authors concluded that there was evidence
suggesting that the Internet would mirror the inequalities already in place regarding who
participates in the electoral process and who does not. This study, therefore, falls within
the reinforcement camp of studies. They used a quasi-experimental design employing a
panel design to examine, longitudinally, changes in civic engagement among users and
non-users of the Internet. Among Internet users, the more politically involved, the more
likely they were to use the Internet for political information. This was especially true of
the younger cohort in the sample than the older one. The benefit of Jennings and
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Zeitner’s study is that they used the panel data to examine individual level changes over
time.
In two studies published in 1998 and 2003, Johnson and Kaye found that people
who go online for political information are already politically engaged. However, those
online tended to be less trustful of government and less likely to vote than those more
trustful or offline. Thus, those online when these studies were conducted, perhaps were
more politically extreme and cynical than those who did not. In their 1998 study they
found that while the Internet had a positive and significant impact on political interest,
there was a negative impact between reliance on the Internet and trust in government,
efficacy, and voting behavior (1996 elections). More importantly for the reinforcement
theory, those who are more web reliant are not any more likely to vote or express interest
in the campaign than more casual users. Johnson and Kaye make another interesting
assertion:
While politically interested web users participate in politics and believe they have
the power to influence the system, this group remains distrustful of politicians
with levels of distrust highest among the heavier users of the Internet. However,
scholars have suggested that the mixture of high efficacy and low trust might
actually be desirable (Johnson and Kaye, 1998, p131-32).
Distrust might lead to citizen action. However, Nie and Erbring (2001) find that
sociability decreases and alienation and societal disconnection increases with Internet
use.
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In a more recent study, consistent with reinforcement theory, Johnson and Kaye
concluded that those who are politically interested are more likely to seek out political
information from the media more so than the general public (Johnson and Kaye, 2004).
“Political attitudes may have little influence on online credibility because studies suggest
that online users rather than being socially isolated and apathetic, are politically
interested and more likely to seek out information from the media than the general
public” (p. 626). The authors conducted an online survey aimed at blog users,
representing diverse ideologies and weblogs. Their sampling technique was a “Snowball
design,” so they had some difficulty in building a representative sample. They conclude
that the web has moved to a more demographically mainstream place from a bastion of
young, white, affluent, highly-educated, males.
In another study showing reinforcement with a potential for mobilization, Solop
(2001) found that the Internet attracted both those with a higher level of education, and
younger voters. In this study on the effects of Internet voting, Solop examined
differences between those choosing to vote via the Internet and those voting in the
traditional manner at a polling place during a Democratic primary in Arizona. Solop
initially finds that more affluent, better educated, white, and younger voters were more
likely to choose the Internet voting option. A logistic regression showed that the best
predictors for Internet voting were education and age. Additionally, Internet voters
scored higher on a scale of political efficacy than non-Internet voters. The findings seem,
on the one hand, to provide evidence for the reinforcement hypothesis, and the
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mobilization hypothesis, but on the other, it shows that younger voters are more attracted
to Internet voting.
In a study among those already online, Norris (2001), finds that a virtual political
system will “most likely facilitate further knowledge, interest and activism of those who
are already most predisposed toward civic engagement, reinforcing patterns of political
participation” (p. 228). Norris studied the characteristics of online users versus nonusers
in the European Union in 1999.
However, some question whether the Internet is a separate medium for politics,
representing a major paradigm shift. They argue that it is merely an extension of the
offerings of the main stream media (MSM), supplementing other sources of political
information (Hill & Hughes, 1998; Kaye, 1998). If anything, the Internet foils the
MSM’s gatekeeper status.
Weber, Loumakis and Bergman (2003) found a positive relationship between
engagement on the Internet and civic and political participation. However, it appears to
exacerbate the socioeconomic bias already exhibited by civic and political participation
prior to the rise of the Internet. This study suffers from self-selection bias in the sampling
procedure because they used Survey 2000, an online survey, which used a nonprobability, self-selected sample.
With the wide array of information available in cyberspace, citizens need to be
able to know where to access political information and possess the necessary skills to
trust the information. Internet proficiency is closely related to online political
participation. DiGennaro and Dutton (2006) found in their study of Internet use and
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political participation in the United Kingdom that fifty-six percent of highly proficient
Internet users participated in at least one political function, compared with 33% of
moderate experts, and 19% of the novices. They base their findings on the 2003 and
2005 Oxford Internet Studies (OxIS), a national telephone survey of Internet use in the
UK. While DiGennarro and Dutton’s findings point to reinforcement—those with the
necessary skills are most likely to participate, the authors still see a greater opportunity
for mobilization by arguing that building Internet skills should increase both internal and
external political efficacy and thus increase active participation.
Xenos and Moy (2007) conducted a secondary analysis on 2004 ANES data to
address two hypotheses related to the Internet and civic and political engagement. The
first: exposure to online political information is positively related to civic and political
engagement. The second: The effects of online political information exposure on civic
and political engagement are contingent on levels of political interest. The results
generally pointed to reinforcement. They found support for differential effects,
specifically that participation was more contingent on levels of political interest. Using
the Internet for participation was greater for those with higher levels of political interest.
On the positive side, regardless of level of political interest, the Internet use increased
levels of political knowledge.
A paper presented by Kroh and Neiss (2009) at the 2009 meeting of the American
Political Science Association asserts that cross-sectional studies attempting to address the
mobilization versus reinforcement questions fall short in that most participation results
from “unspecified background variables” and “self-selection of politically active citizens
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into Internet use.” The Internet benefits, at best, are small and marginal since those who
are most likely to use the Internet for political participation are those already engaged.
The data source is a longitudinal panel conducted in Germany called the German SocioEconomic Panel Study (SOEP) from 1995 through 2008. The authors measure selfselection by analyzing the panel data across time beginning in 1995 when the Internet
was not widely used in the population through 2008. This allows them to create a
“before and after” test for the introduction of the Internet. The authors analyze
differences in political engagement by comparing Internet users and non-users using
cross-sectional data from the 2005 SOEP. The authors use a very limited measure of
Internet access—either one has it or does not. This presents a problem in that that those
who are more active online may be very different from those who spend little time online,
yet they are both categorized together. I address this problem in my own research in
cases 2-4 (see Chapter 3 methodology). Second, their measures of political engagement
are limited to party strength, political interest, and active political work. They find that
Internet access is a relative weak predictor of active work in politics and political interest.
They find that “further education” is a somewhat stronger predictor. Their study, like
others, does not take into account the interaction between Internet use and education to
determine if Internet access moderates the effect of education, which would provide
evidence of a greater impact of the Internet on participation.
2-2: A Case for Mobilization: A Review of the Literature on Online Participation
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While there have been studies supporting the reinforcement thesis, scholars have
found some support for mobilization, albeit limited in nature. A common thread across
many of these studies has been youth appeal of the Internet.
A study of 18 to 29 year old citizens’ use of the Internet for campaign purposes in
the 2004 presidential campaign shows that online campaigns strongly facilitated political
engagement among those with at least some interest in the campaign. (Georgetown
University/Brigham Young University 2004 Presidential Election Internet Study—a 3
wave panel conducted during October-November, 2004 in Owen, 2006). While voters in
this study used the Internet primarily to search for political information, a significant
number used it to express their opinions and to become active online in the election.
Shah, Kwak and Holbert (2001) found that those most likely to be mobilized are
younger people and those with the greatest familiarity and experience with the Internet
regardless of socioeconomic status. Their major research aim was to understand how
“patterns of new media use that provide information or contain the possibility of
strengthening strong ties are positively related to the individual level production of social
capital—including civic voluntarism. They measure voluntarism based on self-reported
frequency of activity. While overall Internet use had a negative impact on civic
engagement, it was significant predictor of civic engagement among “GenXers” (defined
as those between the ages of 18-34). Television viewing, either generally, or for “hard
news” viewing had no effect on civic engagement for “GenXers” or any other age group.
Shah et al. (2007), in a more recent study, looked at whether online news
information seeking and political discussion leads to political participation, found that
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using the Internet and the Web as a means for information and messaging leads to
political participation. However, they show no evidence of whether those participating
are new to the political process. Their theoretical model accounted “for effects of the
Internet use on participation while also accounting for a much broader array of
communication behaviors” (p. 683)” Their findings suggest that young people may be the
best targets of mobilization by the Internet, especially through political messaging. They
suggest future research look at the effects across age groups.
Quintelier and Vissers (2008) studied the online habits of sixteen year olds in
Belgium and hypothesized that the more time young people spend online the more likely
they will be to participate in politics offline and different forms of Internet use will have
positive and/or negative effects on offline political participation. Using a large sample
survey of Belgian youth, the authors find that frequency of Internet use has no effect on
offline political participation. Rather, variables such as political interest, membership
associations, and parental discussion have a greater impact. However, some online
activities, such as blogging, forwarding political emails, and following the news online
have a positive effect on offline participation. While the age of the subjects of this study
is too young for comparability to what I did with the NAES data, the important finding is
the relationship between certain online participation activities and offline participation—
something which I investigate in this dissertation.
There has been some empirical evidence of mobilization across all age groups.
Tolbert and McNeal ( 2003) found those with access to the Internet and online election
news were significantly more likely to report voting in the 1996 and 2000 presidential

31
elections (using NES data) even after controlling for a SES, partisanship, attitudes,
traditional media use, and state environmental factors. The dependent variable was
voting and the causal mechanism for turnout was Internet access and reading election
news online.
Mossbacher, Tolbert and McNeal (2008) empirically showed the relationship
between engaging in such online activities as chat rooms and email and voting. For
example, “the probability of voting increases between 21 and 39 percent, comparing
individuals who regularly send and receive political e-mails, with those who rarely do.
(page 85). The range of probability depends on the impact of other media. For example,
heavy users of television and newspapers for news are less likely to vote as a result of
sending or receiving political emails, and are more likely to vote as a result of sending or
receiving emails if they do not use television or newspapers as a information source.
This is in line with Rosenstone and Hansen’s work (1993).
In addition to sampling issues, what most studies on mobilization have failed to
do is to better specify the nature of the Internet activities. Doing so would create a
clearer understanding of the effects (Shah et al., 2002).
Gibson, Lusoli and Ward (2005) also argue scholars show an incomplete
understanding of online political participation, most specifically by excluding
examination of contextualized online resources that may encourage mobilization. Gibson
et al. go beyond prior studies of the Internet and political participation by widening the
understanding of online political participation as well as introducing Internet-specific
variables as part of their contextualization model of Internet effects. In examining the
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level of political participation by those who are and are not Internet users just prior to the
2002 British parliamentary elections, they found support for their contextualization
model showing that the Internet is expanding the number of those who are politically
active among those who had been previously disengaged in more traditional offline
political activities. The difference in their research is the inclusion of the contextualized
variables not typically found in prior studies of online political participation.
De Huniga et al. (2009) show the impact of the Internet on the political
environment in their study of how reading web logs (blogs) affects participation. They
find that blog usage significantly increases online political participation and discussion,
but has no effect on offline participation. Missing from their sets of controls is political
interest, so it is difficult to determine how blog usage would impact participation by
controlling for that. However, one could treat one of their media variables, “political
book readership” as a proxy. Additionally, they find that media use in general minimally
predicts participation, except that using online news sources does significantly predict
online participation. In my dissertation, I treat blog reading and posting as a form of
participation, so I am unable to compare De Huniga et al.’s findings with my own. The
import of their research is they find a relationship between blog reading and online
participation, but no connection between Internet usage and offline participation,
generally. Therefore, the shows some evidence of mobilization, but again without
controls for political interest, one cannot be certain. The study was based on a secondary
data analysis of Pew Internet and American Life data from the 2008 campaign. The
definition of blog usage is very general and as the authors state, there is no distinction for
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level of blog traffic or blog content. Therefore the relationship between blog use and
participation could have been underestimated.
Two papers presented at the 2009 meeting of the American Political Science
Association held in Toronto, Canada examined how online social networking and online
social capital had an effect on offline participation and engagement. Feezell, Conroy, and
Guerrero studied Facebook users to measure their level of offline political engagement.
They conducted a survey among political science students who were actively on
Facebook and found a positive linkage between Facebook usage and offline participation.
Using OLS regression and an aggregate measure of participation (which they do not
define in their paper) as the dependent variable, they find that membership on Facebook
is associated with offline political participation. However, while Facebook users are
more likely to participate offline, the authors find no significant effect of increased
political knowledge among the users. The primary drawback I see with this study is the
use of a sample of political science students. By choice or by nature, this group is
probably more likely to participate offline in any event compared with non-political
science students. While this is a serious limitation, the research moves in the right
direction and is but one example of the research that is currently taking place to
determine the impact of the Internet on participation.
Gibson and McAllister (2009) also presented a paper on virtual social capital and
civic engagement and participation. Using data collected from the 2007 Australian
Election Study (AES), the authors found that building a bonding type of social capital is
positively associated with political efficacy and active social engagement than is a
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bridging type of social capital. Building a bonding form of social capital simply means
using the Internet to contact others one knows already in an offline context. Bridging
refers to expanding a network to a wider and more diverse group. Further, younger
people tended to be more likely to engage in this form of social network building than
older people. The implication of this study is that targeting tighter networks comprised
mainly of friends and family will be more effective in encouraging participation and
perhaps support around a candidate or issue.
Both Feezell, Conroy, and Guerrero and Gibson and McAllister’s papers provide
further evidence that the Internet has a positive impact on political engagement and
participation. However, neither study go far enough in showing that it is the Internet
itself which helps foster such engagement and participation.
2-3: Evidence of both Mobilization and Reinforcement
There have been at least two studies showing evidence of both reinforcement and
mobilization. I review two of them in this section. Best and Krueger (2005) find
evidence of both reinforcement and mobilization in their examination of offline and
online political participation. The best predictors of online political participation are not
civic skills (e.g., attending a community meeting, sending a letter to an elected official,
planning or chairing a meeting, giving a presentation or speech) but political interest and
Internet skills (e.g., designing a web page, sending an attachment via email, downloading
a file, and posting something on the Internet), suggesting that online participation
behavior differs from offline participation behavior. They support reinforcement in
finding that higher SES and highly politically interested people are more likely to
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participate either offline or online. Internet skills, a predictor of online political
participation, are related to higher SES. However, an important exception to their finding
is young people. Controlling for everything else, younger people have greater Internet
skills, and their levels of online participation is not lower than older people, whereas,
everything being equal, older people are more likely to engage in traditional political
participation than younger people. Age was not a significant predictor of participation,
so the authors point to the Internet skills as a key determinant.
Kwak et al. (2004) find evidence for reinforcement and mobilization in their study
of the relationship between high-speed Internet and knowledge and participation. Using a
differential gains model, they posit that as technology changes and improves, i.e., the
adoption of broadband, the patterns of “political and social consequences that are
different from those introduced by the adoption of narrowband Internet” (p. 427). Since
broadband offers greater entertainment opportunities the gains would be smaller than a
switch from no Internet to narrowband (slower service). While Kwak et al. found that
improved technologies—narrowband to broadband—led to greater socializing (nonpolitical) and “soft knowledge” (non-political, but highly publicized), it had no effect on
increased political discussion or “hard knowledge” (political and international issue
knowledge). Moving from no Internet to narrowband, however, did significantly increase
political discussion. Improved technology, they argue, is more in line with civic
disengagement (citing Shah, 2001) rather than civic engagement. The problems I see
with their study are a very small sample size, limited geographic area of study, and
Internet access was measured at home only. Additionally, the authors did not measure
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Internet frequency in any way, they only were interested whether someone had
narrowband or broadband, which of course is critical to their study, but by measuring
frequency or literacy, one could better determine the effect of narrowband. The study
shows evidence for reinforcement because there is no effect on civic engagement when
moving to a faster technology. Mobilization is seen when going from no Internet to
narrowband. Finally, the study is somewhat dated since fewer services offer the slower
narrowband technology.
The studies reviewed in this chapter point to a rather inconclusive judgment about
whether the Internet and new media are mobilizing forces or tools for reinforcement. As
the Internet becomes more diffuse and as the digital divide narrows with later adopters
going online, the mix of Internet users may change dramatically, becoming more
representative of the population as a whole. Yet, prior studies point to youth as great
hope for mobilization. There is significant potential for future research, especially for
models based on more contextualized measures of online political participation, similar to
what Gibson et al. conducted

I plan to undertake research that will be based on the

foundations of Verba et al. and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). However, I will expand
on traditional activities and incorporate those political participation activities which
extend the traditional ones and will take into account the uniqueness of the information
and communication technologies in the design, to provide a more academically sound
answer to the reinforcement and mobilization debate.
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2-4: The 2008 Election in the Context of this Research
Before describing the methodology for my research, it is important to
understand the context in which this study was conducted. The 2008 election is arguably
the singularly most unique presidential contest in the history of the United States. In
2008, Americans saw a convergence of several factors hitherto not seen in any national
election—an African American nominee for president, a female presidential candidate
who was considered the front-runner going into the early primaries, a female vice
presidential nominee, a collapsing national economy, and extensive use of online tools.
Hillary Clinton, a former First Lady and at the time a U.S. Senator, was the Democratic
party front runner in the period prior to the first caucuses in Iowa, and remained a strong
contender throughout the primaries and caucuses season. Sarah Palin, at the time the
governor of Alaska, was selected by Republican party nominee, Senator John McCain to
be his vice presidential running mate. Palin was the first Republican woman to appear on
a national ticket. Barack Obama, a U.S. Senator was the first African American to be
nominated by a major political party and the first to be elected U.S. president. The
overriding theme of the 2008 election was about hope and change . According to his
campaign advisors and supporters, Barack Obama was seen as the candidate who was
going to turn the hopes of those who voted for him into real change (Jamieson, 2009).
There were also numerous media reports about the great enthusiasm the election
would generate among the voting age population. Some of the headlines readers saw in
late Fall, 2008 included, “Obama campaign banks on enthusiasm” (St. Petersburg SunTimes, September, 28, 2008); “Registration gain favor Democrats; Voter rolls swelling in
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key states” (Washington Post, October 6, 2008); and “A race to keep voters engaged”
(New York Times, October 18, 2008). More people voted in this election than any other,
and turnout as a proportion of the voting eligible population increased slightly from 2004
from 60.1 percent to 61.7 percent (United States Election Project, April 26, 2009).
Further, the Census Bureau reported a significant proportional increase among minorities
and the young. Based on estimates from the Center for Population Statistics (CPS) survey
conducted following the 2008 election, two million more African Americans and two
million more Hispanics cast ballots than the Census Bureau reported for the election in
2004. The change in voters aged 18 to 24 increased significantly by two percentage
points to 49 percent in 2008 from 47 percent in 2004 U.S. Census Bureau, July 20,
2009)3.
The Internet had been used effectively as a fund raising tool in the 2000
campaign, especially by John McCain (Kaye, 2009) and as a fund raising and organizing
tool in the 2004 campaigns, especially by Howard Dean. The role of the Internet
expanded considerably in the 2008 campaign as all the candidates sought to take
advantage of the technology and observers noted its many uses and forms in the
campaign. The Internet was utilized by all actors in the electoral process—campaigns,
media, bloggers, advocates for both candidates, interest groups, and the general voting
public. In 2008 the Internet was not only used to raise money, but to contact potential
supporters to amass large databases for mobilization purposes, and social networks to
produce an efficient well-organized campaign communication and Get Out the Vote
3

Census Bureau conducted the November 2008 Voting and Registration Survey as a supplement to that
month's Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly labor force survey in which interviews
are conducted in approximately 56,000 households across the country.
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(GOTV) effort. YouTube, a peer to peer video sharing site, which did not exist in 2004,
served an important function as both a campaign tool to inform and as a way to become
informed. Viral videos and emails quickly and efficiently made their way through
cyberspace to spread both accurate and deceptive information about the candidates.
Political news sites served as aggregators of campaign news, opinion, and polling to help
feed both the media and the general public. Blogs of all political and ideological
persuasions helped promote or attack candidates throughout the campaign, link to other
blogs, news sites, and political sites, and offered forums for people to express their views
online. The Internet also served a fact-checking functions with sites like FactCheck.org
and PolitiFact.com. For example, FactCheck.org pointed out deceptions in each
candidate’s tax, energy, Social Security, and Iraq war positions (FactCheck.org,
September 25, 2008).
The Internet was also a source for political advertising, but not on the scale of
broadcast and cable in dollars spent. For example, the Obama campaign, which spent
more money than all other candidates, allocated just 6 percent of the $380 million
advertising budget to Internet advertising while it allocated 85 percent to television (FEC
estimates, January 2008 as cited by Kay, 2009). Of course, buying advertising time on
television and cable is significantly more expensive, but the disparity between television
spending and Internet spending is so great, that one can only conclude that most of the
advertising efforts were placed on television. However, perhaps more spending on
Internet advertising would have been advisable since a Pew Center for the People and
the Press finding showed that a third of voters cited the Internet as their primary source
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for election news and 72 percent cited television as their primary source (Pew, October
31, 2008).
Internet advertising held very little persuasive powers compared with broadcast or
cable television (Kaye, 2009). However, the campaigns attempted to use online
advertising as a persuasive tool, but mainly the Internet was used to communicate
information through advertising. In the case of the Obama campaign, the Internet served
their campaign best as a means of building their grassroots volunteer organization..
According to Jon Carson, national field director for the Obama campaign, the Internet
was the net and not the engine. The online efforts of the Obama campaign were targeted
mainly toward quickly mobilizing volunteers toward a number of activities. The Internet
was used to build rapid response teams from state to state. Most of the success in voter
contact by the Obama campaign resulted from the more traditional field methods such as
going door to door and telephoning to recruit and solicit donations. Yet, without the
massive database built from the Internet, they argued the ground forces would never had
been as successful (Jamieson, 2009).
To illustrate the significant role played by the Internet in 2008, I present some
figures from the 2008 general election related to the Obama campaign. During the 2008
campaign, the Obama campaign collected “13 million email addresses, more than a
million cell phone numbers, and a half-billion dollars online”. Further, the Obama
campaign utilized many different forms of online communication and social media.
These included signing on to My.BarackObama.com to create profiles, communicate
with other supporters, and plan and execute hundreds of thousands of offline events such
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as offline dinners and fundraisers. As previously mentioned, volunteers could go online
to download lists of swing voters and their contact information in key battleground
states.. In the final four days of the campaign, this database allowed supporters to make
three million calls to voters. Further, information from the database was analyzed to help
volunteers identify potential voters to tap for support through door-to-door activity in
those final days. While McCain had a web presence and online efforts it was miniscule
compared to the Obama effort. “Obama had four times the number of Facebook
supporters, 24 times the Twitter devotees, and three times the visitors to his site in the
final campaign week. The public watched about 15 million hours of Obama campaign
videos on YouTube” (Ratliff, 2009).
Furthermore, in 2008, as in 2004, the Internet played a major role in fundraising.
The media portrayed the Internet as source of fundraising from small (single donations
totaling less than $200) versus large donors (e.g., USA Today, May 2, 2008), with the
assumption that these small donors were those contacted though and subsequently
donated through the Internet. However, the non-partisan Campaign Finance Institute
concluded after an analysis of Federal Election Commission (FEC) data that Obama
raised 80 percent more from large donors than small donors. This represents a much
higher rate than his opponents and any prior presidential candidate. Additionally, the CFI
analysis showed that Obama raised about the same percentage from small donors
(amounts of less than $200) in 2008, as George W. Bush did in 2004 (Malbin, 2008).
While it is clear that the Internet played a large and important role in the
campaign, for the Internet to mobilize effectively, those segments of society politically
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marginalized in the past, at least must be able to access the Internet to engage and
participate. The digital divide has existed since the advent of the Internet and
consequently there are large disparities among those who have and do not have access to
the Internet and thus providing advantage to those who have access. This digital divide
has existed since the Internet’s introduction (Norris,2001). Further, reinforcement
theorists argue that those who are already who are highly politically interested are more
likely to use the Internet. In the next section, I present descriptive data from the 2008 and
2004 NAES data sets showing the levels of Internet access, usage, political interest, and a
traditional measure of political participation based on Verba et al. (1995). The index
made no differentiation between online and offline participation since NAES did not
measure online participation in 2004. The purpose of the index is to establish at the most
descriptive level whether there are any differences in the levels of access, interest and
participation between the two election years. These baseline numbers serve to provide
context to the analysis presented in the main findings of this dissertation.
2-5: Data on Internet Use, Political Interest, and Participation from the 2008 and
2004 NAES
Tables 2-1 and 2-2 present descriptive date for all adults and among key
subgroups collected during periods of 2004 and 2008.

The data is presented for two

broad reasons: first, to assess the level of change in Internet access, political interest, and
participation between the 2004 and 2008 elections; and, second, to assess changes within
the 2008 election year from the primaries to the general election. The descriptive
analysis helps to establish baseline and context for the main analysis presented in the
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findings section. Internet access is a broad measure meant to show the level of access in
the United States and to establish whether the digital divide continues in the general
public. The level of political interest is measured by the proxy of how closely one is
following the presidential campaign. The participation measure is a combined index
aggregating five activities: persuading others to support or oppose a candidate, doing
work on behalf of a candidate, donating money to a campaign, attending a meeting or
rally in support of a candidate, and wearing a campaign button, or placing a lawn sign or
bumper sticker. The five participation measures were utilized in both the 2004 and 2008
NAES surveys and do not distinguish between online and offline participation activities.
The access data from Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show evidence of a continued digital
divide between those who have access and those who do not have access to the Internet.
The numbers scarcely change from 2008 to 2004. Higher educated and more affluent
adults continue to hold a clear advantage in the level of Internet access, and equally
important, participation did not significantly change between 2004 and 2008 either.
Demographically, participation remained about the same in 2008 when compared
to 2004, except for younger people and African Americans. The data show a slight
decrease among 18 to 29 year olds and a significant increase among African Americans
in participation. African Americans were potentially energized to participate because of
Barack Obama, but controls were inserted for Obama support in my analysis to account
for those biases. Despite everything said and written about young people participating in
the 2008 election, the decrease is surprising. However, this measure of participation does
not include online activities and therefore might be misleading, and thus furthers the
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argument to include online participation activities when measuring participation
behavior.
The 2008 campaign did, however, generate a significantly higher level of interest
when compared to 2004. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show a 14 point increase in the level of
political interest between 2008 and 2004. The increase in interest is evident across all
demographic subgroups presented in the table. Most notable in 2008 is the relatively low
level of interest expressed by the youngest group. However, this number is consistent
with the 2004 data among 18 to 29 year olds.
Participation levels did increase significantly between the primaries and general
election period--generally in the double digits. The relative proportions remained about
the same except for 18 to 29 year olds were there was a small increase relative to a larger
increase for older people.
Looking closely at 2008, comparing the general election to the primaries, Table 22 shows slight increases in Internet access as the campaign progresses but the same
differences are found among the groups. Net usage, measured by online frequency (asked
after the primaries and caucus season ended), is significantly higher for the advantaged
groups, except for non-African Americans who were not significantly higher in their
usage than African Americans.
The description of the online landscape suggests that mobilizing will be difficult
as long as the digital divide remains wide between the “digital haves” and “digital have
nots.” The levels of traditional participation remain relatively static when compared to
2004, but increases among African American and decreases among young adults point to
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two critical trends. First, there certainly was greater enthusiasm about the 2008 election
among African Americans, in general, but the data does not show a similar level of
increased enthusiasm among younger adults. However this could be a result of not taking
into account online activities. This dissertation will demonstrate that young people were
more likely to engage in online participation behavior.
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Table 2-1: Internet Use, Campaign Interest, and Participation Activity (Traditional) 2004 NAES4
All
College
Not
Adults Graduate College
%
Or
Graduate
Higher
%
%

Male
%

Female
%

Age 18- Age 30 or AfricanNot
Household Household
29
older American African- Income: Income:
%
%
%
American $100K Less than
%
Or more
$100K
%
%

2004 GENERAL ELECTION
Have Internet Access (n=55,550))
Following campaign very closely
(n=39,543)
Participation (n=5,051)

76.1
33.2

90.8***
41.5***

67.0
28.1

78.9***
37.7***

73.9
29.5

84.6***
17.5***

74.7
35.9

72.6***
30.6***

76.4
33.4

94.7***
44.3***

72.8
31.2

57.9

65.5***

53.1

58.1*

57.7

56.2

58.2

58.6

57.8

67.3***

56.1

***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05

4

Use of the Internet at least several hours per day not asked in 2004. The 2004 participation data were collected from September 20, 2004 through November 2,
2004, when the questions were on the survey. The general election access and campaign interest data were collected beginning March 9, 2004, when the general
election effectively began as Sen. John Kerry became the presumptive Democratic nominee and President George W. Bush began airing his first general election
ads.
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Table 2-2: Internet Use, Campaign Interest, and Participation Activity: 2008 NAES5
All College
Not
Adults Graduate College
%
Or
Graduate
Higher
%
%

Male
%

Female Age 18- Age 30 AfricanNot
Household Household
%
29
or older American African- Income: Income:
%
%
%
American $100K Less than
%
Or more
$100K
%
%

2008 PRIMARIES
Have Internet Access (n=29,771)

76.6

90.6

67.4

80.5

73.6

86.3

75.7

71.5

77.0

95.1

71.6

Following campaign very closely
(n =29,596)
Participation (RETROSPECTIVE)
(n=2,217)
2008 GENERAL ELECTION

40.3

48.3

35.0

43.1

38.2

21.4

41.9

45.4

39.9

49.3

37.9

39.8

46.9***

34.9

38.7

41.3

45.1

39.3

53.8***

38.7

47.8***

37.6

74.3***
36.9***

79.2
39.6

95.6***
51.8***

74.2
35.1

53.8***

46.6

57.7***

44.3

66.9**

57.4

66.5***

55.2

Have Internet Access (n=24,266)
78.9 91.4***
70.4
81.9***
76.6
87.1*** 78.2
Use the Internet at least several hours per 39.4 47.0***
32.6
42.2***
37.3
44.6*** 39.0
day ++ (n=19,134)
Following campaign very closely
47.2 55.7***
41.2
50.0***
45.1
28.8*** 48.6***
(n=19,134)
Participation (RETROSPECTIVE)
58.0 64.3***
52.6
60.4**
56.1
51.2^
58.3
(n=3,737)
***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05,
5

^Chi Square is significant p<.10

Use of the Internet at least several hours per day not asked during the 2008 primaries and caucus seasons. The 2008 participation data represented in this table reflect a
retrospective measure of participation, while access, interest and usage were collected during the campaigns. The 2008 Primaries retrospective data were collected from July 2,
2008 through August 4, 2008-when the survey asked about primary activity. The contemporaneous primaries access and interest data were collected from Jan. 2, 2008 through
June 10, 2008—during the primaries season. The 2008 General Election access, usage and interest data were collected from July 2, 2008 through November 2, 2008. The
retrospective general election participation data were collected from November 5, 2008 through November 12, 2008 among a panel of respondents who completed a survey
initially during the General Election period in order to collect data reflecting participation from the 2008 general election campaign.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES AND STUDY DESIGN
This dissertation addresses three research questions related to the role of the
Internet in campaigns and elections: (1) Does the Internet mobilize new participants or
reinforce existing biases in participation? (2) Does mobilization or reinforcement vary
depending on whether participation occurs offline or online? (3) Does mobilization or
reinforcement depend upon the ways in which candidates utilize the Internet in their
campaigns? The theoretical mechanism that will drive mobilization is the decentralized
nature of the Internet which lowers communication and networking costs, providing a
convenient, easy, and efficient means of acting and being acted upon by a campaign and
its supporters. The outcome would be an increase in the number of those less likely to
engage in the political process to take action and participate. In this chapter I describe
these three research questions and the related hypotheses that emerge from them in
greater detail. I will then turn to a description of the research design, data, measures and
methods I will use to test these hypotheses.
3-1: Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does using the Internet mobilize new participants or
reinforce the participation of the already engaged?
Whether Internet use alleviates or aggravates existing biases in political
participation is at the heart of this dissertation. This dissertation investigates whether the
extent to which the Internet acts as a mobilizing mechanism includes mobilizing the types
of citizens who are traditionally less engaged (i.e., the young, the less educated, the
economically disadvantaged, minorities and women). At the same time however, Internet
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use also has shown demographic biases in favor of the better educated, the economically
advantaged, and whites. How these sometimes competing, sometimes reinforcing
patterns affect levels of participation is unclear. As the previous chapter makes clear, the
answer to this question is uncertain since prior research provides both theories and
findings in support of both mobilization and reinforcement. For this reason RQ1
generates the following competing hypotheses, each of which can be compared to the
“null hypothesis,” which assumes no effect from Internet use:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged
citizens.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Using the Internet will reinforce the participation of
already engaged citizens.
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Does mobilization or reinforcement vary depending
on whether participation occurs offline or online?
As also discussed in Chapter One, the potential mobilizing or reinforcing effects of the
Internet are further complicated by the fact that the Internet not only provides a means for
becoming more informed or motivated, but also an avenue for actually participating (e.g.,
by contributing money online). As a result, its mobilizing or reinforcing effects may vary
by whether the resulting participation is online or offline. Again extant theory and
research is equivocal on this issue, leading to a second set of competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged
citizens to participate offline.

50
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Using the Internet will reinforce the offline participation of
already engaged citizens.
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): Using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged
citizens to participate online.
Hypothesis 2d (H2d): Using the Internet will reinforce the online participation of
already engaged citizens.
Research Question 3(RQ3): Does mobilization or reinforcement depend upon the
ways in which candidates utilize the Internet in their campaigns?
The final research question to be answered is the extent to which mobilization or
reinforcement is dependent on the effectiveness with which different candidates and their
campaigns utilize the Internet. As Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) posit in their work on
political mobilization, recruitment and candidate contact play a critical role in any
campaign. Through direct and indirect methods of recruitment and activation, campaigns
build up their organization and base of support. A more effective activation effort leads
to greater success in the electoral outcome. Social networks help get the word out,
therefore multiplying the effects of mobilization. Campaigns use the Internet in an
attempt to maximize voter outreach in terms of monetary contributions and support.
Online recruitment gets the message out to the strongest supporters, with the hope of
spurring them into action and also helps to expand this message to those who may be
interested but up until the point of contact were uncertain how to act.
Therefore, I hypothesize
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Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized to
participate than those contacted offline
The popular perception (supported by some evidence) that in the 2008
presidential primaries Barack Obama was more effective than Hillary Clinton in using the
Internet as a mobilizing tool, the Obama campaign may have been more likely to send out
online messages to potential supporters, than the Clinton campaign was to their potential
supporters. Given this perception, I further hypothesize
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Voters for Obama in the primaries were more likely to
have been contacted online by the Obama campaign than were voters for Clinton
in the primaries.
Hypothesis 3c (H3c): The Obama campaign online contact would more likely
lead to political participation than the Clinton campaign online contact.
3-2 Study Design
In order to test the hypotheses and begin to answer the research questions described
above, I utilized data from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Telephone survey. In
this section I provide an overview of this data set and how I employed it through a series
of discrete “case studies,” discuss the specific measures of key variables used in my
analyses, and describe the statistical methods that make up the bulk of my analyses.
3-2.1 Data Source: National Annenberg Election Telephone Survey (NAES)
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The data source for this research is the telephone component of the multimodal6
2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES). The component consisted of a
roughly 100 item, 30 minute pre-election telephone survey utilizing a national rolling
cross-sectional (RCS) telephone design, 7 and a shorter post-election telephone panel
survey. The surveys were designed to measure the dynamics of the 2008 U.S.
presidential campaign. The respondents were adults, age eighteen or older living in the
United States. The field period for the pre-election survey was December 17, 2007
through November 3, 2008 (day before Election Day), producing a robust sample size of
57,967 nationally representative household interviews.8 The post-election panel consisted
of re-contacts with 3,737 respondents from the pre-election survey and was fielded from
November 5, 2008 through November 12, 2008.
My research is divided into four different phases of the 2008 election cycle,
which I present as case studies. In Case 1, the data are from a major portion of the
primaries and caucuses period. Data were collected from February 1 through March 10,
2008 (N=4,812).9 In Case 2, I utilize the data collected during part of the post-primaries

6

The 2008 NAES was conducted as two separate studies: A telephone survey instrument looking at
aggregated changes over time fielded by ABT-SRBI of New York, NY and an online panel measuring
individual changes across five waves conducted by Knowledge Networks of Menlo Park, CA.
7
Briefly, the RCS approach is composed of a series of repeated cross-sections collected over time. The
benefit of using repeated cross-sections is the ability to identify changes between two or more points in
time. In the NAES RCS design, each cross-section is composed individuals selecting using a random-digit
dialing (RDD) technique. NAES is run on a daily release schedule, and is managed in such a way that the
date of an interview is considered a random event. In this way, researchers can treat each days as an
individual, representative study (Romer et al., 2006).
8
Nationally representative of the 48 contiguous United States; no interviews are conducted in Alaska and
Hawaii.
9
Case 1 encompasses the period when thirty-nine primaries and caucuses took place, including the twentytwo states on Super Tuesday, February 5, 2008. The states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
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and caucuses period, July 2 through August 4, 2008 (N=2,217). In Case 3, the data
collection covered the time of the pre-convention period through part of the general
election period, from August 8 through October 2, 2008 (N=6,832).10 Case 4 consists of
the post-election period from November 5 through November 12, 2008 (N=2,026). The
cases are structured in such a way to uniquely answer my research questions and address
my hypotheses.
Table 3-1 displays the time periods and sample sizes within the cases, along with
an indication of which hypotheses and questions have been addressed by the available
information:

Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In addition, the District of
Columbia held its primary on February 12.
10
The Case 3 period ends on October 2 because other pressing questions had to become part of the survey
related to the presidential debates, therefore we made the decision to suspend the participation questions.
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Table 3-1: Sample Periods and Hypotheses/Questions Addressed
Data
Collection
Period
February 1
through
March 10,
2008

Proposed
Sample Size

Hypothesis/RQ to
be Addressed

4,812

H1a-b and H2a-d

Case 2: A Retrospective Measure
of Mobilization, Reinforcement
and Activation during the
Primaries and Caucuses

July 2 through
August 4,
2008

2,217

H1a-b and H2a-d
H3a-c

Case 3: Mobilization and
Reinforcement during the General
Election Period-Pre-Convention
Period to October 2, 2008*

August 8
through
October 2,
2008

6,832 (mainly
asked of a
third of the
sample)

H1a-b and H2a-d

Case 4: A Retrospective Measure
of Mobilization and
Reinforcement during the General
Election using the Post-Election
Panel

November 5
through
November 12,
2008

2,026 recontacts (who
were not
asked the
participation
battery in
their initial
interview)

H1a-b and H2a-d

Case 1: Mobilization and
Reinforcement during the
Primaries and Caucuses on and
around Super Tuesday

3-2.2 Criterion variables
3-2.2.1 Overview of participation measures in the NAES.

The participation

questions in this study are based on work by Verba and Nie (1972), Verba et al. (1995),
and Gibson et al. (2005), among others, and have been tailored to fit the 2008 election.
In this section I will describe the participation measures used in each research case. Due
to a number of circumstances, including space on the survey, time period within the
campaign cycle, and research focus, the participation measures varied from case to case.
However, as discussed later in the chapter, there was a consistent pattern of participation
activities running through each case study. The general structure of the measures is as
follows: 1) Participation activities without regard to whether they were performed online
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or offline; 2) Participation activities performed online; and, 3) Participation activities
performed offline. Each of the participation activities are dichotomous and were
measured discretely by asking respondents whether or not (yes/no) they performed each
activity during a given time-frame.
My analysis mainly focuses on individual activities because different motivations
may underlie decisions to undertake diverse activities. While my analysis of mobilization
and reinforcement is primarily based on individual participation activities, it also includes
a combined index of online participation and a combined index of offline participation.
For example, the most significant predictors of donating to a campaign may be very
different from the most significant predictors of forwarding a campaign email to friends,
or posting to a political blog.
3-2.2.2 Participation activities without regard to whether they are done offline or
online. Internet use or online campaign contact may have an impact on engaging in
certain activities, regardless of whether the activity itself was performed online or offline.
Prior research generally measured engaging in such activities. In this dissertation, there
are three activities that fall within this category: 1) Persuading someone to support or
oppose a candidate for president, 2) volunteering to work for a presidential campaign,
and, 3) donating to a presidential campaign (see Table 3-2).

In each of the case studies,

while the survey questions for these behaviors are worded without any reference to
whether they were performed offline or online, each of these questions is followed up
with a more specific inquiry. The results of this analysis help to test Hypotheses 1a and
1b. (See Appendix 1 for the complete wording of all questions).
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Table 3.2: Participation Activities Without Regard to Online or Offline Performances
Case 1-4 (Complete Wording in Appendix)*

Persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate for president
Volunteer to work for a presidential campaign
Donate money to a presidential candidate or campaign

Cases 1-4




*All variables are dichotomous (yes/no)

3-2.2.3 Offline participation activities—detail. This section details the specific
offline participation activities I have analyzed in each of the cases (see Table 3). During
Cases 1 and 3, I asked respondents about their behavior in the prior week, based on the
assumption that respondents would best recall the time frame closest to the interview
date, and thus allowing for real-time measurement. In Cases 2 and 4, I asked,
retrospectively, about participation behaviors performed at any time during the primary
campaign. In Case 1, only three offline participation activities were included: offline
persuasion of others to support or oppose a candidate, offline volunteering for a
campaign, and offline donating to a campaign. This turned out to be a rather limited set
of participation variables, which I discovered after testing for reliability during a pilot test
(α=.16). Consequently, I determined that it was necessary to expand the list of activities
to include other traditional offline campaign related variables used by Verba et al. (1995)
and others: attending a campaign event in support of a presidential candidate, and
wearing a presidential campaign button or placing a bumper sticker or sign. These
variables became part of NAES, and hence, part of my research design. The results of
the analysis of the offline activities provide a test for Hypotheses 2a through 2d.
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Table 3.3: Offline Participation Activities during—Cases 1-4 (Complete Wording in
Appendix)*

Persuade someone to support or
oppose a candidate for president:
Offline
Volunteer to work for a
presidential campaign: Offline
Donate money to a presidential
candidate or campaign: Offline
Attend campaign event in support
of a presidential candidate:
Offline
Wear a presidential campaign
button, place presidential
candidate sign in yard: Offline

Case 1**


Case 2***


Case 3**












Case 4****
















*All variables are dichotomous (yes/no)
**Activity asked about in the prior week, ***Activity during the course of the primaries and caucuses,
****Activity during the course of the general election

Note that in Case 3, the data concerning whether a respondent made a campaign
donation online or offline could not be used because of a typographical error in the
survey. This error made it impossible to distinguish between online or offline donations.
3-2.2.4 Online participation questions—detail. In Cases 1 through 4, online
participation consisted of up to eight online behaviors (see Table 3-4). In Case 2, due to
space limitations on NAES only five of the eight online participation activities were
measured. The three variables excluded were, 1) reading/posting to a political blog, 2)
discussing politics online in a chat group, and 3) viewing video on sites like YouTube
during the primaries and caucuses. As with the analysis of offline variables, Cases 1 and
3 measured participation behavior performed in the prior week, Case 2 measured
retrospective activities over the course of the entire primary and caucus period, and Case
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4 measured online acts retrospectively over the course of the general election. The
results of this analysis of online activities provide a test for Hypotheses 2a through 2d.
Table 3-4: Online Participation Activities Measured During Cases 1-4 (Complete
Wording in Appendix)*
 =Asked during Case
Persuade someone to support or
oppose a candidate for president:
Online
Volunteer to work for a
presidential campaign: Online
Donate money to a presidential
candidate or campaign: Online
Discuss politics online in a chat
group

Case 1**


Case 2***


Case 3**














Forward emails/audio/video about
presidential candidates or
campaigns to friends, family, coworkers or other people you
know





























Visit a presidential
campaign/party/political website
View video on sites like YouTube
about the presidential
candidates/campaign
Read a political blog/Post to a
political blog or discussion forum

Case 4****








*All variables are dichotomous (yes/no)**Activity asked about in the prior week
***Activity during the course of the primaries and caucuses
****Activity during the course of the general election
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3-2.2.5 The offline and online indexes. In each case, the offline index variable
was created by combining the “yes” responses to the offline questions, The online
participation index was created by combining the “yes” responses to the questions related
directly to online participation. As a result, these indexes were used as a tool to test
hypotheses 1a-b and 2a-d.
3-2.2.6 Retrospective measures to address h3a-c: the activation hypotheses. The
survey included the following question areas to address Hypotheses 3a-c on activating
supporters: whether a presidential campaign contacted the respondent either online or
offline, the frequency of such contact, and the results of such contact related to
participation. In addition, the survey measured most of the online and offline
participation activities noted in the prior sections (See Table 3-5).
Table 3-5: Questions Measuring Activation and Participation during Retrospective PostPrimaries and Caucuses Period (Case 2) (Complete Wording in Appendix)
Activity During Primaries and Caucuses—Case 2
Contact from any of the campaigns
Which campaign contacted respondent
Mode of contact—online, phone, mail, in-person
Frequency of contact
Did Obama/Clinton campaign email respondent to contact others
How did respondent act on contact
Presidential campaign work (offline/online)
Persuade a friend co-worker to vote a certain way in the presidential election
(offline/online)
Presidential campaign contribution (offline/online)
Visit a presidential campaign/party/political website
Forward emails/audio/video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends,
family, co-workers or other people you know
Wear a presidential campaign button, place presidential candidate sign in yard
Attend campaign event in support of a presidential candidate
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3-2.3 Internet usage variables: internet access and internet frequency.
Internet usage measures are critical to test whether mobilization or reinforcement
occur in any particular case. In the NAES there were two general Internet usage
questions. The first was a dichotomous Internet access question which measured whether
someone has access to the Internet at home, work or elsewhere. The second question,
added to the survey at the beginning of the Case 2 time period (July 2, 2008), measured
the respondents’ frequency of general Internet use: several hours per day, almost every
day, at least once per week, a few times a month, every month or so, rarely, or never.
This more detailed measurement of Internet use allowed me to expand the breadth of
analysis I could perform for Cases 2 through 4 including the ability to test interactions
between level of Internet use and the demographic variables for both online and offline
political participation (See Table 3-6).
The Internet access variable is a dichotomous variable and was of limited usage
since one is unable to discern the level or frequency of Internet activity from it. Further,
since Internet access is a prerequisite for answering the questions regarding online
participation, its use was limited in Case 1. I could not test for interactions between
Internet access and the independent variables to determine online mobilization.
Therefore, in Case 1, I focused only on the interaction between Internet and the
independent variables in predicting offline participation.
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Table 3-6: Internet Usage Questions
Question
On another subject, do you have access to the Internet at
home, at work or someplace else?
On average, which of the following best describes how often
you are on the Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every
day, at least once per week, a few times per month, every month
or so, rarely, or never?

Asked in Which Case
1-4
2-4

3-2.4 Independent and control variables used in the analyses.
The survey contained a number of independent and control variables which I
employed in my analysis. These represent the demographic questions measured in the
extant research, including education, gender, age, race, income and frequency of religious
attendance and serve as the basis for addressing the mobilization and reinforcement
hypotheses. Control variables include, party identification, ideology, campaign interest,
campaign contact, media use for campaign information, using the Internet for campaign
information about the presidential campaign, candidate support, and the aforementioned
Internet access and frequency measures (See Table 3-7). Control variables are used to
rule out alternative explanations, but at the same time shed light on what the best
predictors are for a given activity.
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Table 3-7: Independent and Control Variables including Internet Access and Internet
Frequency

Age
Education
Race
Income
Frequency of religious attendance
Party identification
Ideology
Campaign interest
Internet access
Internet frequency
Campaign contact online
Candidate support
Media usage

Data Collection Period
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All, but in the model only during Case 1
All, Except February 1 through March 10
(not on survey)
All
All
All

For purposes of the analyses, I set the demographic variables as dichotomous 0,1
variables (See Table 3-8). I have chosen the age category, “18 to 29 years old” to
measure age because prior research suggests that this younger category is more
technologically sophisticated (e.g., Zukin et al., 2005; Howe and Strauss, 2000). The
education and income variables were set at higher levels, so that they could be used as
markers for the traditional biases in participation. Race as a variable was categorized
simply as black/non-black to test the levels of participation activities of AfricanAmericans, a group considered to be disadvantaged, politically.
Religious attendance is not a dichotomous variable in my analysis. Instead, I
recoded it as a numerical variable ranging from one to five, where one means “never
attend religious services” and a five means, “attend religious services more than once a
week.”
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Table 3-8: Recoded Independent Variables for Analyses
1
Age
Education
Race
Income
Gender

18-29
College Grad or higher
Black
Household Income $100K or
higher
Male

0
Not 18-29
Not College Grad or higher
Not Black
Household Income Not $100K
or higher
Female

3.3 Analytic method
Tables 3-9 and 3-9a display an outline of the analytical methods used to test the
hypotheses, followed by a detailed description of the methods as they apply to the four
case studies that comprise my analysis. Generally, each case follows a similar pattern to
address the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses: descriptive frequencies,
correlation analyses, and determining predictors of political participation using
multivariate analyses. Most of the multivariate models involve logistic regression
because each of the participation dependent variables is dichotomous. Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression was an inappropriate technique for most of analysis because
dichotomous variables violate at least two of the five assumptions necessary to undertake
a linear model: homoscedasticity and normal distribution. Binomial logistic regression
uses maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent variable into a
logit variable which means that the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable
occurring or not. Logistic regression estimates the odds of a certain event occurring.11
However, I did use OLS regression to estimate the predictors for the online and offline
participation indexes.
11

For a further discussion on logistic regression, see Allison (2006)
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The regression models included interactions to test whether a third variable
moderates the influence of an independent variable on the outcome or dependent
variable. In Case 1, the interaction terms are made up of the Internet access variable and
the demographic independent variables. In Cases 2 through 4, the interaction terms
include frequency of Internet use and one of the demographic independent variables.12
For purposes of the multivariate analyses, I made the decision to collapse the frequency
of internet usage variable into a dichotomous high frequency of Internet usage. Those
who indicated they use the Internet several hours per day were re-coded as “1” and less
frequent internet users were coded as “0”.13 If the interaction term decreases the
influence of the independent variable, significantly, then the interaction has a moderating
effect on the original relationship, and thus provides evidence for mobilization.14

12

In a personal conversation with Eszter Hargittai, a professor of communication at Northwestern
University on December 10, 2008, she mentioned that a nuanced measure of Internet literacy/skill is a
better Internet classification variable than frequency, but we never measured literacy. Therefore, I cannot
empirically test her assertion, but believe that Internet frequency is sufficient. She suggested I make it clear
that more recent studies on Internet use (by her) use literacy rather than frequency as a better classification
variable.
13
From the beginning of Case 2 (July 2, 2008) through the end of the field period (11/3), 31.2% said they
were frequent Internet users
14
For more on interactions, see Jaccard and Turis, 2006)
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Table 3-9: Outline of Analytical Method for Cases 1 and 2
Case 1
Mobilization, Reinforcement During the Primaries and
Caucuses Period February 1 through March 10
Step 1: Descriptive analysis using primary data
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most
robust predictors of online and offline participation
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions
between Internet use and predictors
Case 2
A Retrospective Analysis of Mobilization and
Reinforcement during the Primaries and Caucuses
Step 1: Descriptive analysis using retrospective primary
data
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most
robust predictors of online and offline participation—A
Retrospective Analysis
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions
between Internet use and predictors--A Retrospective
Analysis
A Retrospective Analysis of Activation during the
Primaries and Caucuses
Step 1: OLS Regression to determine if online campaign
contact during the primaries and caucuses was more likely
to activate political participation than offline campaign
contact—A Retrospective Analysis
Step 2: Descriptive analysis of online political participation
activities performed during the primaries and caucuses to
determine effectiveness of Obama online communication
compared with Clinton online campaign communication--A
Retrospective Analysis

Hypothesis to be Addressed
H1a-b and H2a-d

H1a-b and H2a-d

H3a-c
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Table 3-9a: Outline of Analytical Method for Cases 3 and 4
Case 3
Mobilization and Reinforcement during the General
Election Period-Pre-convention Period to General Election
Day (Data Collected August 8 through October 2)
Step 1: Descriptive analysis using pre-election data
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most
robust predictors of online and offline participation
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions
between Internet use and predictors
Case 4
A Retrospective Analysis of Mobilization and
Reinforcement during the General Election using the Postelection Panel
Step 1: Descriptive analysis using pre-election data
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most
robust predictors of Online and Offline participation
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions
between Internet use and predictors

H1a-b and H2a-d

H1a-b and H2a-d

3-3.1 Testing the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses
For each of the four cases, I conducted a test of the mobilization and
reinforcement hypotheses (H1a-b and H2a-d) applying univariate, bivariate and
multivariate analytical techniques. For each of the cases, I followed specific steps which
are described in detail in the next section. I discuss Case 1 separately because the
Internet measure in terms of access was qualitatively and quantitatively different from the
Internet measure in the other cases in terms of frequency of usage.

3-3.2 Case 1: Mobilization, Reinforcement During the Primaries and Caucuses Period
February 1 through March 10
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3-3.2.1 Step1: Descriptive Analysis of Online Political Participation—Case 1. As
a first step, I describe the type and frequency of online and offline participation activities
reported by respondents. I then conducted a bivariate analysis of these participation
activities by the key demographic independent variables as a means of establishing
whether the traditional biases occurred or if new biases emerged, potentially as a result of
the Internet’s influence.
3-3.2.2 Step 2: Correlations between online and offline participation activities
and key demographic and behavioral variables—Case One. In this step, I conducted a
correlation analysis to determine if there were significant relationships between, and
among, the participation variables and key demographic and political behavioral and
attitudinal variables, such as party identification and campaign interest. This is an
important step to undertake because before I attempt to establish causation, I need to
show whether relationships to exist between and among these variables.
3-3.2.3 Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to Determine the Most Robust
Predictors of Offline and Online Political Participation—Case One . In order to
determine the predictors of the variety of participation activities, I ran a series of logistic
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. These predictors will provide
additional evidence that either the traditional biases continue in the presence of controls
or new biases occur (e.g. older people less likely to view political video online). The
dependent variables, in Case 1, were the three general participation variables measured
without regard to whether they were done online or offline (persuasion for support,
volunteering for campaign, donating to a campaign), the variety of individual online and
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offline political participation behaviors, and the two offline and online indexes. The
independent variables in the model included age, gender, race, education, income, and
religiosity. The control variables were party identification, ideology, campaign contact,
Internet use, campaign interest, candidate support, and media usage for political
information.
Within each of the participation activities, the most robust predictors are those
with the highest odds ratios estimated by the logistic regression models when compared
within category.

If the odds ratios are significant and higher among younger people,

African-Americans, or people from lower socioeconomic status, then this would be
evidence that the traditional biases did not emerge or disappeared after applying controls.
Similarly, when looking at the combined indexes, if the unstandardized “b” coefficients
are significant and greater for the non-traditional independent variables, then this would
be evidence that the biases seen in prior elections did not emerge. Furthermore, if the
coefficients are significant and greater for online participation than offline participation
then that is also evidence of mobilization (See Table 3-10).
3-3.2.4 Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test Interactions between Internet
use and predictors—Case One. I estimated discrete logistic regression models for the
discrete participation variables and OLS regression models for the indexes to test for
interactions between Internet access and age, gender, race, income and education. In Case
1, Internet access could be a moderator of the effect of one of the independent variables
on offline political participation, the outcome variable. During the primary period,
Internet access was measured as a dichotomous variable: “yes” or “no” to a question
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asking whether respondents had Internet access at home, work, or elsewhere. These
interactions will indicate if having Internet access impacts the effect of demographic
variables on offline participation. If the offline political participation regression model,
before interactions, shows support for the reinforcement hypothesis, where the traditional
biases are upheld, then a significant and negative interaction between the demographic
variables and Internet access could moderate the effect and, therefore provide evidence
for mobilization (See Table 3-10).
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Table 3-10: Case 1-- Regression Models to Test H1a-b and H2a-b (Steps 3 and 4)
Model/Hyp

Dependent Variable

Independent Variable

1-3

Political participation
variables without regard to
being offline and online:
1) Persuading others to
support or oppose a candidate,

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income, Religious
attendance, Campaign
interest, Party Identification,
Ideology, Internet access,
Media use for political
information, Candidate
Support

H1a-b

2) Volunteering to work for a
campaign,
3) Donating to a campaign
Online political participation
variables (See Table 5)

4-11
Determine
Predictors

Offline political participation
variables (See Table 2)

12-14
H2a-b

Online political participation
Index

15
Determine
Predictors

16
H2a-b

Offline political participation
Index

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income, Religious
attendance, Campaign
interest, Party Identification,
Ideology, Internet access,
Media use for political
information, Candidate
Support
Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income, Religious
attendance, Campaign
interest, Party Identification,
Ideology, Internet access,
Media use for political
information, Candidate
support
Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income, Religious
attendance, Campaign
interest, Party Identification,
Ideology, Internet access,
Media use for political
information, Candidate
Support
Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income, Religious
attendance, Campaign
interest, Party Identification,
Ideology, Internet access,
Media use for political
information, Candidate
support

Interaction
Variables*
Internet Access X
Age, Education,
Race, Gender,
Income, Religious
Attendance

N/A

Internet Access X
Age, Education,
Race, Gender,
Income, Religious
Attendance

N/A

Internet Access X
Age, Education,
Race, Gender,
Income, Religious
Attendance

*I will only test Interactions when the demographic independent variable’s
coefficient is significant.
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3-3.3: Cases 2 through 4: An analysis of mobilization and reinforcement

In Case 1, the analysis focused on testing mobilization and reinforcement during
the early and middle primary and caucus period (February 1 through March 10, 2008). I
was limited in my test because of the lack of a truly discriminating internet usage
question. Beginning with Case 2, I was able to put such a measure in place. Therefore, I
was able to expand the number of tests I could perform on my hypotheses. This section
details the steps I followed in testing these hypotheses in Cases 2 through 4. I will point
out the slight differences in each case, but for the most part, the process was the same.
Case 2 took a retrospective look at mobilization and reinforcement during the
entire primary and caucus period. The retrospective primary and caucus questions
differed somewhat from the primary period questions since the focus was mainly on
activation by the campaigns (H4a-b) rather than solely on participation activities. Case 2
represents a slightly different way to test mobilization and reinforcement since it covers
the entire primary and caucus period. Case 3 focuses on data collected during much but
not the entire general election period (August 8 through October 2, 2008). The analysis
of the Case 3 data shows whether mobilization, reinforcement, or both occurred during
the 2008 general election campaign. The participation variables are somewhat different
from those in Case 1 and Case 2 and, therefore, present a slightly different test of the
hypotheses.

Last, during Case 4, the final phase of data collection, NAES collected

retrospective participation data from respondents who completed the survey from August
8, 2008 through November 3, 2008. The retrospective participation questions were
similar to the pre-general election questions in Case 3, but I asked the respondent to recall
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participation activities throughout the general election period, rather than during the prior
week (See Tables 3,4, 6 and 7 for questions used in each of the cases related to the
mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses).
3-3.3.1 Step1: Descriptive Analysis—Cases 2 through 4. In Step 1, I describe the
type and frequency of online and offline participation activities undertaken in each case,
followed by a bivariate analyses of these participation activities by the key demographic
independent variables as a means of showing if the traditional biases occurred or if new
biases emerged.
3-3.3.2 Step 2: Correlations between online and offline participation activities
and key demographic and behavioral variables—Cases 2 through 4. Similar to Case 1, I
performed a correlation analysis to determine if the relationships between the
participation variables and key demographics, political variables, and relevant behavioral
variables are significant. However, cases are not directly comparable because the set of
participation questions are slightly different.
3-3.3.3 Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most robust predictors
of Online and Offline participation— Cases 2 through 4. In Step 3, I determined the
predictors of online and offline participation, by conducting a series of logistic
regressions for the particular participation items, and an OLS regression for the combined
online index and the combined offline index.

As in Case 1, the independent variables in

the model include age, gender, race, education, income, and religiosity. Control variables
include party identification, ideology, campaign contact, frequency of Internet use
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(replacing Internet access), campaign interest, candidate support/vote, and media usage
for political information (See Table 11).
3-3.3.4 Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test Interactions between Internet
use and predictors--Cases 2 through 4. As the final and most direct test of the
mobilization versus reinforcement hypotheses I added interaction terms (between
frequency of internet use and age, gender, race income and education) into the logistic
regression analyses (see Table 3-11). The logic of these analyses is straightforward.
Consider, for example, the frequency of offline political discussion. Suppose that in the
initial logistic regression analyses describe in “step three” I find that frequent internet use
increases offline political discussion, but being young (18-29) decreases offline
discussion. If internet use acts to reduce age-related biases in participation beyond the
direct or main effects of being young and using the Internet frequently (i.e., has a
mobilizing effect), then the interaction between these two variables should be significant
and positive. If, however, it acts to reinforce this bias, it should be negative. Beyond this,
the size of the interaction (relative to the main effects of age and Internet use) and the
specific pattern of this interaction (i.e., whether it is being driven by young people who
use the internet frequently increasing their political discussion or Internet users
decreasing their political discussion) provides further evidence in support or opposition to
the mobilization hypothesis.
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Table 3-11: Cases 2-4-- Regression Models to Test H1a-b and H2a-d (Steps 3 and 4)
Model/Hypoth
1-3
H1a-b

Dependent Variable
Political participation
variables without regard to
being offline and online: 1)
Persuading others to
support or oppose a
candidate,
2) Volunteering to work
for a campaign,

4-11
H2a-d

12-16
H2a-b

17

3) Donating to a campaign
Online political
participation variables (See
Table 6)

Offline political
participation variables (See
Table 3)

Online political
participation Index

H2c-d

18
H2a-b

Offline political
participation Index

Independent Variable
Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Religious attendance,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Internet access, Media use
for political information,
Candidate Support,

Interaction Variables*
High Internet Use X
Age, Education, Race,
Gender, Income,
Religious attendance

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Religious attendance,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Internet access, Media use
for political information,
Candidate Support
Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Religious attendance,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Internet access, Media use
for political information,
Candidate support
Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Religious attendance,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Internet access, Media use
for political information,
Candidate Support
Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Religious attendance,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Internet access, Media use
for political information,
Candidate support

High Internet Use X
Age, Education, Race,
Gender, Income,
Religious attendance

High Internet Use X
Age, Education, Race,
Gender, Income,
Religious attendance

High Internet Use X
Age, Education, Race,
Gender, Income,
Religious attendance

High Internet Use X
Age, Education, Race,
Gender, Income,
Religious attendance

*I will only test Interactions when the demographic independent variable’s
coefficient is significant.
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3-3.4: Testing H3ac: Case 2-- A Retrospective Analysis of Activation during the
Primaries and Caucuses (July 2 through August 4, 2008)
Research Question Four presents the following hypotheses:
H3a: Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized than those
contacted offline
H3b: Voters for Obama in the primaries were more likely to have been contacted
online by the Obama campaign than were voters for Clinton by the Clinton
campaign in the primaries.
H3c: Those contacted online by the Obama campaign were more likely to be
mobilized than those contacted by the Clinton campaign

I analyzed Case 2 data (the retrospective primaries and caucuses) to test Hypotheses 3a-

c. To test H3a and H3c, I used OLS regression to determine if campaign contact
activated political participation. To test H3b, I used descriptive analysis of online
political participation activities performed during the primaries.
3-3.4.1 Step 1: OLS Regression To Determine If Campaign Contact Activated
Political Participation, Using Primary Retrospective Data (H3a and H3c). In order to
test hypotheses 3a and 3c, I constructed several OLS regression models to determine if
campaign contact activated political participation. I ran several regression models
addressing this hypothetical claim that those contacted online were more likely to be
mobilized than those contacted offline. I then ran several more regression models
addressing the claim of hypothesis 3c that those contacted online by Obama were more
likely to be mobilized than those contacted online by Clinton. The key dependent
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variables for both hypotheses 3a and 3c are political participation (without specifying
offline or online), offline political participation, and online political participation.
There would be support for hypothesis 3a if the positive coefficients are greater for online
contact variables than for offline contact. Support for hypothesis 3c would exist if the
positive coefficients are greater for the Obama contact variables than for the Clinton
contact variables (See Table 3-12).
3-3.4.2 Step 2: Descriptive Analysis of Online Political Participation Activities
Performed During the Primaries Using Primary Retrospective Data (H3b. In this final
part of the analysis, I ran a straightforward descriptive analysis showing the types of
offline and online participation activities respondents performed during the primaries. In
addition, I ran bivariate analyses showing the frequency of campaign contact by the
Clinton and Obama campaign and analyses tying campaign contact with the participation
activities.

77
Table 3-12: Case 2-- Regression Models to Test H3a-c (Step 2)
Model
1

Dependent Variable
Offline Political Participation

Independent Variables
a) Contacted by Either
Clinton or Obama
b) Contact by Campaign
Online

2

Online Political Participation

c) Contact by Campaign
Offline
a) Contacted by Either
Clinton or Obama
b) Contact by Campaign
Online

3

Political Participation
(combined)

c) Contact by Campaign
Offline
a) Contacted by Either
Clinton or Obama
b) Contact by Campaign
Online

4

Offline Political Participation

c) Contact by Campaign
Offline
a) Contact by the Obama
Campaign
b) Contact by the Obama
Campaign Online

5

Online Political Participation

c) Contact by the Obama
Campaign Offline
a) Contact by the Obama
Campaign
b) Contact by the Obama
Campaign Online

6

Political Participation
(combined)

c) Contact by the Obama
Campaign Offline
a) Contact by the Obama
Campaign
b) Contact by the Obama
Campaign Online

7

Offline Political Participation

c) Contact by the Obama
Campaign Offline
a) Contact by the Clinton
Campaign

Controls
Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Religious attendance,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Level of Internet access

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Level of Internet access

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Religious attendance,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Level of Internet access

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Campaign interest,
Religious attendance, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Level of Internet access

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Campaign interest,
Religious attendance, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Level of Internet access

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Campaign interest,
Religious attendance, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Level of Internet access

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
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b) Contact by the Clinton
Campaign Online

8

Online Political Participation

c) Contact by the Clinton
Campaign Offline
a) Contact by the Clinton
Campaign
b) Contact by the Clinton
Campaign Online

9

Political Participation
(combined)

c) Contact by the Clinton
Campaign Offline
a) Contact by the Clinton
Campaign
b) Contact by the Clinton
Campaign Online
c) Contact by the Clinton
Campaign Offline

Religious attendance,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Level of Internet access

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Religious attendance,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Level of Internet access

Age, Gender, Race,
Education, Income,
Religious attendance,
Campaign interest, Party
Identification, Ideology,
Level of Internet access
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3.4:

Limitations to Design

There are several limitations to this design that I must point out here.
First, measures are based on self-report, which have been shown to be less reliable
measures of behavior (See Hovland, 1959; Converse, 1964; Prior, 2009). Additionally,
Hargittai (2005, 2009), asserts that nuanced measures of Internet literacy/skill are
superior to self-reported frequency or general self-reported Internet literacy. Other
studies have used Internet skills as a measure to predict participation, also (DiGennaro
and Dutton, 2006). However, NAES does not measure frequency in that way and
contains no measures of Internet literacy; therefore, I accept this as a limitation of this
study. Second, the political participation questions have not been consistent throughout
the survey periods, and therefore there is no mechanism to directly compare results
among the time periods. However, each case can be viewed as a separate study of
mobilization and reinforcement contributing important findings related to different
measures. Third, it might be difficult to assess the wider applicability of these results
beyond 2008 because of this presidential campaign’s uniqueness. This is a campaign
where for the first time a major party has nominated an African American, and nearly
nominated a woman. The excitement generated by the Obama and Clinton candidacies in
attracting voters might overpower the effects of the Internet. However, with my study,
which controls for those variables, I will demonstrate how the campaigns effectively used
the Internet as part of the activation process.
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MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT FINDINGS PART I:
THE 2008 PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES

I have divided the findings related to mobilization and reinforcement into two
parts. Part I presents the analysis of the two cases covering the 2008 primaries and
caucuses—Case 1 (Chapter 4) and Case 2 (Chapter 5). Part II presents the mobilization
and reinforcement findings from the two cases concentrating on the general election
period—Case 3 (Chapter 6) and Case 4 (Chapter 7). I have organized the findings in this
way, so the reader may easily follow and compare the results from these two distinct
periods in the 2008 presidential campaign.
The four case studies illustrate in multiple ways how political participation
occurred online and offline during the 2008 campaign, how often, who was more likely to
participate and/or predict participation, and finally, determine whether reinforcement,
mobilization, or both occurred. Prior research is equivocal about the impact of internet
on participation. The results presented in the following chapters are an attempt to the
provide clarity, but in the end, they raise more questions. Nevertheless, I conclude that
the data suggest strongly that mobilization took place.
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CHAPTER 4: CASE 1-- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT DURING THE
2008 PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES ON AND AROUND SUPER TUESDAY

The findings contained within this chapter are from the Case 1 data collected as
part of the NAES rolling cross section telephone survey from February 1, 2008 through
March 10, 2008. The data cover the period in which there were thirty-nine primaries and
caucuses, including twenty-two that took place on Super Tuesday, February 5. During
this period the candidates from both the Democratic and Republican parties engaged in
intensive efforts to involve more potential voters than at any other point during the
primaries and caucuses.
Findings presented in this chapter and the subsequent ones related to mobilization
and reinforcement (Chs. 4-7) are structured similarly. Minor variation will be noted
accordingly in the specific chapter. Chapter 4 includes the following analyses of Case 1:
•

A descriptive analysis of political participation activities reported
retrospectively; including a correlation analysis among participation activities;

•

Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online
participation;

•

Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between Internet access and
demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization and/or
reinforcement—focusing only on offline participation.
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4-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities
In Case 1, political participation activities were measured by respondent recall of
engagement in selected activities during the week prior to being interviewed. The results
indicate a relatively low level of participation, but interesting patterns emerged from this
data collection method. A major premise underlying this study of mobilization and
reinforcement rests on the notion that there is systematic bias in the levels of political
participation across different demographic groups. Prior research, noted in Chapter 2,
has demonstrated that those who are better educated and more affluent are most likely to
engage in political participation activities, while the less educated, minorities and young
adults are least likely to be involved in such actions. The descriptive analysis detailed in
this chapter partly affirms and contradicts the past biases in a variety of ways.
Demographically, some of the Case 1 findings provide evidence of the bias
reported in prior research, with more affluent and better educated adults more likely to
engage in the measured participation activities, both online and offline. However,
countering the biases, the data show that younger people were more likely to report
engaging in most of the measured online behaviors and most of the offline behaviors,
pointing, perhaps, to greater youth involvement in the campaign. More significantly,
African Americans emerge as a group more likely to say they engaged in several of the
online and offline behaviors. This finding also contradicts prior research on participation
among African Americans during the primaries (See Table 4-1), and may reflect the
effects of the presence of a “serious” African American candidate.15 This first picture of

15

The most direct comparison is the 2004 NAES. During the primaries, African Americans were
significantly less likely than whites to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate and contribute to
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African American activity is rather incomplete since Table 4-1 provides descriptive data
only, without the presence of controls. Subsequent analyses will provide a clearer picture.
As for the frequency of activity among the adult population, generally, the Case 1
data show more adults reported participating by attempting to persuade someone they
knew to either support or oppose a candidate (27.2%) than any other activity. However,
they were much more likely to say they engaged in this type of persuasion offline
(24.1%) than online (3.0%).
Few adults reported performing the other offline activities measured during this
period. Two percent or fewer reported they volunteered to work for (0.7%), or
contributed to one of the candidates, offline (2.1%).
In Case 1, the survey measured eight online participation activities (See Chapter 3
for detail). A nearly equal proportion of adults said they performed one of the three
activities: forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others (14.7%), viewing political
video on sites like YouTube (13.4%), visiting web sites of one of the campaigns (12.3%),
or discussing politics online (11.4%). Among the unique online activities measured,
fewer said they read or posted to a blog having to do with politics or the campaign (7.3%)
(See Table 4-1). 16 Not surprisingly, these four uniquely online activities are moderately,
but significantly and positively correlated with each other. For example, forwarding
political emails is moderately correlated with discussing politics online (r= .45), viewing
political video online (r= .29), and visiting a campaign website (r= .28). Visiting a

the primary campaign of one of the candidates. During the 2008 primaries and caucus period measured in
Case 1, the gap has closed—See Table 4-1.
16
Unique because there is no equivalent offline activity
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campaign web site is also moderately correlated with viewing a political video (r= .36)
and reading or posting to a political blog (r= .24) (See Appendix for correlation table).
It is important to note that the while the relationships are moderate and positive,
they are not strong enough to be concerned about collinearity. The Case 1 correlations
among the variety of participation activities range from r= .02 to r=.45, suggesting that it
is proper to examine the mobilizing or reinforcing effect of each activity, rather than
combining them into an index.
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Table 4-1: Case 1 Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls)
Activities Regardless of
Whether it Was Performed
Offline during the presidential
primary campaign done in the
prior week

All
Adults
%

College
Not
Male
Female Age 18- Age 30 or AfricanNot
Household
Graduate College
%
%
29
older American African- Income:
Or
Graduate
%
%
%
American $100K
Higher
%
%
Or more
%
%
(n=4,812) (n=1,914) (n=2,898) (n=2,047) (n=2,765) (n=377) (n=4,435) (n=425) (n=4,387) (n=990)

Household
Income:
Less than
$100K
%
(n=3,822)

Attempt to persuade someone
to support or oppose a
presidential candidate

27.2

32.2***

23.8

28.0

26.5

33.4**

26.6

30.8

26.5

33.6***

25.5

Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates

1.0

1.1

0.9

0.8

1.1

1.6

0.9

1.9

0.9

0.9

1.0

Contribute money to
campaigns or candidates

3-3

5.4***

1.8

3.4

3.1

2.1

3.3

3.5

3.2

5.8***

2.6

24.1

27.8***

21.7

24.5

23.9

28.6*

23.8

28.2*

23.8

28.7***

23.0

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.5

0.8

0.8

0.7

1.9**

0.6

0.4

0.8

2.1

3.0***

1.4

2.2

1.9

1.1

2.2

2.1

2.1

3.1**

1.8

OFFLINE Activities during the
presidential primary campaign
done in the prior week
Attempt to persuade someone
OFFLINE to support or oppose
a candidate
Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates
OFFLINE
Contribute money to campaigns
or candidates OFFLINE
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ONLINE Activities during the
presidential primary campaign
done in the prior week
Attempt to persuade someone to
support or oppose one of the
presidential candidates
ONLINE
Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates
ONLINE
Contribute money to campaigns
or candidates ONLINE

3.0

4.4***

2.1

3.5

2.7

4.8*

2.9

2.6

3.1

4.9***

2.5

+
+

0.5

+
+

+
+

+
+

0.8

+
+

+
+

+
+

0.5

+
+

1.1

2.4***

+
+

1.5

0.9

1.1

1.1

1.4

1.1

2.6***

0.8

Discuss Politics ONLINE

11.4

16.4***

8.1

12.4

10.6

19.6***

10.7

11.4

11.1

16.9***

10.0

Visited Website of a
presidential campaign or
political party
Viewed video on sites like
YouTube about the presidential
candidates or campaign
Read or posted a comment on a
blog having to do with politics
or a campaign
Forwarded emails, audio or
video about presidential
candidates or campaigns to
friends, families, co-workers or
other people you know

12.3

17.9***

8.7

13.9**

11.2

20.7***

11.6

17.2**

11.9

18.9***

10.6

13.4

18.1***

10.2

16.6***

11.0

26.0***

12.3

19.8***

12.8

19.5***

11.8

7.3

9.9***

5.6

8.8**

6.3

13.0***

6.9

10.6**

7.0

9.9**

6.7

14.7

19.5***

11.5

15.1

14.3

15.9

14.6

14.1

14.7

23.2***

12.5

++=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05
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4-2: Determining Predictors of Offline and Online Political Participation
The Case 1 descriptive analysis of participation during the primaries taking place
on and around Super Tuesday suggest that the biases toward the more advantaged groups
(educated and affluent) continue, but at the same time, it suggests potential for the
emergence of more non-traditional participatory groups—young adults and African
Americans, being particularly energized. The next step in the analysis involving Logistic
and OLS regression produced a more accurate outcome because the models of
participation were tested with a number of statistical controls in place. In the presence of
controls, high education is a significant predictor only for the acts of contributing money
to campaigns, either offline or online. Education was not significant for any other
activities. The emergence of a more active African American participation group is not
borne out by the results of the multivariate analysis, where African Americans are
significant predictors of just two activities. On the other hand, the models did produce
an increase in the predictive value of age since young adults were significant predictors
for half of the activities measured. While the demographic variables are my primary
focus, the political variables, including campaign interest and online campaign contact,
emerged most often as the most robust significant predictors for many of the participation
activities. The significant strength of campaign contact is consistent with Rosenstone and
Hansen’s (1993) argument about mobilizing citizens to participate in the political
process. “High campaign interest” as a predictor is consistent with much of the previous
work on participation, especially that which shows reinforcement (e.g., Johnson and
Kaye, 1998, 2003; Scheufele and Nisbet, 2002; Bimber and Davis, 2003; Norris, 2001).
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This pattern showing the strength and robustness of campaign interest and campaign
contact is found throughout this study. In contrast to the consistency of interest and
contact, the data will show a decided lack of consistency in the predictive value of the
demographic variables from case to case.
For the remainder of this section, I present the details of the multivariate analyses
of the four classes of participation activities: 1) persuasion, volunteering, and donating
without regard to whether the activity took place online or offline, 2) offline activities
including offline persuasion, offline campaign volunteering, and offline donating, 3)
online activities including online persuasion, volunteering, online donating, discussing
politics online, visiting campaign web sites, viewing political video on sites like
YouTube, reading or posting to a political blog, and forwarding emails, audio or video
related to the presidential campaign, and 4) the combined online and offline indexes.
Within each of these classes of activities, profiles will be constructed to illustrate those
who are more likely to engage in the participation behaviors.
Logistic regression was used to model the individual activities and OLS to model
the indexes. The logistic predictors are represented as “odds ratios” (OR). Odds Ratios
simply present the likelihood of an outcome occurring (e.g., visiting a campaign web site)
for a particular independent variable (e.g., males). Within each of the participation
activities, the most vigorous predictors are those with the highest odds ratios estimated by
the logistic regression models when compared within category.

A significant odds ratio

of 2.5 for the likelihood of a male viewing a political video on YouTube means that a
male is two and a half times more likely than a female to view an online political video,
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controlling for other factors. In general, if odds ratios are significant and higher among
younger people, African-Americans, or people from lower socioeconomic status, then
this would be evidence that the traditional biases did not emerge or disappeared after
applying controls. Similarly, when looking at the combined indexes, if the
unstandardized “b” coefficients are significant and greater for the lower SES independent
variables, then this would be evidence that the biases seen in prior elections did not
emerge. Furthermore, if the coefficients are significant and greater for online
participation than offline participation then that is also evidence of the mobilizing effects
of the Internet.

4-2.1: Predictors of Participation Activities Regardless of Online or Offline Distinctions
The participation activities analyzed in this section are those which occur either
offline or online. These activities, persuading, donating, and attending campaign
meetings and rallies replicate some of the activities measured in elections before the
advent of the Internet as a tool for political participation. The purpose of this analysis
was to assess whether the traditional SES biases found in prior elections were found in
the 2008 primaries.
4.2.1.1: Persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate.
This activity involves persuading someone with whom one comes in contact to
either support or oppose one of the presidential candidates. This could be in-person, faceto-face, through writing, email, texting, blogging, by telephone, or in a meeting.
Controlling for other demographic, attitudinal and behavioral factors, young adults, age
18 to 29, were twice as likely as older ones to say they persuaded someone to support or
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oppose a presidential candidate (OR=1.985, p<.001). No other demographic group (e.g.,
gender, education, income) showed a significant relationship with persuasion. Of the
non-demographic variables included in the model, high levels of campaign interest
(OR=2.310, p<.001) and reporting having been contacted online by one of the campaigns
(OR=1.879, p<.05) were most strongly associated with attempting to persuade someone
how to vote. Additionally, those who engaged in this type of persuasion were more likely
to be self-identified as Democrats (OR=1.373) (See Table 4-2).
4-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign. None of the SES
variables traditionally associated with political participation significantly predicted
volunteering for a campaign, though consistent with the findings of Verba et al. (1995)
and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the more one attends religious services the greater
the likelihood of volunteering (OR=1.683, p<.001). Also consistent with Rosenstone
and Hansen’s (1993) work on recruitment, online campaign contact was an exceedingly
strong predictor of this behavior (OR=19.299, p<.001).17 High interest in the presidential
campaign (OR=1.916, p<.01), self-identifying as a liberal (OR=1.506, p<.05), and citing
the Internet as a primary source for campaign information (OR=1.16, p<.05) were also
significant predictors of volunteering regardless whether it was done online or offline
(See Table 4-2).
4-2.1.3: Contributing money to a candidate or a campaign. The more educated
the respondent, the more likely he or she was to report having donated money to one of
the campaigns (OR=2.184, p<.001). Those reporting online campaign contact
(OR=2.291, p<.05), and high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.912, p<.001) were about
17

Odds ratio may be high because so few said they volunteered to work for a campaign during that period.
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twice as likely to contribute to a campaign. Surprisingly, according to the logistic
regression, Obama supporters were less likely to say they contributed to a campaign in
the week prior to being interviewed than supporters of other candidate (OR=0.665,
p<.05).
In sum, the demographic predictors of activities without regard to whether they
are done offline or online are young adults for persuading others, religious attendance for
volunteering, and education for donating to campaign. These demographic variables are
also found to be significant for predicting the related offline and online activities, as the
next two sections will show.
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Table 4-2: Case 1--Predictors of Political Participation Regardless of whether it was
conducted offline or online
Logistic Regression EXP(B)
Attempt to
Persuade
someone
to support/
oppose
candidate

Volunteer
for
Candidate
or
Campaign

Education (Collgrad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income (100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Internet Access (yes)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter
Constant
N

.996
.924
1.985***
1.037
1.182
1.081**
1.373***
.972
1.087***
1.088***
1.008
1.016
1.259*
2.310***
1.879*
.822*
.009***
4,458

.753
.861
2.166
1.051
.893
1.683***
1.319
1.506*
1.160*
1.009
1.073
.926
.559
1.916*
19.299***
1.312
.000***
4,458

Correctly Classified

73.7%

Nagelkerke R Square
Cox & Snell R Square
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,
^=not asked in Case 2

Contribute
Money to a
candidate or
campaign

2.184***
.974
1.146
1.529
1.422
.963
1.239
1.024
1.052
1.073*
1.090**
.962
1.056
1.912***
2.291*
.665*
.001***
4,458

99.1%

96.7%

.166

.226

.103

.115

.022

.026
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4-2.2: Predictors of Offline Participation Activities
In Case 1, only three offline participation activities were measured.18
Demographically the logistic models produced no pattern of behavior that could be linked
consistently to one or two demographic measures. Instead, each offline activity had a
different significant demographic predictor. Youth was a significant predictor for offline
persuasion, high levels of education was a significant predictor for offline donations, and
religious attendance significantly predicted volunteering for a campaign offline. Online
campaign contact was not a consistent predictor of offline participation. Campaign
interest was the most consistent predictor, since it was significant for both offline
persuasion and offline donation. Detail follows:
4-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone offline to support or oppose a
candidate. Demographically, young adults were most active in this behavior, according
to the Case 1 logistic model. Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were about twice as
likely as older ones (OR=1.831, p<.001) to say they attempted to persuade someone,
offline, to support or oppose a presidential candidate. Those highly interested in the
presidential campaign during this period were more than twice as likely as others less
interested to say they engaged in this type of persuasion (OR=2.123, p<.001). Politically,
self-identified Democrats were more likely than Republicans or Independents to say they
tried to persuade others offline (OR=1.401, p<.001) (See Table 4-3).
4-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. Attending
religious services (OR=1.619, p<.01) was a significant demographic predictor for offline

18

Beginning with Case 2, I was able to add two more—a rally/meeting attendance and wearing a
button/displaying a bumper sticker or lawn sign.
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campaign volunteering, but it was the only one. Online campaign contact was an
extremely robust predictor of volunteering offline (OR=12.809, p<.001). Additionally,
those identifying themselves as liberal were almost one and a half times more likely to
say they volunteered for one of the campaigns offline (OR=1.469, p<.05)(See Table 4-3).
4-2.2.3: Contributing money offline to a presidential candidate or campaign.
Demographically, the more one is educated, the more likely one was to say he or she
contributed to one of the campaigns during the primaries period covered by Case 1
(OR=1.740, p<.01). Campaign interest was also a significant predictor, as those with a
high level of interest in the presidential campaign were about twice as likely as those
with less interest to say they donated offline (OR=1.964, p<.01) Finally, the model
showed that Obama supporters were less likely to contribute money to a campaign,
offline (See Table 4-3).
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Table 4-3: Case 1-- Predictors of Offline Political Participation
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

Education (Collgrad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income (100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Internet Access (yes)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter
Constant
N

Attempt to
Persuade
someone to
support or
oppose
candidate
OFFLINE
1.017
.937
1.831***
1.055
1.147
1.072*
1.401***
.993
1.030*
1.071***
1.009
1.028
1.232*
2.123***
1.033
.825*
.011***
4,458

Volunteer
for
candidate
or
campaign
OFFLINE

Contribute
money to
candidate
or
campaign
OFFLINE

.730
.888
1.628
1.675
.711
1.619**
1.414
1.469*
1.048
.984
1.088
.969
.602
2.048
12.80***9
1.323
.000***
4,458

1.740*
.817
1.052
1.383
1.297
.997
1.179
1.054
.959
1.083*
1.110**
1.003
.958
1.964**
.907
.553*
.001***
4,458

99.4%

97.9%

Correctly Classified

75.5%

Nagelkerke R Square

.115

.158

.071

Cox & Snell R Square

.077

.011

.013

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,
^=not asked in Case 2
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4-2.3: Predictors of Online Participation Activities
In this section I examine how predictors of campaign participation look when I
separate on-line and off-line activities. The logistic regression models using the former
as the dependent variables produce one fairly consistent demographic predictor of online
participation —age. Those aged 18 to 29 years old emerge as significant predictors for
five of the eight online activities. In comparison, race is a significant predictor for only
two of the eight online activities and education is a significant predictor for just one.
Among the non-demographic variables, citing the Internet as a campaign source was a
significant predictor for all of the on-line activities, while online campaign contact was a
significant predictor for all but one. High level of campaign interest was also a significant
predictor for most of the activities. In sum, during this period of the campaign, the
strongest predictors of most online political participation activities were: youth, Internet
use for political purposes, campaign interest, and campaign contact were the strongest
predictors of most online political participation activities.
4-2.3.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a candidate.
While very few respondents said they persuaded someone to support or oppose a
candidate online (3% total), among those who did, young adults (age 18-29) (OR=1.821,
p<.05) were nearly twice as likely as older ones to say they engaged in this behavior. If
one was contacted by a campaign online, that person was almost four times as likely as
those who were not contacted online to say they persuaded others online (OR=3.598,
p<.001). Additionally, the more one expressed interest in the campaign, the more likely
one was to say they persuaded someone to support or oppose a candidate online
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(OR=2.707, p<.001). Finally, reporting that the Internet was a main source for campaign
information was a significant predictor of this behavior (OR=1.414, p<.001) (See Table
4-4).
4-2.3.2: Volunteering online to do work for a candidate or campaign. Religious
attendance was the only significant demographic predictor for online volunteering for a
campaign (OR=1.687, p<.05). Among the political variables included in the models, the
strongest predictor by far was online campaign contact. Those reporting such contact
were nearly thirty times more likely than those who were not contacted online to
volunteer to work online for a candidate. This large ratio might be explained by the fact
that so few people indicated they engaged in this behavior (less than 0.5%) or perhaps the
campaigns were good at identifying who to contact. Using the Internet as a primary
source for campaign information was also a significant predictor (OR=1.682, p<.01)
(See Table 4-4).
4-2.3.3: Contributing money online to a presidential candidate or campaign.
Higher education was the only significant demographic predictor for donating to a
campaign online (OR=4.284, p<.001), and strongest among all the demographic and
political variables in the logistic model. Online campaign contact was about as important
as education since those contacted online were just about four times as likely as their
counterparts to say they made an online contribution to a presidential candidate during
the primary and caucus period on and around Super Tuesday (OR=3.928, p<.01). The
more often one went online for campaign information the more likely they were to report
donating online (OR=1.266, p<.001) (See Table 4-4).
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4-2.3.4: Discussing politics online. During this active February and early-March
phase of the primaries and caucuses, younger adults, age 18 to 29 (OR=2.435, p<.001),
were more than twice as likely as older adults to say they discussed politics online with
others, even when controlling for a host of other factors. No other demographic
independent variable was significant. Again, the most robust of the predictors, however,
was online campaign contact (OR=4.358, p<.001). Not surprisingly, those highly
interested in the presidential campaign were twice as likely as those less interested to say
they discussed politics online (OR=2.031, p<.001). The other significant predictor of note
was citing the Internet as a source of campaign information (OR=1.358, p<.001) (See
Table 4-4).
4-2.3.5: Visiting a campaign web site. According to the Case 1 logistic model,
the demographic profile of those most likely to visit a presidential campaign web site
comprised young adults (OR=2.422, p<.001), African Americans (OR=1.620, p<.01), and
frequent attendees of religious services (OR=1.158, p<.001). Beyond the demographic
predictors, online campaign contact (OR=2.571, p<.001) and campaign interest
(OR=2.351, p<.001) were the other significant predictors of visiting a campaign web site.
Citing the Internet as a primary campaign source was another important predictor for
going to a campaign web site (OR=1.411, p<.001) (See Table 4-4).
4-2.3.6: Viewing political video on sites like YouTube. Viewing political video on
sites like YouTube was typically done by young adults, African Americans, and males,
according to the Case 1 logistic model. Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were almost
three times more likely (OR=2.698, p<.001) than older adults to say they viewed a
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political video on YouTube. African Americans were almost twice as likely as nonAfrican Americans to say they engaged in this viewing behavior (OR=1.817, p<.001).
Males were about thirty percent more likely than females to say they viewed political
video on sites like YouTube (OR=1.292, p<.05). Outside of demographic variables, high
levels of campaign interest (OR=1.633, p<.001) and using the Internet as a primary
source of campaign information (OR=1.426, p<.001) were the other significant predictors
for this viewing behavior (See Table 4-4).
4-2.3.7: Reading or posting to a blog about the campaign. Youth was the only
significant demographic predictor for reading or posting to a blog about the campaign.
Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were nearly two times more likely to read or post to
a political blog than older adults (OR=1.836, p<.01). Online campaign contact
(OR=1.791, p<.05), high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.418, p<.01), citing the
Internet as a source of campaign information (OR=1.413, p<.001) and support for Barack
Obama (OR=1.325, p<.05) were the other significant indicators of this behavior (See
Table 4-4).
4-2.3.8: Forwarding emails, audio or videos about one of the candidates. While
males were more likely to say they viewed a political video on a site like YouTube, they
were less likely than females to say they would forward a political video, email, or audio
to others (OR=0.690, p<.001). Economic affluence was the other significant demographic
predictor indicating those from households with an income of one hundred thousand or
higher were more likely than less affluent households to say they forward political
material to others (OR=1.424, p<.01). Perhaps because it might be the source for some
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of the forwarded campaign material, online campaign contact was the most significant
predictor for this behavior (OR=3.981, p<.001). High levels of campaign interest
(OR=1.453, p<.001) and using the Internet as a primary campaign source (OR=1.313,
p<.001) were also significant predictors of forwarding political emails, audio, or video
(See Table 4-4).
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Table 4-4: Case 1-- Predictors of Online Political Participation: Logistic Regression EXP(B)

Education (Collgrad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income (100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Internet Access (yes)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter
Constant
N
Correctly Classified
Nagelkerke R Square
Cox & Snell R Square

Attempt to
Persuade
someone to
support/
oppose
candidate
ONLINE
.952
.894
1.821*
.865
1.235
1.068
.870
.906
1.414***
1.100**
.994
.932
NA
2.707***
3.598***
.920
.000***
4,458
96.9%
.230
.056

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ^=not asked in Case 2

Volunteer
for
candidate
or
campaign
ONLINE

Contribute
money to
candidate
or
campaign
ONLINE

^Discuss
Politics
Online

Visit
Campaign
Website

^Viewed
Political
Video on
Sites Like
YouTube

^Read or
Post to a
blog
about
campaign

Forward
Emails,
Audios,
or Videos
to Others
about the
candidates

.926
.747
3.249
.000
1.353
1.687*
1.146
1.487
1.682**
1.077
1.011
.841
NA
1.331
29.173***
1.190
.000***
4,458
99.7%
.386
.015

4.284***
1.399
1.324
1.850
1.608
.905
1.364
.968
1.266***
1.049
1.040
.894
NA
1.709
3.928**
.873
.000***
4,458
98.8%
.189
.023

1.116
.839
2.435***
.880
1.098
1.027
.871
1.108*
1.358***
1.077***
1.022
.971
NA
2.031***
4.358***
1.224
.002***
4,458
88.7%
.284
.146

1.147
.993
2.422***
1.620**
1.212
1.158***
1.055
1.103
1.411***
1.032
1.007
.969
NA
2.351***
2.571***
.965
.001***
4,458
87.0%
.313
.168

1.034
1.292*
2.698***
1.817***
1.112
.969
1.307*
1.065
1.426***
1.034
1.027
.937**
NA
1.633***
1.664
1.152
.007***
4,458
86.8%
.306
.169

.965
1.103
1.836**
1.478
.926
1.029
1.065
1.084
1.413***
1.073**
1.034
.953
NA
1.418**
1.791*
1.325*
.004***
4,458
92.3%
.239
.100

.959
.690***
1.215
1.142
1.424**
.977
.712**
.895*
1.313***
1.106***
1.002
1.024
NA
1.453***
3.981***
1.035
.027***
4,458
85.0%
.231
.133
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4-2.4: Online Index and Offline Index: Predictors

The analyses thus far suggest a complex pattern of predictors of campaign
participation that varied both by type of participation and whether that participation
occurred online or offline. But can we say anything more general about these patterns?
As one attempt to do this, in this section I report the results of two OLS regression
models measuring the predictors for a combined online index and a combined offline
index.

As stated in the methods chapter (Ch 3.), the online participation index was

created by combining the “yes” responses to the questions related directly to online
participation. The offline index variable was created by combining the “yes” responses to
the offline questions.
The OLS online participation index model produced two strong demographic
predictors: Age and race. Age is also a significant predictor for offline participation, but
not as strong as for online participation. Young adults were more likely to report
engaging in at least one of the online participation activities (b=.368, p<.001). Being
African American significantly predicts online participation, as well (b=.128, p<.05).
Youth is a significant predictor for offline participation (b=.105, p<.001), but no other
demographic variables produce strong significant effects. Religious attendance produces
a weak, but significant positive effect for offline participation (b=.013, p<.05) (See Table
4-5).
Moving beyond the demographic variables, online campaign contact was a strong,
significant predictor for online participation, more so, by far, than any other control
variable (b=1.295, p<.001). However, it was not a significant predictor for offline
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participation. High campaign interest was a significant predictor for both online (b=.196,
p<.001) and offline participation (b=.119, p<.001). Finally, citing the Internet as a
primary campaign information source was a significant predictor of online participation
(b=.202, p<.001) (See Table 4-5).

Table 4-5: Case 1--Predictors of Online Political Participation and Offline
Political Participation: OLS Regression

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Internet Access (Yes)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter
Constant
N

Online Participation
Index
.008
-.028
.368***
.128*
.071
.011
-.001
.013
.202***
.041***
.009
-.018**
NA
.196***
1.295***
.065
-.538***
4,457

Offline
Participation
Index
.012
-.015
.105***
.025
.028
.013*
.064***
.003
.006*
.016***
.004
.003
.024
.119***
.084
-.043**
-.275***
4,457

R Square

.362

.079

R Square Change

.306***

.067***

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

4-3: Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both
As our final effort to assess the mobilizing and/or reinforcing effects of the
Internet on political participation in Case 1, I replicated the logistic regression models for
predicting online participation discussed earlier, this time adding variables for the
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interaction of Internet access the central demographic independent variables (age,
income, race, gender and education).19 The purpose of these analyses is to determine if
the combination of Internet access (used here as a proxy for general Internet use) and key
demographic characteristics has an additional effect on offline participation beyond that
of any main effects, and if so, are these effects more consistent with reinforcement (i.e.,
the interaction further boosts the participation of those who already participate at
relatively greater rates) or mobilization (i.e., it reduces or erases the participation gaps
traditionally associated with SES).
However, the results of these tests of the mobilization and reinforcement
hypotheses produced no significant interactions between Internet access and any of the
significant demographic variables predicting the offline participation activities. In short,
these tests, while limited, provided no additional support for either mobilization or
reinforcement.
4-4: Case 1--Summary of Findings
In Case 1 the analysis focused on a period during the primaries and caucuses in
which there was a great deal of activity due to the number of states holding their
primary/caucus electoral contests at that time. The takeaway from the Case 1 analysis is
that age, race, online contact and campaign interest are consistently strong predictors for
both the online index and individual activities, but individuals show more nuanced
behavior which cannot be picked up by the index. In summarizing Case 1 findings, the

19

As detailed in the methods chapter, a test was conducted for mobilization or reinforcement only among
the offline participation variables. The Internet measure during the Case 1 period was an access measure
and not a frequency measure.
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descriptive analysis of the Case 1 online and offline participation activities revealed that
the traditional demographic variables associated with participation—education and
income—produced the biases found in prior research. However, the frequencies pointed
to some evidence that young people, a group not traditionally associated with
participation, had become involved in a number of participation activities, both offline
(persuasion), and online (persuasion, discussion, visiting campaign web sites, viewing
online political video and reading or posting to a blog). In addition, African Americans
were more likely to become involved in the campaign, according to the descriptive
analysis.
As for general participatory behavior, the descriptive analysis indicated a
relatively low level of reported participation among the total adult population for most
activities. However, when extrapolating these relatively low numbers to the actual adult
population, they do not appear to be insignificant—numbering in the millions. One
potential explanation for the low numbers could be a result of how the questions were
posed to the respondents. During the Case 1 period, respondents were asked to report
their behavior in the prior week only rather than over the entire campaign. Case 2 posed
the participation questions to respondents in a way they could answer retrospectively over
the entire campaign. As will be shown in the presentation of the Case 2 findings, reported
behaviors were higher.
As part of the descriptive analysis, correlations among the various participation
activities were generally low, with a few exceptions for online participation where the
relationships were moderate (r ranging between .24 and .45). This analysis indicates that
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since the activities were not highly correlated, then following an analytical plan whereby,
each activity was examined, separately, makes sense.
Predictors showed that with statistical controls in place, the effect of education and
income disappeared or diminished for most activities. Young adults remained significant
predictors for several activities, but the significance of African Americans as predictors
of certain behaviors disappeared or diminished. Beyond the demographics, online
campaign contact and campaign interest, emerged consistently as the most robust
predictors of behavior for nearly all participation activities, both online and offline.
Contrary to the online analysis presentation online campaign contact was not a
consistent predictor of offline participation. However, where the Obama campaign
excelled—using the Internet to mobilize volunteers—online campaign contact was a
robust, significant predictor. Campaign interest was most consistent predictor, since it
was significant for both offline persuasion and offline donation.
Tables 4-6 and 4-7 provide a visual summary of which variables were the top
predictors based on both level of significance and size of the odds ratio. A positive sign
next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was
greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the odds ratio was less than one,
meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity. For example, if Age
(18-29) was significant and negative, then those older than age 29 were more likely to
perform the activity.
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Table 4-6: Case 1-- Top 6 Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation
(Up to 6)
Persuade
someone to vote
offline
Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter

Volunteer for
candidate
offline

Donate to
Presidential
Campaign
OFFLINE
X+

X+

X+
X+
X+

X+

X+
X+
X-

X-
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Table 4-7: Case 1—Top Significant Predictors of Online Participation (Up to 6)
Persuade
someone to
vote online

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter

Volunteer
for
candidate
online

Donate to a
Presidential
Campaign
Online

Discuss
politics
online

Visit
Campaign
Website

X+

X+
X+

Viewed
Video
Sites
Like
YouTube

Read or
Post to a
blog about
campaign

Forward
Emails

X+

X-

X+
X+

X+
X+
X+

X+
X+

X+

X+

X+
X+
X+

X+

X+
X+

X+

X+
X+

X+

X+

X+

X+

X+
X+

X+

X+
X+

X+
X+

X+

X+
X+
X+

X+
X+
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Finally, the Case 1 analysis provided no support for either mobilization or
reinforcement during the early primaries and caucuses. Internet access did not
significantly interact with any of the significant demographic predictors for the offline
activities, either individually or for the combined index.
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CHAPTER 5: CASE 2 FINDINGS-- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT
DURING THE PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES PERIOD-RETROSPECTIVE DATA
COLLECTION
This chapter presents the analysis of mobilization and reinforcement during the
primaries and caucuses, measured retrospectively. The findings reported in the previous
chapter were measured during a narrower period of time and respondents were asked to
report their activities in the prior week. This retrospective analysis takes a broader look at
the participation activities respondents reported throughout the primaries and caucuses.
The Case 2 data were collected as part of the NAES rolling cross section
telephone sample from July 2, 2008 through August 4, 2008. This chapter presents
results of the following analyses
•

A descriptive analysis of political participation activities reported
retrospectively, including a correlation analysis among participation activities;

•

Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online
participation;

•

Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between levels of Internet
use and demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization
and/or reinforcement; and

•

A comparison between the data from Cases 1 and 2
5-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities

In Case 1, political participation was based on self-reported behavior in the week
prior to being interviewed during an intensive period of the primaries and caucuses
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calendar when a strong majority of the states were holding or had just held their primaries
or caucuses. Despite the intensity of campaign activity across many states, the
percentage of adults who indicated engaging in some form of participation was low.
Perhaps this low report of activity is a consequence of the prior week recall method. The
data indicate a similar pattern of recall and reporting as Case 3 (which focused on the
general election) when the participation questions were posed in a similar manner. Not
surprisingly, given the wider time-frame covered, respondents reported higher levels of
participation using this method. The relative rates of participation across different types
were generally similar across the two cases, however, giving us confidence that the
responses accurately reflect actual behavior.
Consistent with the traditional SES model documented by Verba and Nie (1972)
among others, advantaged groups--well-educated and affluent--were consistently more
likely to say they participated in all the activities—offline or online—than were the less
educated and less affluent (See Table 5-1). However, once again African Americans, a
group considered less likely to participate in prior elections, far exceeded their nonAfrican American counterparts in a number of reported offline activities and two of five
of online activities.

The emergence of African Americans as more active participants in

this and other cases reported in this dissertation suggests that the unique nature of the
2008 presidential campaign, where for the first time in United States history an African
American was a serious contender for a party nomination, may have disproportionately
mobilized African American voters. In addition young adults (age 18-29) were more
likely to say they participated in some activities, but less likely than older adults to do so
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for things like donating money to a campaign. The data in Table 5-1, are descriptive in
nature and there are no controls to further explain the result.
Across the adult population, more than three in ten (31%) said they made an
attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose a presidential candidate during the
primaries and caucuses. More than a quarter said they did so offline (27.5%), but well
under a tenth (3.6%) said they persuaded others using online methods (See Table 5-1).
The finding showing that persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate is done
most often offline, rather than online, is consistent with findings from all the cases.
About a tenth of adults (10.5%), claimed to have contributed to a campaign. The
data reveal that contributing is more likely to be done offline (6.5%) than online (4.1%)
during the primaries and caucuses, but the differences are slim and insignificant.
However, it is noteworthy that there is a nearly even split between the more traditional
offline methods and the more recent online methods (See Table 5-1). Additionally,
despite the massive efforts campaigns make to solicit donations via their web sites, there
is only a moderate correlation between donating to a campaign online and visiting a
campaign web site (r=.26).
The success of any campaign also rests partly on the size of its volunteer
campaign organization. According to the Case 2 data, just 2.1 percent of respondents
indicated they performed any work for one of the candidates offline and even fewer did
so online (less than one half of one percent) (See Table 5-1). While a relatively small
proportion of adults said they took part in these activities, they were both moderately
correlated with attending political rallies and meetings and wearing a presidential
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campaign button (r=.29) or displaying a bumper sticker or yard sign in support of a
candidate (r=.24).
About a tenth of adults also said they engaged in the two traditional offline
activities added to the survey during the retrospective period--wearing presidential
campaign buttons, placing a bumper sticker or yard sign in support of a candidate (9.1%)
and attending political meetings and rallies in support of a candidate (7.4%). These
represent modest numbers but are slightly higher than what NAES reported in 2004
(Romer et al., 2006).20
Because of space limitations on the survey, I measured only five of the original
eight online participation activities in the retrospective period.21 Among the included
activities, the most popular related to campaign learning and passing along campaign
information. About a quarter (23.1%) said they visited a web site of a presidential
campaign or political party and slightly more than a fifth (20.9%) said they forward
emails, audio, or video about the presidential campaign to others (See Table 5-1). Their
interest is in campaign information gathering and dissemination and as such, these
activities are moderately correlated (r= .31). Forwarding emails was also moderately
correlated with online persuasion (r=.28). Correlations offer support to this research
design which asserts that analysis should focus on individual activities rather than a
combined index.

20

In 2004 NAES showed that 4.0% reported displaying a sign, button, or bumper sticker at any time during
the campaign, and 3.4% said they attended a rally or meeting in support of a candidate at any time during
the campaign.
21
The survey did not include the following activities; discussing politics online, reading/posting to a blog,
and viewing a political video online.
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Table 5-1: Case 2 Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls)
Activities Regardless of Whether it
Was Performed Offline during the
presidential primary campaign

Attempt to persuade someone to
support or oppose a presidential
candidate

All
College
Not
Adults Graduate/ College
%
Higher Graduate
%
%

Male
%

Female
%

Age 18- Age 30 or African
Not
Household Household
29
older American African Income: Income:
%
%
%
American $100K Less than
%
Or more
$100K
%
%
(n=2,217) (n=906) (n=1,311) (n=906) (n=1,311) (n=175) (n=2,042) (n=158) (n=2,059) (n=464) (n=1,753)
31.1
37.0***
26.9
32.8
30.0
36.0
30.7
32.3
31.0
38.8***
29.1

Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates

2.4

3.4**

1.7

2.4

2.4

2.3

2.4

5.1*

2.2

4.3**

1.9

Contribute money to campaigns or
candidates
OFFLINE Activities during the
presidential primary campaign
Attempt to persuade someone
OFFLINE to support or oppose a
candidate

10.5

18.0***

5.3

11.6

9.8

4.0**

11.1

15.8*

10.1

19.0***

8.3

27.5

32.0***

28.1

27.2

36.8

32.0

27.1

30.4

27.3

33.0**

26.1

2.1

2.8

1.6

2.2

2.0

2.3

2.1

4.4*

1.9

3.9**

1.6

6.5

9.8***

4.1

7.1

6.0

1.1**

6.9

7.6

6.4

9.7**

5.6

7.4

9.4**

5.9

7.3

7.4

6.9

7.4

14.6***

6.8

10.8**

6.4

Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates OFFLINE
Contribute money to campaigns or
candidates OFFLINE
Attend political meetings, rallies,
speeches, dinners or things like that
in support of a particular
presidential candidate OFFLINE
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Wear a presidential campaign
button, put a campaign sticker on
your car or place a sign in your
window or in front of your house.
ONLINE activities during the
presidential primary campaign
Attempt to persuade someone to
support or oppose one of the
presidential candidates ONLINE
Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates ONLINE
Contribute money to campaigns or
candidates ONLINE
Visited Web site of a presidential
campaign or political party

9.1

10.2

8.3

7.9

9.8

13.7*

8.7

24.1***

7.9

12.7**

8.1

3.6

5.2**

2.5

4.7*

2.8

4.0

3.6

1.9

3.7

5.8**

3.0

+
+

0.7*

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

0.6

+
+

+
+

+
+

4.1

8.2***

1.2

4.5

3.7

2.9

4.2

8.2**

3.7

9.3***

2.7

23.1

33.2***

16.2

24.0

22.6

29.7*

22.6

31.6**

22.5

37.3***

19.4

21.0

33.0***

17.7

20.9
26.9***
Forwarded emails, audio or video
16.8
19.0
22.3
20.0
21.0
19.6
about presidential candidates or
campaigns to friends, families, coworkers or other people you know
+=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05
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5-2: Determining Predictors of Online and Offline Political Participation during the
Primaries
The descriptive analysis of participation activities during the primaries
provided some evidence that the traditional biases that favor the better educated and
more affluent continued in 2008, with some exceptions. However, multivariate
analysis using logistic and OLS regression models including several statistical
controls provide a very different picture. For instance, high levels of education
continued to be a significant predictor for contributing campaign funds, but its
significance disappeared for all other participation activities measured. Income as a
predictor of campaign participation emerged only for the acts of forwarding emails
and offline volunteering. On the other hand, unlike Case 1 the models did not predict
an increase in the predictive value of age on participation. Young adults were
significant predictors for just a handful of activities. Like Case 1, African Americans
and women were significant predictors of only a few activities.
In the remainder of this section, I present the details of these multivariate
analyses for the following types of participation activities: 1) persuasion,
volunteering, and donating without regard to whether the activity took place online or
offline; 2) offline activities including offline persuasion, offline campaign
volunteering, offline donating, attending presidential campaign meetings or rallies, or
the wearing of campaign buttons; 3) online activities including online persuasion,
volunteering, online donating, visiting campaign web sites, and forwarding emails,
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audio or video related to the presidential campaign, and 4) the combined online and
offline indexes.
While the demographic variables are my primary focus, the political
variables-- campaign interest and online campaign contact--generally emerged as the
most robust significant predictors for many of the participation activities. The
noteworthy strength of campaign contact is consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen’s
(1993) argument about mobilizing citizens to participate in the political process.

5-2.1: Predictors of participation activities regardless of online or offline distinctions
Generally, Case 2 patterns of participation in these areas were similar to those
observed in Case 1. Age was a significant predictor of donating to campaigns.
Online contact and campaign interest were the most robust and significant predictors
within all three of the activities measured, regardless of online and offline
distinctions.
5-2.1.1: Attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate.
Even with controls, young adults, age 18 to 29, were nearly twice as likely as older
respondents to say they persuaded someone to support or oppose a presidential
candidate (OR=1.921, p<.01). African Americans were less likely than non-African
Americans to say they engaged in this type of persuasion (OR=.636/1.57 for nonAfrican Americans, p<.05). High levels of campaign interest (OR=2.179, p<.001) and
online campaign contact (OR=1.832, p<.05) also were significant predictors of
persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate. Additionally, “persuaders”
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were more likely to be Obama voters in the primaries (OR=1.553, p<.01) (See Table
5-2).
5-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign. Once controls
were added there were no significant demographic predictors for volunteering to
work for a candidate regardless of whether it was done online or offline. High
interest in the presidential campaign (OR=2.346, p<.01) and online campaign contact
(OR=2.596, p<.05) were the strongest predictors. They were more than twice as
likely to volunteer for a campaign during the primaries than those not contacted and
less interested. This may suggest the success or necessity for an effective grassroots
communication campaign to encourage this active form of participation (See Table 72).
5-2.1.3: Contributing money to a candidate or campaign. The regression
model indicates that better educated adults were more likely to donate to a campaign
during the primary (OR=2.176, p<.001). However, the likelihood of donating was
greatest among those who were contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=4.698
p<.001). As in the other activities, campaign interest (OR=2.155, p<.001) was also a
significant predictor. The effect of Internet use was important to the act of donating
money to a campaign, according to the model, since those more frequently online
were nearly one and one half times more likely to say they contributed to one of the
campaigns (OR=1.448, p<.05). Politically, Obama support during the primaries, was
a significant predictor. Obama voters (OR=1.7436, p<.01) were almost twice as likely
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as those who voted for other candidates to say they donated to one of the campaigns
(See Table 5-2).
Table 5-2: Case 2--Predictors of Political Participation Regardless of whether it was
conducted offline or online
Logistic Regression EXP(B)
Volunteer for
Candidate or
Campaign

Contribute
Money to
candidate or
campaign

Education (CollGrad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income (100K +)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Primary Voter
Constant
N

Attempt to
Persuade
someone to
support/ oppose
candidate
1.064
.876
1.921**
.636*
1.028
1.089*
1.155
.998
1.121***
1.067**
1.019
1.032
.794
2.179***
1.832*
1.553**
.015***
2,000

.718
.950
1.252
1.620
1.924
1.032
1.382
1.246
1.092
1.058
1.133*
.881*
.825
2.346**
2.596*
1.377
.000***
2,000

2.176***
1.045
.416
1.316
1.384
.961
1.235
1.030
1.003
1.026
1.137***
.997
1.448*
2.155***
4.698***
1.743**
.002
2,000

Correctly Classified

71.8%

97.6%

90.0%

Nagelkerke R Square

.190

.159

.266

Cox & Snell R Square

.136

.032

.133

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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5-2.2: Predictors of offline participation activities
There were no dominant demographic independent predictors of the offline
behaviors. Younger adults were more likely to say they persuaded someone to support or
oppose a candidate during the primaries and caucuses. Economic affluence was a
significant predictor of offline campaign volunteering. African Americans, females, and
those with less than a college degree were more likely than their counterparts to say they
wore buttons or displayed a bumper sticker or sign during the primary and caucus season.
Those with at least a college degree were more likely to say they donated offline to a
presidential campaign during the primaries. The retrospective analysis produced little
consistency in which demographic groups would be more likely to engage in offline
participation. Again, there was more consistency among the political variables,
especially high campaign interest, online campaign contact, and Obama support, with
campaign interest being a significant predictor for all measured activities.
These results bear some resemblance to Case 1 findings. However, the strength
of online campaign contact diminished, while campaign interest remained a significant
predictor.
5-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone offline to vote for a candidate. Young
adults were nearly twice as likely to say they persuaded others to support or oppose one
of the presidential candidates during the primaries and caucuses (OR=1.900, p<.001).
Those highly interested in the primary campaigns (OR=1.937, p<.001) and those
contacted online by one of the candidates (OR=1.797, p<.05) were also nearly twice as

121
likely as their counterparts to say they engaged in this type of persuasion. Obama voters
in the primaries were over one and a half times more likely to say they persuaded
someone offline to support or oppose a candidate (OR=1.540, p<.01). Interestingly, the
less time one spent online the more likely they were to report persuading someone offline
to support or oppose a candidate (OR=1.402/ 0.713 for frequent Internet users, p<.05)
(See Table 5-3).
5-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. Affluence and
online campaign contact were the most robust predictors of volunteering offline. Those
with household incomes of $100,000 or greater (OR=2.279, p<.05) and those contacted
by a campaign online were more than twice as likely (OR=2.354, p<.01) to say they
volunteered to work for a candidate offline (See Table 5-3).
5-2.2.3: Contributing money offline to a presidential candidate or campaign.
Those with at least a college degree were nearly twice as likely as their counterparts
(OR=1.701, p<.05) to say they donated to a presidential campaign offline during the
primaries. Perhaps related to education, those who cite the newspaper as a campaign
source (OR=1.213, p<.001) are also more likely to indicate they participated online.
Campaign interest is the most robust predictor of offline campaign donation during the
primary (OR=1.929, p<.001), according to the model (See Table 5-3).
5-2.2.4: Attending a rally, meeting, or other event in support of a candidate.
According to the logistic model tested in Case 2, no significant demographic predictors
emerged for attending a rally or meeting in support of a candidate. Those more likely to
participate in this way were those contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=3.528,

122
p<.001), highly interested in the campaign (OR=1.832, p<.001), Obama voters in the
primaries and caucuses (OR=1.700, p<.05) and liberal (OR=1.296, p<.01) (See Table 53).
5-2.2.5: Wearing a campaign button, placing a bumper sticker or lawn sign in
support of a candidate. The logistic model estimates that African Americans were nearly
three times more likely to display their support for their candidate with either a button,
bumper sticker or sign (OR=2.767, p<.001). Additionally, the model estimated that the
less educated were more than one and a half times more likely to display their support in
this manner (OR=1.618/0.618 for higher educated, p<.05). Again, online campaign
contact (OR=2.221, p<.01), voting for Obama in the primaries or caucuses (OR=2.112,
p<.001), and high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.853, p<.001) were significant
predictors of this form of persuasion. Ideologically, self-identified liberals were more
likely than moderates or conservatives to say they wore a button or displayed a sign or
bumper sticker (OR=1.328, p<.01) (See Table 5-3).
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Table 5-3: Case 2-- Predictors of Offline Political Participation
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

Education (CollGrad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income (100K +)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Internet Frequency (Several hours a day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Primary Voter
Constant
N
Correctly Classified
Nagelkerke R Square
Cox & Snell R Square

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Attempt to Persuade
someone to support
or oppose candidate
OFFLINE
1.048
.866
1.900**
.699
1.056
1.081
1.169
.986
1.064**
1.056**
1.026
1.045*
.713*
1.937***
1.797*
1.540**
.021***
2,000
728%
.141
.098

Volunteer for
candidate or
campaign
OFFLINE
.656
1.100
1.436
1.569
2.279*
1.000
1.211
1.215
1.046
1.055
1.129*
.867
.736
2.354**
2.212
1.601
.000
2,000
97.9%
.139
.026

Donate to
candidate or
campaign
OFFLINE
1.701*
1.013
.149
1.373
1.204
.960
1.023
1.030
.930
1.036
1.213***
.981
1.052
1.929***
1.592
.904
.003
2,000
93.3%
.149
.058

Attend Rally/
Meeting

.781
.885
.878
1.572
1.329
1.050
1.349
1.296**
1.056
1.074*
1.073*
.945
.893
1.832***
3.528***
1.700*
.003
2,000
92.4%
.171
.071

Wear Campaign
Button/Bumper
Sticker/Lawn Sign
.618*
.691*
1.685
2.767**
1.327
1.029
1.287
1.328**
1.119***
1.055
1.048
.969
.900
1.853***
2.221**
2.112***
.003***
2,000
90.8%
.202
.093
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5-2.3: Predictors of online participation activities
As with the online participation behaviors measured in Case 2, no single
demographic independent variable dominated as the most likely to predict the online
participation activities measured in Case 2. A high level of education was a significant
predictor of two of the five measured activities. However, campaign interest, online
campaign contact, citing the Internet as a campaign information source, a high frequency
of Internet use, and Obama support all were significant predictors of multiple online
activities. The models show that most of the significant predictors were for contributing
money to a campaign online, visiting a campaign web site, and forwarding political
emails, audio, and videos to others.
Case 2 results differ from Case 1 possibly as a consequence of three factors.
First, Case 2 measured fewer participation activities, excluding because of space
limitations “reading or commenting on a political blog,” “viewing a political video
online,” and “discussing the presidential campaign online.” Second, the sample size was
smaller by more than half in Case 2. Age was not as frequently a significant predictor,
nor was online campaign contact. Third, the question wording differed in each case
5-2.3.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a candidate.
Once controls were added, there were no significant demographic predictors of online
persuasion, according to the logistic regression model. In fact, there were just two
significant predictors from the model. These predictors, high campaign interest
(OR=3.269, p<.001) and using the Internet as a primary campaign source (OR=1.358,
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p<.001), are more consistent with a reinforcement than a mobilization argument (See
Table 5-4).
5-2.3.2: Volunteering online to do work for a candidate. There were no
significant predictors for the act of volunteering online for a campaign (See Table 5-4).
This result is also possibly due to very few respondents, retrospectively, reporting that
they engaged in this behavior (less than 0.5%). However, this low number does not fully
explain the lack of significant predictors and I am uncertain of other reasons for this.
5-2.3.3: Contributing money online to a presidential campaign. The analysis to
determine the predictors of donating online to a campaign, again, showed that the higher
the education level, the more likely one is to say they contributed money to one of the
presidential campaigns online. Those with a college degree or higher were over three
times more likely to indicate they made an online donation to one of the campaigns
(OR=3.709, p<.001), a finding consistent with the reinforcement argument. The model
also indicates that online contact efforts to solicit donations were very successful since
those who said they were contacted by one of the campaigns online were over six times
more likely to say they made an online donation (OR=6.178, p<.001). Voting for Obama
during the primaries and caucuses was also a significant predictor of online donations
since those claiming they voted for Obama in the primaries or caucuses were over three
times more likely to report contributing online than were voters of the other primary
season candidates (OR=3.394, p<.001). High levels of campaign interest (OR=2.483,
p<.01), spending a great deal of time online (OR=2.115, p<.01) were also significant
predictors (See Table 5-4).
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5-2.3.4: Visiting a campaign web site. The profile of someone visiting a
presidential campaign web site during the primaries and caucuses in Case 2 can be
described generally as a young adult, with at least a college degree, highly interested in
the campaign, generally online a great deal including time spent on the Internet for
campaign information. They were more likely to say they voted for Obama during the
primaries and caucuses and say they were contacted by one of the campaigns online.
According to the logistic model, younger adults were more likely to say they
visited a presidential campaign web site during the primaries and caucuses than older
adults (OR=1.601, p<.05). Those with at least a college degree were more likely than
those with less education to say they visited a campaign web site (OR=1.411, p<.01).
The several other significant political and behavioral predictors for going to a campaign
web site included, online campaign contact (OR=3.191, p<.001), high campaign interest
(OR=1.773, p<.001), high frequency of Internet use (OR=1.653, p<.001), Obama voter
(OR=1.479, p<.05), and citing the Internet as a major campaign information source
(OR=1.240, p<.001) (See Table 5-4).
5-2.3.5: Forwarding emails, audio or videos to others about the candidates or
campaign. A different demographic profile of those more likely to forward political
emails emerged than the one for visiting a campaign web site. Females (OR=1.825/.548
for men, p<.001) and those from more affluent households (OR=1.368, p<.05) were more
likely than their counterparts to say they forwarded political emails, audio, or video to
others. Politically, those more likely to forward political emails included Obama primary
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voters (OR=1.571, p<.05) and non-Democrats (OR=1.445/0.692 for Democrats, p<.05).22
In this case, unlike others, online campaign contact is not a significant predictor of this
behavior, but high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.614, p<.001), spending a great deal
of time online (OR=1.665, p<.001), and users of the Internet for political information
(OR=1.240, p<.001) are significant predictors of this behavior (See Table 5-4).

22

There was a great deal of email in support or opposition of all candidates. Some were campaigngenerated or sanctioned, some were not. This might explain why I see Obama voters and non-Democrats
more likely to forward emails, etc…For example, there were anti-Hillary Clinton campaign emails coming
from both the Obama campaign and its supporters as well as a loosely organized group calling itself
“Project Chaos.” The goal of “Project Chaos” was to encourage Republicans to switch registration during
the primaries to become Democrats in order to vote for Hillary Clinton and thus artificially extend the
Democratic primaries and caucuses. These groups may have been forwarding both pro-Obama/antiObama, pro-Clinton/anti-Clinton electronic communications. In addition, during January and February, the
Republican campaign was active. I have no way of confirming this with the available data, however.
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Table 5-4: Case 2-- Predictors of Online Political Participation
Logistic Regression EXP(B)
(*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001)
Attempt to Persuade
someone to support/
oppose candidate
ONLINE

Education (CollGrad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income (100K +)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Internet Frequency (Several hours a day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Primary Voter
Constant
N
Correctly Classified
Nagelkerke R Square
Cox & Snell R Square

1.146
1.008
1.334
.530
.840
1.057
.903
1.073
1.358***
1.039
.966
.934
1.540
3.269***
.973
.968
.000
2,000
96.6%
.211
.055

Volunteer for
candidate or
campaign
ONLINE

1.303
.213
.000
2.170
.505
1.529
4.362
1.787
1.999
1.098
1.161
1.028
1.913
2.593
4.322
.390
.000
2,000
99.7%
.401
.016

Contribute
money to
candidate or
campaign
ONLINE
3.709***
1.159
.839
1.295
1.489
.951
1.713
.999
1.161**
.993
.954
1.021
2.115**
2.483**
6.178***
3.394***
.000***
2,000
96.3%
.387
.115

Visit
Campaign
Web site

1.411**
.869
1.601*
1.323
1.304
1.076
1.201
1.135*
1.240***
1.033
1.023
.926**
1.653***
1.773***
3.191***
1.479*
.011***
2,000
80.3%
.299
.200

Forward
Emails,
Audios, or
Videos to
Others about
the candidates
1.015
.548***
1.136
.719
1.368*
1.035
.692*
.921
1.240***
1.044
1.023
.991
1.665***
1.614***
1.243
1.571*
.035***
2,000
79.4%
.228
.147
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5-2.4: Online index and offline index: predictors
As in Case 1, an analysis was conducted to determine the predictors of online
political participation and offline participation, where the dependent variables are the
combined indexes of participation. The purpose, again, is to determine whether there is a
more general pattern underlying the findings regarding predictors of more specific forms
of offline and online participation, and whether this pattern hints at mobilization,
reinforcement, both, or neither.
Among the demographic variables in the model, income is the only one which
emerged as a significant predictor of both the online (b=.116, p<.01) and offline indexes
(b=.095, p<.05). That is, those affluent adults were more likely to participate in at least
one activity. However, the income coefficient for offline participation is weak.
Education (b=.080. p<.05) and gender (b= -.100, p<.01) were significant predictors for
online participation, but not offline participation. The offline model suggests that women
were more likely than men to say they participated in offline activities. Race was a
significant predictor for offline participation, but not online participation. African
Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to participate offline (b=.143,
p<.05).
The variables with the strongest coefficients for predicting online or offline
participation were online contact by the campaign Obama voters in the primary, and
campaign interest (b= .582 for the online index and b=.597 for the offline index.
Additionally, online frequency was not a significant predictor for offline activities, but
was a significant predictor for online activities (b=.23, p<.001) (See Table 5-5).
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The results differ from the analysis of individual participation variables since
gender and income emerged from the online index model, but other significant variables
do not. Interest and contact are significant for both models, while race is significant for
the offline index, only.

131
Table 5-5: Case 2--Predictors of Online Political Participation and Offline
Political Participation: OLS Regression

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Voter
Constant
N

Online Participation
Index
.080*
-.100**
.068
.002
.116**
.014
-.006
.014
.097***
.015*
.006
-.015*
.218***
.164***
.582***
.217***
-.366***
1,999

Offline
Participation
Index
-.015
-.063
.128
.143*
.095*
.016
.069
.045*
.021**
.027***
.030***
-.004
-.082
.209***
.597***
.262***
-.510
1,999

R Square

.326

.173

R Square Change

.252***

.149***

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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5-3: Further Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both
The final step in Case 2 is the more direct test of the mobilization and
reinforcement hypotheses. As stated in the methods chapter (Ch 3), the logic of the
analyses in this step is straightforward. Consider, for example, the frequency of online
political discussion. Suppose, hypothetically, that in the initial logistic regression
analyses described in “step three” I find that both frequent Internet use and being young
(18-29) increases online political discussion. If Internet use acts to increase discussion
among an older population (30 or older) beyond the direct or main effects of being young
and using the Internet frequently (i.e., has a mobilizing effect), then the interaction (b
coefficient) between these two variables should be significant and negative. The negative
interaction serves to close the gap between the two age groups. In this case the Internet
mobilizes older people to more online political discussion. A positive and significant
interaction (b coefficient) in this case would widen the gap between the two age groups
and serve to reinforce. Beyond this, the size of the interaction (relative to the main
effects of age and Internet use) and the specific pattern of this interaction (i.e., whether it
is being driven by young people who use the internet frequently increasing their political
discussion or Internet users decreasing their political discussion) provides further
evidence in support or opposition to the mobilization hypothesis. In order to see the
effect of the interaction visually, I plotted each significant interaction to display its effect.
Moving from the hypothetical to the actual Case 2 data, the logistic models
produced significant interactions between frequent Internet use and education for
predicting contributing to a campaign offline (OR=.801, p<.05, b=-.222) and for
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predicting visiting a campaign web site (OR=.880, p<.05, b=-.127). The negative
coefficients indicate that the original relationships between education and these activities
were moderated by their interaction with the frequency of general Internet use. Therefore,
this provides support for mobilization (H1A). Additionally, the models showed that
relationship between high income and forwarding political emails, audios, or videos
(OR=.851, p<.01, b=-.162) and engaging in any online activity (as measured by the
index) (b=-.031, p<.05) was significantly moderated by interacting with online frequency
(See Table 5-6 and 5-7). These results provide support for hypotheses 2c and 2d—
evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement. While the coefficients presented in
Tables 5-6 and 5-7 show the significant interactions, the effects are better illustrated by
viewing the graphic presentations in Figures 5-1 to 5-4.
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Table 5-6: Case 2: Testing for Mobilization and Reinforcement--Significant Interactions: (Exp(B)(b coefficient)
Offline Campaign
Contributions: with
Interaction (Internet
Frequency X Education
(Coll grad or higher))

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
Obama Voter
Online Frequency X Income ($100K or higher)
Online Frequency X Education (Col Grad or higher)
Constant
N
Correctly classified
Nagelkerke R Square
Cox Snell R Square
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

1.677* (b=0.517)
1.012
.147
1.334
1.240
.972
1.039
1.032
.929*
1.038
1.215***
.979
1.341
1.934***
1.575
.944
NA
.801* (b=-0.222)
.003***
1,999
93.3%
.155
.060

Visiting a Campaign
Web Site (Internet
Frequency X
Education (Coll grad
or higher))

1.485** (b=0.396)
.871
1.596*
1.307
1.324*
1.082
1.215
1.138*
1.239***
1.034
1.023
.927***
1.795***
1.768***
3.093***
1.519*
NA
.880* (b=-0.127)
.010***
2,000
80.5%
.303
.203

Forwarding Political
Emails (Internet
Frequency X Income
($100K or higher))

1.013
.538***
1.131
.727
1.609** (b=0.475)
1.038
.686*
.922
1.239***
1.041
1.021
.993
1.837***
1.619***
1.277
1.592*
.851** (b=-0.162)
NA
.033***
2,000
78.9%
.235
.152
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Table 5-7: Case 2: Testing Mobilization and Reinforcement on the Combined Online
Participation Index
OLS Regression
(Unstandardized B)
Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
Obama Supporter
Online Frequency X Income ($100K or higher)
Constant
N

Online Participation Index
. 080*
-.101**
.068
.003
.137**
.015
-.007
.014
.097***
.015*
.006
-.014*
.231***
.164***
.588***
.218***
-.031*
-.369***
1,999

R Square

.323

R Square Change

.249***

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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5.3.1: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting offline
contributions to a presidential campaign during the primaries and caucuses
Figure 5-1 illustrates that frequent general Internet use reduces the likelihood of
offline campaign donations among the better educated, while increasing this likelihood
among those without a college degree. That is, the result of this interaction is a clear
narrowing of the participation gap between greater and lesser educated citizens, a finding
that provides direct support for the mobilization thesis (H1a).
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Figure 5-1: Case 2 Interaction: Education (College Grad or Higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Offline Donations
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5-3.2: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting visiting a
campaign web site
The interaction between frequent Internet use and education produced evidence
for both mobilization and reinforcement in predicting visiting a campaign web site during
the primaries and caucuses period. Those who have earned at least a college degree and
are frequently on the Internet are more likely to say they visited a web site during that
time. Similarly, the more frequently those with less education are online, the more likely
they are to say they visited a campaign web site during the primaries and caucuses (See
Figure 5-2). Thus, hypotheses 2c and 2d are supported by these data. At the very least,
visiting a campaign website the Internet mobilized previously disengaged citizens to
participate online (H2c) while also reinforcing the online participation of already engaged
citizens (H2d). The net effect of these two impacts of the Internet is to increase the
overall level of this form of participation while modestly reducing the participation gap
based on education.
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Figure 5-2: Case 2 Interaction: Education (College Grad or higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Visiting a Campaign Web Site
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5-3.3:Income (household income $100k or higher) by high Internet use predicting the
likelihood of forwarding political email/audio/video
The gap between more and less affluent adults just about completely closes in the
interaction between income and frequency of Internet when assessing the likelihood of
forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others. Those most frequently online are
most likely to engage in this forwarding behavior regardless of income. The gap is much
wider between the two income categories ($100K or more and less than $100K) among
those who are less frequent Internet users.. These results provide evidence for both
mobilization and reinforcement and, thus, evidence in support of Hypotheses 2c and 2d.
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Figure 5-3: Case 2 Interaction: (Income Household Income $100k or higher)by High Internet Use Predicting Likelihood of
Forwarding Email/Audio/Video about Presidential Campaign
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5-3.4: Income (Household Income $100k or higher) by high Internet use predicting
online participation
Income by Internet frequency also shows evidence of both mobilization and
reinforcement when it comes to predicting online participation, in general. The combined
online index is the dependent variable in this instance, and as Internet frequency increases
among both income categories, the likelihood for online political participation also rises.
Hypotheses 2c and 2d are supported by this interaction (See Figure 5-4).
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Figure 5-4: Case 2: Income (Household Income $100k or higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Online Participation
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5-4: Case 2--Summary of Findings
The Case 2 findings presented a retrospective look by respondents across the
entire primaries and caucus period, rather than a narrow one week window to report their
participation activities. Given that descriptive analysis covered a wider period of
engagement—the entire primary and caucus campaign, the data revealed a higher
frequency of reporting participation activities when compared with Case 1. Also, in Case
2, there were more data on offline participation with the addition of “meetings and
rallies,” and “button wearing and bumper sticker/yard sign” display. While Case 1 had a
much lower level of activity reporting, the general patterns were similar.
In the Case 2 descriptive analysis, without the presence of statistical controls, the
data revealed that the biases of the past continued to dominate in this part of the
campaign. Higher education and higher income adults were more likely to participate in
most activities than those with less education and income. However, I also saw a
significant participation effort by African Americans in both online and offline activities
and a moderate effort by young adults. Nevertheless, many of these numbers did not
maintain any significance in the presence of controls.
With controls in place, the effect of education as a predictor was only significant
for contributing to campaigns, according to the model tested for the participation
activities. There were no consistent patterns among the demographic independent
variables when placed in each of the models to determine significant predictors of the
participation activities. Younger people were more likely to say they visited campaign
web sites and persuade others offline to support or oppose a candidate. Affluent adults
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were more likely to say they volunteered to work for a candidate, offline, and forward
political emails, audio, or video. Females were more likely to say they forwarded political
emails, audio, or videos, and African Americans were more likely to say they displayed
their support with a button, bumper sticker, or lawn sign.
Rather, the most robust predictors were not demographic but rather political or
behavioral—those with a great deal of campaign interest, those contacted online by one
of the campaigns and those who voted for Obama were all significant predictors of online
and offline participation activities during the primaries and caucuses, according to the
results of the model. Tables 5-8 and 5-9 summarize which variables significantly
predicted offline and online activities.
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Table 5-8: Case 2-- Top Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation (Up to 6)
Attempt to
Persuade
someone to
support or
oppose
candidate
OFFLINE
Education (CollGrad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income (100K +)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Primary Voter

Volunteer for
candidate or
campaign
OFFLINE

Donate to
candidate
or
campaign
OFFLINE

Attend Rally/
Meeting

X+

Wear
Campaign
Button/Bumper
Sticker/Lawn
Sign

XX-

X+
X+
X+

XX+
X+
X+

X+

X+

X+

X+

X+

X+

X+
X+
X+

X+
X+
X+

A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the
odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.
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Table 5-9: Case 2—Top Significant Predictors of Online Participation (Up to 6)
(A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the
odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.)
Attempt to
Persuade
someone to
support/
oppose
candidate
ONLINE
Education (CollGrad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income (100K +)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Primary Voter

Volunteer for
candidate or
campaign
ONLINE

Contribute
money to
candidate or
campaign
ONLINE

Visit
Campaign
Web site

NONE

X+

X+

Forward
Emails,
Audios, or
Videos to
Others
about the
candidates
X-

X+
X+
XX+

X+

X+

X+
X+
X+
X+

X+
X+
X+
X+

X+
X+
X+
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The above summarized findings are just a preamble for the crux of this research—
finding evidence for mobilization and/or reinforcement. The evidence in Case 2
supported hypotheses H1a, H2c and H2d. There was clear evidence of mobilization and
reinforcement when Internet use interacts with education and income. Lower educated
but frequent Internet users were more likely to donate offline; which is a clear indication
of mobilization. Regardless of education level, the more one is online the more one is
likely to visit a campaign web site, thus supporting mobilization and reinforcement.
Additionally, regardless of income, higher frequency of Internet use predicts forwarding
political emails, audio, and video and general online participation (mobilization and
reinforcement).
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MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT FINDINGS PART II:
GENERAL ELECTION

Part II of the “Findings” presents the mobilization and reinforcement findings
from Case 3 (Chapter 6) and Case 4 (Chapter 7).
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CHAPTER 6: CASE 3-- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT DURING THE
GENERAL ELECTION PERIOD-PRE-CONVENTION (AUGUST 8, 2008 TO
OCTOBER 2, 2008)

In this chapter, I present the findings from the Case 3 data collected during the
general election period (August 8, 2008 to October 2, 2008). Ultimately, I will test the
hypotheses addressing mobilization and reinforcement (1a-b and 2a-d), as I detailed in
Chapter 3 (Methods), this analysis will follow three steps:
•

A descriptive analysis of political participation activities using pre-general
election data, including a correlation analysis among participation activities
and between those activities and demographic independent variables;

•

Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online
participation; and,

•

Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between levels of Internet
use and demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization
and/or reinforcement.
6-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities

In prior research on political participation during general elections, the more
advantaged demographic elements, higher educated and more affluent adults, primarily
engaged in most participation activities. The descriptive data I presented in Part I from
the primaries and caucuses affirmed the prior biases, but showed some evidence of
increased participation by younger adults and African Americans. While more complex
multivariate analysis decreased the strength of education and income for some activities,
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there was evidence, also, that younger adults and African Americans were more likely to
participate in some activities. Similar to the research I conducted during the primaries,
presented in Part 1, the expectation is that the same pattern will emerge in the analysis of
the general election data. As the descriptive analysis of the Case 3 data shows, this
pattern does emerge.
In the Case 3 data, without the presence of controls, the traditional demographic
groups, such as the better educated and more affluent were consistently more likely to say
they participated in the political activities I measured during this period of the general
election. However, for several of the activities, my research reveals that African
Americans were significantly more likely than non-African Americans to say they
participated in the political process. The participation activity of young adults, age 18 to
29 years old, is consistent with past biases for the more traditional offline activities, but
they are more likely to say they participated in the online activities.
As Table 6-1 shows, those with at least a college degree are significantly more
likely than their less educated counterparts to engage in all the measured activities, except
for working for a campaign online where the numbers were extremely low and the
differences were not significant. Those with higher incomes also reported a greater
likelihood to engage in just about all of the activities, with the exception of wearing a
button and performing online work for a candidate.
On the other hand, African Americans were more likely than non-African
Americans to say they participated in many of the measured activities (See Table 6-1).
This is a departure from previous general elections where participation by African
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Americans in measurable activities was either significantly less than non-African
Americans, or not significantly different. For example, in the 2004 National Annenberg
Election Survey, African Americans were less likely to participate in the activities
measured during the 2004 general election period. According to the NAES data, this
election (primaries and general elections) compared to the past election, demonstrates a
clear increase in political participation among African Americans.23
While Case 3 provides initial evidence that most of the biases found in prior
elections emerged in 2008, NAES data show the overall level of participation among the
voting age population was low during the general election. As in Case 1 (Chapter 4),
relatively few adults participated in the various political activities I measured (See Table
6-1).24 Without regard to whether the activity was performed offline or online,
persuading someone to support a candidate was the activity reportedly done most
frequently (24.4%). The other activities, volunteering for a candidate or donating money
to a candidate were performed by few adults, (1.3% and 4.3%, respectively). Examining
offline activities, specifically, the descriptive data yields a similar result. In the week
prior to being interviewed, persuading someone offline to support or oppose a candidate
was reportedly performed by a little more than one fifth of adults, according to the survey
data. Other offline activities measured during this period, including wearing a button,
placing a bumper sticker on one’s vehicle, or placing a lawn sign (7%), attending a
23

According to the 2004 NAES, during the general election campaign, Non-African Americans were more
likely to try to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate (22.9% vs. 17.0%), and donate money to
a presidential candidate (5.6% to 1.3%). Further there was no significant difference between African
Americans and Non-African Americans in attending campaign rallies.
24
These low numbers may be an artifact of how the question was asked. That is, the survey asked for
behavior performed in the prior week rather than over the course of the general election period. It is
difficult to assert with certainty that this accounts for the low numbers, since the survey did not ask a
comparison question measuring behavior over the course of the campaign during the same period.
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meeting or rally in support of a candidate (1.7%), or volunteering for a candidate offline
(1.0%) were all reported at significantly lower levels than persuading someone directly.
In contrast to offline participation behavior, very few adults (3%) said they engaged in
online persuasion by trying to convince others to support or oppose a candidate. Instead,
persuasion took on a more indirect form. Among the variety of online participation
activities measured by the NAES survey, more adults said they viewed video about the
presidential campaign on sites like YouTube (14.4%) or forwarded emails, audio, or
video about the candidates to friends and family members than the other participation
activities (14.3%). Yet, the proportion who said they took part in these activities
represented less than a fifth of the adult respondents. As for the other online activities,
about one in ten said they performed other online activities that serve as a means of
learning about the campaign and discussing the campaign online with others. These
activities include visiting a campaign web site (10.1%), discussing politics online
(10.0%), and reading or posting to a political blog (8.9%). Online work for a campaign is
an activity that was performed by just about no adults.
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Table 6-1: Case 3-- Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls)
Activities Regardless of
Whether it Was Performed
Offline in the prior week

All Adults College
Not
Male
Female Age 18- Age 30 or AfricanNot
Household
%
Graduate College
%
%
29
older American African- Income:
Or
Graduate
%
%
%
American $100K
Higher
%
%
Or more
%
%
(n=6,832) (n=2,778) (n=4,054) (n=2,936) (n=3,896) (n=480) (n=6,352) (n=520) (n=6,312) (n=1,427)

Household
Income:
Less than
$100K
%
(n=5,405)

Attempt to persuade someone
to support or oppose a
presidential candidate

24.4

28.2***

21.7

27.1***

22.3

28.3*

24.1

28.5*

24.0

31.1***

22.6

Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates

1.3

1.9***

0.9

1.0

1.5

1.5

1.3

5.0***

1.0

2.1**

1.1

Contribute money to
campaigns or candidates

4.3

6.3***

2.9

4.3

4.3

1.7**

4.5

9.0***

3.9

6.1***

3.8

21.3

23.8***

19.6

23.6***

19.6

24.4

21.1

25.6*

21.0

26.7***

19.9

1.0

1.4**

0.7

0.7*

1.2

0.8

1.0

4.2***

0.7

1.5*

0.9

1.7

2.1*

1.4

1.6

1.7

3.1*

1.6

5.6***

1.4

2.6**

1.4

OFFLINE Activities in the
prior week
Attempt to persuade someone
OFFLINE to support or
oppose
a candidate
Done any work for one of the
presidential
candidates OFFLINE
Attend political meetings,
rallies, speeches, dinners or
things like that in support of a
particular presidential
candidate OFFLINE
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Wear a presidential campaign
button, put a campaign sticker
on your car or place a sign in
your window or in front of
your house.
ONLINE activities in the prior
week

7.0

8.4***

6.0

6.8

7.1

10.2**

6.7

20.6***

5.8

7.9

6.7

Attempt to persuade someone
to support or oppose one of the
presidential candidates
ONLINE
Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates
ONLINE
Discuss politics online

3.0

4.4***

2.1

3.6*

2.6

4.0

3.0

2.9

3.1

4.4**

2.7

+

0.06

+

+

+

0.06

+

0.08

+

0.06

+

10.0

14.2***

7.1

10.7

9.4

15.8***

9.5

8.3

10.1

14.3***

8.9

14.6***

8.9

22.5***

12.2

13.5***

7.6

16.0***

8.3

10.1
14.1***
7.4
10.9
9.5
17.1***
9.6
21.0***
9.2
Visited Website of a
presidential campaign or
political party
14.4
18.9***
11.2
17.2***
12.2
28.8***
Viewed video on sites like
13.3
21.0***
13.8
YouTube about the
presidential candidates or
campaign
8.9
11.9***
6.8
11.4***
6.9
16.0***
8.3
13.1***
8.5
Read or posted a comment on
a blog having to do with
politics or a campaign
14.3
18.9***
11.1
14.2
14.4
16.0
14.2
17.3*
14.1
Forwarded emails, audio or
video about presidential
candidates or campaigns to
friends, families, co-workers
or other people you know
+=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05
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Assessing the relationship among the participation variables is an important
means of determining whether it was correct or not to analyze each activity separately,
rather than combine them into an index. The results from this Case, as in previous cases,
affirm this analytical decision. In general, many of the correlations among the variety of
participation variables were statistically significant; however, they were very low. This
outcome is likely due to the large sample size of Case 3 (n=6,832), which can uncover
substantively small but statistically significant relationships. The full correlation
matrices can be found in Appendix E.
Among online activities, the highest correlations were for discussing politics
online and forwarding campaign-related emails to others (r=.41, p<.001), online
persuasion to encourage support or opposition to a candidate (r=.34, p<.001), viewing
political videos about the campaign (r=.29, p<.001), reading or posting to a blog about
the campaign (r=.28, p<.001), and visiting campaign web sites (r=.24, p<.001). Further,
there was a clearly positive relationship between viewing a video about the presidential
campaign on a site like YouTube and forwarding an email, audio or video related to the
presidential campaign to others (r=0.32, p<.001). Additionally, viewing video about the
presidential campaign on a site like YouTube was positively related to visiting a
campaign website (r=.31, p<.001), and reading or posting to a blog (r=.26, p>.001) two
places where links to videos are often found.

Forwarding emails, audio, or video was

also correlated with online persuasion to support or oppose a candidate (r=.31, p<.001)
and with visiting a campaign’s web site (r=.24, p<.001).
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Among offline activities, most associations were low. The only relationship
above the threshold was the correlation between attending campaign rallies or meetings
and volunteering for a campaign offline (r=.32, p<.001).

Correlations between offline

and online activities were also generally very low, also. The strongest correlation was
between the offline activity of showing ones support by wearing a button or placing a
lawn sign and the online activity of visiting a campaign web site (r=.20, p<.001) (See
Appendix for the full correlation matrix table).
6-2: Determining Predictors of Online and Offline Political Participation during the
General Election Period: Pre-Convention through October 2, 2008
In the previous section, I established two important trends regarding participation
in the 2008 election. First, the frequency of political participation among respondents was
generally low. Second, without applying statistical controls, the biases found in prior
research emerged again in the 2008 data, but there was some evidence that previously
marginalized electoral groups were participating at greater levels relative to their more
advantaged counterparts.
As stated before, much of this study is predicated on the idea that the Internet will
diminish the importance of demographic groups such as higher educated and more
affluent while increasing the importance of demographic groups such as the young and
African Americans. As stated in chapter 4, when controlling demographic, political and
behavioral variables, odds ratios and OLS “b” coefficients can flip the results from
univariate analysis. For example, the effect of education as a predictor for a particular
activity could disappear in such models with the application of controls.
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Therefore, I present the results of the regression models for all participation
activities with the inclusion of statistical controls. Participation activities are presented in
four subsections: 1) persuasion, volunteering, and donating without regard to whether the
activity took place online or offline, 2) offline activities including offline persuasion,
offline campaign volunteering, attending presidential campaign meetings or rallies, or the
wearing of campaign buttons, 3) online activities including online persuasion,
volunteering, political discussion, visiting campaign websites, viewing political
campaign-related videos on sites like YouTube, reading or posting on a blog, and
forwarding emails, audio or video related to the presidential campaign, and 4) combined
online index and combined offline index.
Generally, across all the analytic subsections in Case 3, age and race emerged
most frequently as significant demographic predictors of several of the participation
activities. Specifically, younger people and African Americans were more likely than
their counterparts to engage in activities such as discussing politics online, visiting
campaign web sites, reading or posting to a political blog, attending rallies and displaying
a button, bumper sticker or sign. As I will describe in the following pages, after adding
controls to the regression models, the significance of education disappears and high
income is a significant predictor for just two of the activities.
The most robust predictors for all the activities were two political variables. For
most activities, being contacted online by one of the presidential campaigns and
indicating a high level of campaign interest were more likely to predict engagement with
the activities than age, race, gender, education or income. As in the prior cases, the
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importance of campaign contact and campaign interest, are consistent with prior research
on participation.

6-2.1: Predictors of participation activities regardless of online or offline distinctions
The analysis in this section focuses on three dependent variables performed
regardless of method: persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate,
volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign, and contributing money to a campaign.
According to the data, race was a significant predictor of volunteering and contributing
money, without regard to whether they were done offline or online. African Americans
were more likely to say they engaged in those activities. No other demographic
independent variable stood out as predictors of more than a single activity within this
section. Among the non-demographic variables, campaign interest and online campaign
contact were significant predictors for each of these participation activities.
6-2.1.1: Attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate. Using
a logistic regression model, with controls,25 I constructed a profile of voters who
generally reported engaging in persuading others to support or oppose a presidential
candidate consisting of younger (OR=1.602, p<.001), more affluent (OR=1.171, p<.05)
adults, who tended to be male (OR=1.144, p<.05). Politically they were highly interested
in the campaign (OR=2.127, p<.001), and they tended to identify themselves as
Democrats (OR=1.276, p<.01).
25

This profile of persuaders were more likely to be

Without the presence of controls in the logistic regression model, education, a traditional predictor of
political participation also was a significant predictor in this election for persuading someone to support a
candidate (OR=1.263, p<.001), volunteer on a campaign (OR=1.927, p<.001), or donate money
(OR=2.012, p<.001). However, education, as a significant predictor disappears when the controls are
applied to the models for participation activities without regard to whether they are performed online or
offline.
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contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=1.342, p<.05), and were more likely to be
Obama supporters (OR=1.210, p<.05) (See Table 6-2).
6-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign. Those more inclined
to say they volunteered for a presidential candidate in the 2008 general election,
according to the logistic regression model, were African Americans (OR=2.868, p<.001)
and females (OR =1.65/0.605 for males, p<.05). Volunteers were more likely to say they
were contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=3.816, p<.001) and perhaps as a
result, they were more likely to indicate a high interest in the presidential campaign
(OR=2.690, p<.001). Finally, the more they relied on newspapers for campaign
information, the more likely they were to say they volunteered for one of the campaigns
(OR=1.177, p<.001) (See Table 6-2).
6-2.1.3: Contributing money to candidate or campaign. During the general
election period measured by Case 3, African Americans were more likely to say they
donated to a presidential candidate than non-African Americans (OR=1.711, p<.01).
Further, those saying they donated to a campaign were more likely to be a Democrat
(OR=1.415, p<.05). The model also showed that those with more education were also
more likely to say they contributed to a presidential campaign (OR=1.334, p<.05). Those
who were contacted by one of the campaigns online were three times more likely to
report donating than those who were not (OR=3.148, p<.001). While it is unclear
whether this contact increased campaign interest or whether campaign interest inspired
contact, the odds of contributing to a campaign were greater for those with higher
campaign interest than those with less interest (OR=2.714, p<.001) (See Table 6-2).
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Table 6-2: Case 3--Predictors of Political Participation Without Regard to Online/Offline
Logistic Regression EXP(B)
Attempt to Persuade
someone to support
or oppose a
candidate

Volunteer
for
Candidate
or
campaign

Contribute
Money to
campaign or
candidate

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter
Constant
N

.977
1.144*
1.602***
.840
1.171*
1.056*
1.276**
.902**
1.057***
1.097***
1.033**
1.035*
1.021
2.127***
1.342*
1.210*
.012***
6,251

.990
.605*
1.101
2.868***
1.244
1.203
1.124
1.034
1.108*
1.041
1.177***
.916
.976
2.690***
3.816***
1.897
.000***
6,251

1.334*
.906
.481*
1.711**
.994
1.018
1.415*
.963
1.044
1.072**
1.084***
1.011
1.009
2.714***
3.148***
1.285
.000***
6,251

Correctly Classified

75.4%

98.7%

95.5%

Nagelkerke R Square

.151

.201

.158

Cox & Snell R Square

.102

.027

.048

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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6-2.2: Predictors of offline participation activities
Perhaps it was because Obama was the first African American to be nominated
for president or perhaps it was due to the efforts of the Obama \campaign, but during the
period prior to the general election, when these Case 3 data were collected, African
Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to report they engaged in
offline participation activities for three out of the four measured—volunteering offline,
attending a campaign rally or meeting, and wearing a button, placing a bumpers sticker or
lawn sign in support of a presidential campaign. Younger adults, like African Americans,
were more likely than older ones to say they engaged in three of the four offline
activities—persuasion, rally attendance, and displaying a button, bumper sticker or lawn
sign. Campaign interest, online contact, and support for Obama each significantly
predicted offline behavior.
6-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone offline to vote for a candidate.
Significant demographic predictors of offline persuasion were age, gender, and income,
though neither of these variables were significant predictors of online persuasion. More
specifically, being younger (OR=1.539,p<.001), male (OR=1.159, p<.05) and more
affluent (OR=1.220, p<.05) were significant predictors of offline persuasion. Politically,
those engaged in offline persuasion tended to identify themselves as Democrats
(OR=1.308, p<.01), highly interested in the presidential campaign (OR=1.933, p<.001)
and said they supported Obama (OR=1.265, p<.01) (See Table 6-3).
6-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. Three
variables significantly stood out above the others as predictors of volunteering to work
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for a candidate offline: race, online campaign contact, and campaign interest. According
to the logistic regression model, African Americans were nearly three and a half times
more likely than non-African Americans to say they volunteered to work for a candidate
(OR=3.420, p<.001). Further, those who reported receiving an online campaign
communication were four times more likely to say they volunteered to work for one of
the candidates, offline (OR=3.966, p<.001). Campaign interest would seem to naturally
lead to campaign voluntarism and those with the highest levels of campaign awareness
were nearly three times more likely to report volunteering for a campaign than those with
lower interest (OR=2.949, p<.001) (See Table 6-3).
6-2.2.3: Attending a rally, meeting, or other event in support of a candidate. Race
and age were the significant demographic predictors for attending a campaign event or
meeting during the general phase of the campaign through October 2, 2008. African
Americans (OR=2.488, p<.01) and younger adults (OR=1.993, p<.05) were most likely to
say they participated in this activity. However, religious service attendance (OR=1.206,
p<.05) also served as a significant predictor. Campaign interest was once again a
powerfully significant predictor of attending a campaign rally or meeting. By about a
four and a half to one ratio, those with a high level of campaign interest said they were
more likely to attend an event than those with lesser levels of interest (OR=4.440,
p<.001). Consistent with other offline and online activities, online campaign contact was
also a significant predictor of this behavior (OR=2.170, p<.01) (See Table 6-3).
6-2.2.4: Wearing a campaign button, placing a bumper sticker or lawn sign in
support of a candidate. Similar to rally attendance, being African-American (OR=2.212,
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p<.001), young (OR=1.824, p<.01), or a regular attendee of religious services (OR=1.146
p<.01) were reliable predictors of wearing a button, or placing a sign or bumper sticker in
support of a candidate. Additionally, the odds of this type of display of support were
significantly higher for those who were contacted online by a campaign (OR=3.210,
p<.001) than those who were not contacted. Other significant predictors include
campaign interest (OR=2.096, p<.001) support for Obama (OR=1.695, p<.001), and selfidentified Democrats (OR=1.545, p<.01) (See Table 6-3).
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Table 6-3: Case 3--Predictors of Offline Political Participation
Logistic Regression EXP(B)
Volunteer
for
candidate or
campaign
OFFLINE

Attend
Rally/
Meeting

Wear
Campaign
Button/
Bumper
Sticker/Lawn
Sign

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day/ more)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter
Constant
N

Attempt to
Persuade
someone to
support or
oppose
candidate
OFFLINE
.959
1.159*
1.539**
.857
1.220*
1.050
1.308**
.930*
1.011
1.094***
1.040***
1.049**
.953
1.933***
1.048
1.265**
.013***
6,251

.886
.602
.821
3.420***
1.124
1.214
1.190
1.111
1.033
1.049
1.176**
.899
1.068
2.949***
3.966***
1.647
.000***
6,251

.810
.857
1.993*
2.488**
1.416
1.206*
1.091
1.243*
1.066
1.010
1.046
.948
1.129
4.440***
2.170**
1.370
.000***
6,251

.900
.987
1.824**
2.212***
.903
1.146**
1.545**
1.037
1.047*
1.057**
1.061**
1.004
1.040
2.096***
3.210***
1.695***
.001***
6,251

Correctly Classified

78.0%

98.9%

98.3%

92.9%

Nagelkerke R Square

.115

.190

.153

.170

Cox & Snell R Square

.075

.021

.024

.069

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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6-2.3: Predictors of online participation activities
Age and race were significant predictors of more online activities than any other
demographic variable. Young adults were more likely than older ones to say they
participated in four of the seven activities measured during this general election period.
African Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to say they engaged in
visiting a campaign web site, viewing a political video on a site like YouTube, and
forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others. Men and women split on several
activities. In some instances, the logistic model showed that women were more likely
than men to say they performed an activity, and in some cases men were more likely than
women to engage in an activity. The model also showed that citing the Internet as a
primary source of campaign information, online campaign contact, and high levels of
campaign interest, were significant predictors of nearly all the activities measured.
6-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a candidate.
Demographically, there were no significant predictors of online persuasion, according to
the logistic regression model. However, those who persuaded online tended to be highly
interested in the campaign (OR=2.982, p<.001), frequent users of the Internet for general
purposes (OR=1.402, p<.05), and as a source for political information (OR=1.311,
p<.001). Online contact from one of the campaigns was also a significant predictor of
this behavior of persuading (OR=2.233, p<.001) (See Table 6-4).
6-2.3.2: Volunteering online to work for a candidate or campaign. As with online
persuasion, the model reveals that demographic variables were not significant predictors
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of volunteering online for a candidate. The only significant predictors of online
volunteering were typically contacted online by one of the campaigns (OR=3.171, p<.05)
and using the Internet as a source for campaign information (OR=1.604, p<.01) (See
Table 6-4).
6-2.3.3: Discussing politics online. Those who reported engaging in online
political discussion were more likely to be younger (OR=1.881, p<.001), and less likely
to be African-American (OR=0.557, p<.01), and less likely to be male (OR=.831,
p<.05). Online political discussion typically occurred among those who said they were
frequently online (OR=1.740, p<.001) and cited the Internet as a major source for
campaign information (OR=1.287, p<.001). High campaign interest (OR=1.75, p<.001),
and online contact by one of the campaigns (OR=1.718, p<.001) were also among the
predictors with the highest odds ratios (See Table 6-4).
6-2.3.4: Visiting a campaign website. The significant demographic predictors of
visiting a campaign website, according to the model, were age and race. For example,
young people age 18 to 29 (OR=1.999, p<.001), were twice as likely as older adults to
say they visited a campaign website. African Americans (OR=1.806, p<.001) were also
about twice as likely as non-African Americans to say they participated in visiting a
campaign website. Frequent Internet users (OR=1.308, p<.001) tended to say they
visited campaign websites more so than less frequent Internet users. Again, online
campaign contact was a strong predictor: those contacted were nearly three times more
likely than others to say they visited a campaign website (OR=2.909, p<.001). Those
who were highly interested in the campaign were twice as likely as those less interested
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to report visiting a campaign website (OR=2.011, p<.001), and Obama supporters were
one and a half times more likely than non-supporters to visit a campaign website
(OR=1.493, p<.01) (See Table 6-4).
6-2.3.5: Viewing a political video on a site like YouTube. Consistent with other online
activities, the model demonstrated that younger people were more likely than older
people to say they viewed a political video on a site like YouTube. In fact, they were
nearly three times more likely than those ages thirty or older to report this behavior
(OR=2.687, p<.001), suggesting that YouTube is generally a medium for the young.
However, African Americans were more likely to report viewing political video online
than non-African Americans (OR=1.365, p<.05), despite their age. Perhaps an
explanation for the findings related can be attributed to the popularity of the pro-Obama
videos, including the Will.I.Am’s “Yes We Can” video (14.4 million views on YouTube)
and “Wassup 2008” video (5.3 million views on YouTube) (ShiftingtheDebate.com,
2008) .
Those who used the Internet as a campaign source (OR=1.338, p<.001) were
more likely to report viewing political videos online than those who were less likely to
rely on the Internet for campaign information. Online contact from one of the campaigns
(OR=1.842, p<.001) and campaign interest (OR=1.614, p<.001) were significant
predictors of viewing political videos as well (See Table 6-4).
6-2.3.6: Reading or posting to a blog about the presidential campaign. Younger
people (OR=2.015, p<.001) and males (OR=1.366, p<.01) were characteristically more
likely to say the read or posted to a blog about the presidential campaign. Other
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significant characteristics predicting this behavior included online frequency (OR=1.457,
p<.001), using the Internet as a source for campaign information (OR=1.282, p<.001),
high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.399, p<.001), and being contacted online by one
of the campaigns (OR=1.535, p<.01) (See Table 6-4).
6-2.3.7: Forwarding emails, audio or videos to others about one of the candidates
or campaigns. Forwarding emails, audio or videos about the presidential campaign to
others was an activity primarily reported by females (OR=0.694 for males, p<.001) and
African Americans (OR=1.480, p<.05), according to these data. Those who did not
support Obama were more likely to say they did this than Obama supporters
(OR=1.44/0.647, p<.001). Other significant predictors include: frequent use of the
Internet (OR=1.55/0.644 for Obama supporters, p<.001) and high levels of campaign
interest (OR=1.539, p<.001). Further, as seen with other activities, online forwarders
were more likely than non-forwarders to have been contacted online by one of the
campaigns (OR=2.514, p<.001) (See Table 6-4).
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Table 6-4: Case 3--Predictors of Online Political Participation
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day/ more)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter
Constant
N
Correctly Classified
Nagelkerke R Square
Cox & Snell R Square
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Attempt to
persuade
someone to
support/
oppose
candidate
ONLINE
1.132
.964
1.536
.834
.897
1.044
.935
.829*
1.311***
1.040
.970
.938
1.402*
2.982***
2.233***
.824
.000***
6,251
96.8%
.192
.047

Volunteer for
candidate or
campaign
ONLINE

Discuss
Politics
Online

Visit
Campaign
Website

Viewed
Political
Video on
Sites Like
YouTube

Read or
Post to a
blog about
campaign

Forward
Emails,
Audios, or
Videos to
Others
about the
candidates

1.674
.647
2.465
1.100
1.595
1.130
.930
.783
1.604**
1.002
1.165
.987
.728
1.799
3.171*
3.220
.000***
6,251
99.7%
.231
.009

1.205
.831*
1.881***
.557**
.887
1.033
.895
.956
1.287***
1.055**
1.011
.974
1.740***
1.750***
1.718***
1.168
.005***
6,251
89.6%
0.226
0.110

1.063
.959
1.999***
1.806***
.971
1.039
1.095
1.071
1.288***
1.040*
1.004
1.024
1.308**
2.011***
2.909***
1.493**
.001***
6,251
89.7%
0.270
0.132

.968
1.192*
2.687***
1.365*
1.247*
1.012
.965
1.106*
1.338***
1.065***
.987
.946**
1.363***
1.614***
1.842***
1.009
.008***
6,251
85.3%
.277
.157

1.006
1.366**
2.015***
1.356
1.069
1.060
.852
.963
1.282***
1.056**
1.043*
.940**
1.457***
1.399***
1.535**
1.200
.009***
6,251
90.8%
.193
.088

1.037
.694***
1.126
1.418*
1.106
.992
.925
.905*
1.267***
1.074***
1.009
1.009
1.628***
1.539***
2.514***
.644***
.020***
6,251
85.7 %
.237
.135
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6-2.4: Online index and offline index: predictors
The previous sections of Case 3 concentrated on the significant predictors of
individual participation activities. Different attributes were more predictive of different
behaviors, with some attributes like campaign interest, online campaign contact, race, and
age emerging most often as predictors with the highest odds ratios. Turning to the
combined indexes of online and offline behaviors and using OLS regression, results show
a similar pattern for online and offline participation behavior. As stated in the methods
chapter, the offline index variable was created by combining the “yes” responses to the
offline questions. The online participation index was created by combining the “yes”
responses to the questions related directly to online participation. According to the data,
younger adults and African Americans were more likely to perform either one of the
online or offline participation activities. However, the coefficients are stronger for
younger adults for the online index than the offline index (See Table 6-5). As in the
analyses of the individual participation activities, online campaign contact is a key
influence of any participation. Being online frequently and using the Internet as a source
for campaign information are other important influences for online participation behavior
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Table 6-5: Case 3—Testing Mobilization and Reinforcement on the Combined Online
and the Combined Offline Participation Index
OLS Regression
(Unstandardized B)

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
Obama Supporter
Constant
N

Online Participation
Index
.008
-.019
.321***
.131**
.026
.014
-.025
-.006
.148***
.033***
.005
-.012*
.219***
.185***
.716***
.013
-.474***
6,250

Offline Participation
Index
-.016
.013
.108***
.138***
.035
.020***
.076***
.001
.008**
.022***
.013***
.004
-.002
.131***
.247***
.067***
-.377***
6,250

R Square

.312

.116

R Square Change

.261***

.092***

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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6-3: Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both
Thus far, the Case 3 data have shown that with statistical controls in place, some
of the traditional demographic biases predicting participation have diminished or
disappeared for some activities, but remained for others. Additionally, the findings point
to an emergence of young adults and African Americans as reliable predictors of several
participation activities. Yet, while these results are potentially suggestive of mobilization,
none of the analysis provides firm support for either mobilization or reinforcement.
The purpose of step 4 of the analytical process is to establish evidence for
mobilization, reinforcement, or both by testing interactions between a high frequency of
Internet use and the significant demographic predictor variables across the various types
of participation. As the final and most direct test of the mobilization versus
reinforcement hypotheses, I added interaction terms (between frequency of internet use
and age, gender, race income and education) into the logistic regression analyses. In
order to see the effect of the interaction visually, I plotted each significant interaction to
display its effect.
While there were many instances of statistically significant predictor variables in
the analyses, only a small number of those variables were moderated by the interaction
with Internet frequency. During the general election data collection phase represented
by Case 3, I found evidence of mobilization in two very similar areas—1) persuading
someone to support or oppose a candidate regardless of whether it was done offline or
online, and 2) persuading someone offline to support or oppose a candidate.
Additionally, I found evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement in two areas of
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activity: First, the online participation activity of viewing a campaign video online by
age. Second, when looking at the combined index of online participation, there was
evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement in the likelihood of participating online
by race.
6-3.1: Case 3 interactions represented in the model
In Table 6-6, one can see the results of the models including the interaction terms.
In each, the model produced a significant and positive main effect for age, represented by
18 to 29 year olds. However, as hypothesized, age interacting with frequency of Internet
use, produced a negative b coefficient and diminished the effect of age on each of the
predictions: attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate without
regard to it being performed online (OR=0.945, p<.05, b=-.057), attempting to persuade
someone to support or oppose a candidate, offline (OR=0.944, p<.05. b=-.057), and
viewing a political video on a site like YouTube (OR=0.931, p<.05,b=-.071). The
conclusion one can reach is that an age by Internet frequency interaction moderates the
effect of age, and thereby shows evidence of mobilization. However, to obtain a clearer
picture of what that mobilization effect looks like, I have plotted the interaction as a
graph (Figure 6-1) showing the closing of the gap between the young adults, age 18 to 29,
and the adults age 30 or older, as a result of the interaction.
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Table 6-6: Case 3--Testing for Mobilization and Reinforcement--Significant Interactions
(Exp(B)(b coefficient)
Viewing A Political Video on
a Site Like YouTube
(Internet Frequency X
Age(18-29))

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
Obama Supporter
Online Frequency X Age (18-29)
Constant
N

Persuade Someone to
Support or Oppose a
Candidate with
Interaction (Internet
Frequency X Age(18-29))
.974
1.143*
1.686*** (b=0.523)
.842
1.169*
1.056*
1.277**
.902**
1.056***
1.097***
1.033**
1.036*
1.030
2.139***
1.353*
1.209*
.945* (b= -.057)
.011
6,251

Offline: Persuade Someone
to Support or Oppose a
Candidate with Interaction
(Internet Frequency X
Age(18-29))
.956
1.158*
1.609*** (b=0.476)
.859
1.218*
1.051
1.308**
.930*
1.010
1.094***
1.040***
1.050**
.962
1.943***
1.056
1.264**
.944* (b=-.057)
.013***
6,251

.964
1.190*
2.963*** (b=1.086)
1.367*
1.245*
1.012
.967
1.106*
1.336***
1.064***
.986
.948**
1.406***
1.630***
1.858***
1.006
.931* (b=-.071)
.007***
6,251

Correctly classified

75.5%

77.9%

85.4%

.103
.153

.117
.076

.279
.158

Nagelkerke R Square
Cox Snell R Square
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

176

6.3.2.1: Graphical representation—age (18 to 29) interacting with Internet
frequency predicting attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate
without regard to it being performed online or offline. In Figure 6-1, the graph shows
that as Internet frequency increases there is a greater likelihood of engaging in persuasion
by those over age 30, beyond the main effects of both age and Internet use. The more
often older Americans use the Internet, the more likely they were to engage in persuading
others to support one of the candidates. This closing of the gap between old and young,
albeit small, is clear evidence of mobilization, but not in the way originally hypothesized.
The expectation was that the Internet would mobilize previously disengaged voters, thus
closing the anticipated participation gap between young and old by increasing the
involvement of the former at a greater rate than the latter. Rather, frequent use of the
Internet increased the likelihood of persuasion among a group more associated with
engagement, older people. It is important to note that the technology may have served to
motivate older adults, though it is difficult to illustrate this using survey data, it is entirely
possible.

The interaction between the Internet and age was not significant in predicting

persuasion to support or oppose a candidate. With or without the technology, younger
adults persuaded at the same rate. This analysis illustrated by Figure 6-1 provides
support for Hypothesis 1b—the Internet reinforces participation of already engaged
citizens.
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Figure 6-1: Case 3 Interaction--Age (18-29) by High Internet Use Predicting the Likelihood of Persuading Someone to Support or
Oppose a Candidate Without Regard to Performing it Offline or Online
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6.3.2.2: Graphical representation—age (18 to 29 )interacting with Internet
frequency predicting attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate
offline. Similarly, the interaction between age and Internet frequency produces a negative
coefficient and significantly diminishes the effect of age, graphically represented in
Figure 6-2. The illustrated analysis provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 2b---using
the Internet reinforces the offline participation of already engaged citizens by showing
that older adults are more likely to attempt offline persuasion, the more they are online.
The expected group, older adults increase their likelihood when they get online.
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Figure 6-2: Case 3 Interaction--Age (18-29) by High Internet Use Predicting the Likelihood of Persuading Someone to Support or
Oppose a Candidate Offline
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6-3.2.3: Graphical representation—age (18 to 29) interacting with internet
frequency predicting viewing a political video on a site like YouTube. Finally, the third
significant interaction also involves age and Internet frequency as a predictor for viewing
a political video on a site like YouTube. The main effect of age is strong and in a
positive direction. Young adults are nearly three times more likely than older ones
(OR=2.963, p<.001) to say they viewed online political video. Interacting age and
Internet frequency causes this effect to disappear (OR=.931, p<.05). Figure 6-3 shows
the graphic plot of this interaction. Figure 6-3 shows evidence of both mobilization and
reinforcement occurring. Regardless of age, the greater the frequency of Internet use, the
more likely one is to view a political video online. However, it is clear from the graph
that the gap between young and old is closing with more Internet usage. This provides
support for both Hypotheses 2c and 2d.
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Figure 6-3: Case 3 Interaction--Age (18-29) by High Internet Use Predicting Viewing A Political Video on a Site Like YouTube
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6-3.2.4: Race (African American) interacting with internet frequency predicting
online participation (combined index). Not only is there some evidence of mobilization
and reinforcement for some individual participation activities, the Case 3 data also
produced evidence of mobilization for race in predicting general online participation
(represented by the combined index). Using OLS regression, the model produced a
significant main effect for race (African American) as a predictor of online participation.
The effect is significantly moderated by the interaction between race and Internet
frequency (b=.027, p<.05). While not negative, the main effect is moderated by Internet
frequency (See Table 6-7).
Table 6-7: Case 3--Testing Mobilization and Reinforcement on the Combined Online
Participation Index: OLS Regression (Unstandardized B)

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
Obama Supporter
Online Frequency X Race (African American)
Constant
N

Online Participation
Index
.007
-.019
.318***
.130**
.027
.014
-.024
-.006
.148***
.033***
.005
-.013*
.219***
.185***
.712***
.013
.027*
-.472
6,250

R Square

.313

R Square Change

.262

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Standard Error
(SE)
.026
.025
.047
.047
.031
.010
.030
.013
.005
.005
.004
.005
.029
.017
.053
.031
.012
.072
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The evidence for mobilization and reinforcement is more obvious in Figure 6-4.
As Internet frequency increases, there is a greater likelihood that the voter will engage in
any of the online participatory activities among both African American and non-African
American populations. This small but significant increase provides support for the
mobilization hypothesis 2c and the reinforcement hypothesis 2d. With all the controls in
place, including support for Obama, campaign interest, and online campaign contact, the
Internet mobilized a previously less engaged group, African Americans, to a greater level
of participation. However, the gap between African Americans and non-African
Americans is widening rather than narrowing, suggesting that while the Internet
mobilizes people of all races to participate online, the rate of increase is greater among
African Americans.
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Figure 6-4: Case 3 Interaction--Race (Black) by High Internet Use Predicting Online Participation
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6-4: Case 3--Summary of Findings
The Case 3 findings represent participation activity in the relatively early part of
the general election campaign—before the party conventions through the first presidential
debate (September 29). Analyzing the raw frequencies, participation activities were
relatively low, with many of the activities reported only in the single digits. This may be
as a result of the question wording where respondents were asked to report their behavior
in the prior week only rather than over the entire campaign. Still, when extrapolating
behavior even as low as one percent to all U.S. households, those numbers translate into
millions of participants.
Without statistical controls, traditional demographic variables—education and
income resulted in the expected modes they have in prior election studies. However,
there were some variables which did not—race and age. Investigating the raw data, those
with higher education and income were more likely to say they performed most of the
participation activities measured in this study. However, African Americans were more
likely than non-African Americans to say they participated in most activities. Younger
adults, were more likely to engage in online activities than older adults. The greater
likelihood to participate by these groups might be the result of a number of factors
surrounding the uniqueness of this general election campaign, including the greater role
of technology, the nomination of the first African American candidate for president by a
major political party, and the Obama campaign’s ability to mobilize support.
Predictors showed that with controls in place, the effect of education and income
disappeared or diminished for most activities. However, young people and African
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Americans emerged as significant predictors of participation. As in the primaries, online
campaign contact and campaign interest, more often than not, produced the highest odds
ratios. If one was contacted online by one of the presidential campaigns or was strongly
interested in the presidential campaign, then there was a greater likelihood to participate
in one of the activities. Tables 6-8 and 6-9 summarize the significant predictors with the
highest odds ratios.
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Table 6-8: Case 3-- Top Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation
(Up to 6)
Persuade
someone to vote
offline
Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter

Volunteer for
candidate
offline

X+
X+
X+

Attend
Rally/Meeting

Wear
Campaign
Button

X+
X+

X+
X+

X+
X+
X+

X+
X+

X+

X+
X+

X+
X+

X+
X+

X+
X+
X+

(A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign
indicates that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.)
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Table 6-9: Case 3—Top Significant Predictors of Online Participation (Up to 6)
Persuade
someone
to vote
online
Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African-American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Supporter

Volunteer
for
candidate
online

XX+

X+

X+
X+
X+

X+

Viewed
Video Sites
Like
YouTube

Read or
Post to a
blog about
campaign

X+
X+

X+
X+
X+
X+

X+
X+
X+

X+

X+
X+
X+

X+
X+
X+

X+
X+
X+

X+
X+
X-

Discuss
politics
online

Visit
Campaign
Website

XX+
X-

X+
X+
X+

Forward
Emails

X-

(A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates
that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.)

189
The analysis testing for mobilization and reinforcement provided some support
for H1a-b and H2a-d, but only for a limited number of activities. The data show
mobilization towards participation as a result of using the Internet among groups more
likely to be engaged anyhow. Use of the technology led to both offline and online
participation. The Internet mobilized older people to become more active, but at the
same time increasing the likelihood of younger people to participate in viewing political
videos. The OLS model testing interactions between race and Internet frequency as
predictors for online participation (combined index) showed that African Americans were
more likely to participate online the more they were online, more so than non-African
Americans.
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CHAPTER 7: CASE 4 -- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT DURING THE
GENERAL ELECTION PERIOD-RETROSPECTIVE DATA COLLECTION AMONG
POST-GENERAL ELECTION PANEL

In the prior chapter, I presented the analysis of mobilization and reinforcement
reported as close to “real time” as possible by asking about participation behaviors in the
week prior to the interview. This results I present in this chapter provide a different
view: retrospective analysis of mobilization and reinforcement. The findings in this
chapter are reported from the Case 4 data collected among a telephone panel who
participated in the rolling cross-section survey. The post-election panel was conducted in
the seven days following the general election (November 5, 2008 through November, 12,
2008). I present the following analyses:
•

A descriptive analysis of political participation activities using post-general
election panel data, including a correlation Analysis among participation
activities;

•

Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online
participation; and,

•

Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between levels of Internet
use and demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization
and/or reinforcement.

•

A comparison between the data from Cases 3 and 4
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7-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities
Perhaps as a result of the different data collection methods, the frequency of
reporting participation activities in Case 4 was higher than for Case 3. However, the
patterns of participation were generally similar, and, like Case 3, the descriptive analysis
of the Case 4 post-election panel data affirms some of the past demographic biases about
participation, while countering them in other instances.
The raw frequencies in Case 4, without any controls, reveal that better educated
and more affluent respondents continue to be advantaged since they are significantly
more likely to report participating in most of the measured behaviors than less educated
and less affluent (See Table 7-1). Young adults age 18 to 29 years old report
participating in fewer offline activities than older adults. This is consistent with past
research showing older adults were more likely to participate in traditional activities.
Countering past biases, African Americans were significantly more likely than nonAfrican Americans to say they participated in several political activities. These include,
working for a presidential candidate offline, contributing to a presidential campaign
regardless if the method was offline or online, attending political meetings or rallies, and
wearing a campaign button or displaying a sign in support of a candidate. Unlike Case 3,
where results show younger adults more likely to say they participated in most of the
measured online activities, the Case 4 descriptive data reveal they are more likely than
older adults to say they participated in less than half of the measured online activities.
Not surprisingly, reported participation behavior was demonstrably higher in Case
4, undoubtedly the result of the expanded time frame in which respondents considered
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performing the participation behaviors. However, the patterns of behavior, i.e., which
activities respondents reported doing most often, were generally the same between cases,
but there were exceptions.
Nearly half of all adults (46.1%) said they attempted to persuade others to support
or oppose a candidate regardless of whether it was performed offline or online. Nearly a
fifth (19.2%) said they contributed money to one of the presidential campaigns without
regard to whether the activity was performed offline or online, and under a tenth (7.5%)
said they performed work from one of the presidential candidates without specification of
whether it was done offline or online (See Table 7.1).
Among the offline activities, more adults engaged in in-person persuasion either
by directly speaking with someone (38.5%) or by the more passive method of wearing a
campaign button or displaying a sign or bumper sticker (21.1%). An equal number
reported attending political meetings or rallies (11.5%) and contributing to a campaign or
candidate through traditional offline methods (11.2%). Few said they actually did any
work offline for one of the candidates (6.3%) (See Table 7.1). Respondents were more
likely to report rally attendance in Case 4 than in Case 3, relative to other activities.
In the descriptive analysis of online activities, three activities stood out. A roughly
equal proportion of adults said they visited a campaign web site (30.1%), viewed a
political video on a site like YouTube (29.1%) or forwarded campaign-related emails,
audio, or video to others (28.8%). All three were top activities in Case 3, also. These
activities are moderately correlated. The correlation between visiting a campaign web site
and viewing a political video is r= .41 and between forwarding a campaign-related email
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is r=.37. The correlation between viewing a political video and forwarding a campaignrelated email is r=.42.26

About one in five said they discussed politics online during the

general election campaign. The data suggest that direct persuasion online, person-toperson, is less popular than offline persuasion with just 7.6 percent adults saying they
tried to persuade others to support or oppose a candidate during the general election.
Finally, while much has been written and spoken about online donations, fewer adults
said they gave online (7.9%) than offline (11.2%). However, the proportion of online
donors represents a significant number of adults, well into the millions (See Table 7.1).

26

While these correlations are moderate, they are not so high to warrant abandoning an analysis of the
individual activities in favor of combined online and offline indexes.
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Table 7-1: Case 4 Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls)
Activities Regardless of
Whether it Was Performed
Offline during the presidential
campaign

All
Adults
%

College
Not
Male
Female Age 18- Age 30 or African
Not
Household
Graduate College
%
%
29
older American African Income:
Or
Graduate
%
%
%
American $100K
Higher
%
%
Or more
%
%
(n=2,026 (n=944) (n=1,082) (n=898) (n=1,128) (n=93) (n=1,933) (n=137) (n=1,889) (n=514)

Household
Income:
Less than
$100K
%
(n=1,512)

Attempt to persuade someone
to support or oppose a
presidential candidate

46.1

51.0***

41.9

49.0*

43.8

40.9

46.4

43.8

46.3

55.6***

42.9

Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates

7.5

10.1***

5.3

5.9*

8.9

6.5

7.6

20.4***

6.6

9.3

6.9

Contribute money to campaigns
or candidates

19.2

26.3***

12.9

18.5

19.7

12.9

19.5

26.3*

18.6

28.2***

16.1

38.5

39.9

37.2

40.6

36.8

32.3

38.8

37.2

38.6

43.0*

37.0

Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates
OFFLINE

6.3

8.4***

4.5

4.7*

7.6

5.4

6.4

18.2***

5.5

7.4

6.0

Contribute money to campaigns
or candidates OFFLINE

11.2

13.3**

9.3

11.7

10.8

2.2**

11.6

16.1

10.9

14.6**

10.1

Attend political meetings,
rallies, speeches, dinners or
things like that in support of a
particular presidential candidate

11.5

16.1***

7.4

9.8*

12.8

14.0

11.3

27.7***

10.3

13.0

10.9

OFFLINE Activities during the
presidential campaign
Attempt to persuade someone
OFFLINE to support or oppose
a candidate
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OFFLINE
Wear a presidential campaign
button, put a campaign sticker
on car/place sign in your
window/ in front of your house.
ONLINE activities during the
presidential campaign
Attempt to persuade someone to
support or oppose one of the
presidential candidates ONLINE

21.1

23.7*

19.0

19.4

22.7

26.9

21.1

43.8***

19.6

23.0

20.6

7.6

11.0***

4.6

8.4

7.0

8.6

7.6

6.6

7.7

12.6***

5.9

Done any work for one of the
presidential candidates ONLINE

1.2

1.7*

0.7

1.2

1.2

1.1

1.2

2.2

1.1

1.9

0.9

Contribute money to campaigns
or candidates ONLINE

7.9

12.9***

3.6

6.8

8.9

10.8

7.8

10.2

7.8

13.6***

6.0

Discuss politics online

19.6

28.6***

11.7

21.3

18.3

33.3**

18.9

23.4

19.3

29.2***

16.3

42.8***

25.7

43.2***

24.3

40.9***

24.7

30.1
41.0***
20.5
31.1
29.3
41.9*
29.5
35.0
29.7
Visited Web site of a
presidential campaign or
political party
29.1
40.0***
19.5
31.2
27.4
45.2***
28.3
28.5
29.1
Viewed video on sites like
YouTube about the presidential
candidates or campaign
28.8
39.0***
20.0
28.8
30.4
24.7
29.0
33.6
28.5
Forwarded emails, audio or
video about presidential
candidates or campaigns to
friends, families, co-workers or
other people you know
+=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05
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7-2: Determining Predictors of Online and Offline Political Participation
With the presence of statistical controls in the regression models, the data provide
a more accurate picture of which variables are more effectively predicting political
participation activities. In this section, I present results of the multivariate analyses of the
four classes of participation activities: 1) persuasion, volunteering, and donating without
regard to whether the activity took place online or offline, 2) offline activities including
offline persuasion, offline campaign volunteering, offline donating, attending presidential
campaign meetings or rallies, or the wearing of campaign buttons, 3) online activities
including online persuasion, volunteering, online donating, political discussion, visiting
campaign web sites, viewing political campaign-related videos on sites like YouTube,
and forwarding emails, audio or video related to the presidential campaign, and 4) the
combined online and offline indexes.
In contrast to what the data showed in Case 3, higher education was a significant
predictor for a variety of activities, more so than any other demographic variable. This is
especially true of the online participation variables. More consistent with Case 3,
however, is the outcome that young adults are significant predictors of several online
activities, but still fewer than in Case 3, and was not at all significant for any offline
activities. Females turned out to be a significant predictor for a majority of offline
activities, and those activities measured without regard to whether they were performed
offline or online. Female was also a significant predictor for two of the seven online
activities.

197
As in all three of the prior cases, online campaign contact and campaign interest
were the most robust predictors for all the activities. In addition, voting for Obama was a
significant predictor for a number of activities.

7-2.1: Predictors of participation activities regardless of online or offline distinctions
Affluence was a consistent predictor for two of the three activities not taking into
account whether they were performed offline or online, while education was a significant
predictor for one of them. The meaning one could take away from this is that, in Case 4
for these activities, the traditional biases were affirmed. Yet again, gender, specifically,
being female, was a significant predictor for volunteering and donating—two critical
needs for any successful campaign. Campaign interest, online campaign contact, and
support for Obama, were significant predictor for all three.
7-2.1.1: Attempting to persuade someone to vote for a candidate.
Demographically, the predictors for persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate
differ from the Case 3 predictors, but the non-demographic variables in the model
generally are consistent with Case 3. Based on the results of the logistic regression
model, with statistical controls, those from more affluent households were 1.3 times more
likely to say they persuaded someone to support or oppose a candidate than those from
less affluent households (OR=1.338, p<.05). Politically those more likely to say they
persuaded others to support or oppose a candidate tended to be highly interested in the
campaign (OR=1.873 p<.001), likely to be contacted by one of the campaigns online
(OR=1.455, p<.01), and more likely to be an Obama voter (OR=1.299, p<.05) (See Table
7-2).
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7-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign. The Case 4
demographic predictors for volunteering for a candidate are somewhat similar to Case 3.
Consistent with Verba et al. (1995) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the more
frequent one attends religious services, the more likely they were to say they volunteered
to work for a campaign (OR=1.231, p<.01). Females (OR=1.664/.601 for males, p>.05)
were more likely than males to say they volunteered to work for a campaign. Also
consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen, those contacted by a campaign online were
nearly five times more likely to say they volunteered to work for a campaign (OR=4.829,
p<.001) than those who had no such contact. Obama voters were nearly two and a half
times more likely (OR=2.334, p<.01) than McCain voters to say they worked for one of
the candidates, and those with a higher level of campaign interest were more than one and
a half times more likely (OR=1.584, p<.05) to say they volunteered for a campaign either
offline or online (See Table 7-2).
7-2.1.3: Contributing money to a candidate or campaign. According to the results
of the regression, those most likely to say they donated to one of the campaign during the
general election campaign were the more affluent (OR=1.594, p<.01), the better educated
(OR=1.352, p<.05) and females (OR=1.328/.753 (male), p<.05). Unlike in Case 3, race
was not a significant predictor for making a campaign contribution in Case 4. Politically,
those saying they donated to a campaign typically were more likely to be Democratic
(OR=1.515, p<.05). Again, online campaign contact was a significant predictor since
those who were contacted by one of the campaigns online were four times more likely to
say they donated than those who were not (OR=4.206, p<.001). Presumably, one would
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have to have a certain amount of interest in a campaign to want to donate, thus high
campaign interest was a significant predictor of donating (OR=2.278, p<.001). Finally,
the model revealed that Obama voters were more likely to say they donated money to a
campaign during the general election period (OR=1.605, p<.05), though this might have
more to do with the fact that the McCain campaign accepted public campaign financing
which barred it from accepting direct campaign donations once McCain accepted the
nomination at the party convention in early September. Obama had no such restriction,
since his campaign chose not to accept public financing (See Table 7-2).
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Table 7-2: Case 4--Predictors of Political Participation Regardless of Online or
Offline
Logistic Regression EXP(B)
Volunteer
for
candidate or
campaign

Contribute
Money to a
candidate or
campaign

1.204
.601*
.883
1.738
1.126
1.231**
1.494
1.220
1.051
1.100**
1.021
.982
1.257
1.584*
4.829***
2.334**
.001***
1,925

1.352*
.753*
.839
.815
1.594**
.995
1.515*
.966
1.024
1.120***
1.107***
1.013
.946
2.278***
4.206***
1.605*
.002***
1,925

93.0%

83.1%

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
Obama Voter
Constant
N

Attempt to
persuade
someone to
support/
oppose
candidate
.868
1.136
1.004
.680
1.338*
.952
1.091
.905
1.077***
1.087***
1.038*
1.025
.960
1.873***
1.455**
1.299*
.056***
1,925

Correctly Classified

64.9%

Nagelkerke R Square

.160

.279

.308

Cox & Snell R Square

.120

.114

.193

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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7-2.2: Predictors of offline participation activities
The demographic analysis of offline participation activities reveals that women
and African Americans are more likely to say they took part in these traditional behaviors
of political participation. This is particularly true for offline volunteering, attending
rallies, and displaying support for a candidate among women, and attending rallies and
displaying support for African Americans. Consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen
(1993) and Verba et al. (1995) regarding the importance of religious attendance and
volunteering, the Case 4 logistic model shows that the more one attends religious services
the more likely that person was to volunteer to work for a campaign online and to attend
a rally or meeting in support of a candidate. Politically, online campaign contact appears
to have made a difference for offline activities as well as online activities. Online contact
significantly predicted, volunteering offline, attending rallies or meeting, displaying
campaign support, and donating money offline. Similarly, high campaign interest was a
significant predictor of offline donating, rally attendance, and displaying support.
Additionally, more than predicting online activities, Obama voters were more likely than
non-voters to say they persuade offline, attend rallies or meetings, and display candidate
support. The remainder of this section details the significant predictors for the offline
participation activities.
7-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone offline to vote for a candidate. Case 3
data indicated that youth, gender, and income were significant predictors of offline
persuasion, however, in Case 4, there were no significant demographic predictors of
offline persuasion. Those saying they engaged in offline persuasion tended to be highly
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interested in the presidential campaign (OR=1.560, p<.001) and were more likely to be
Obama voters (OR=1.34, p<.05) (See Table 7-3).
7-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. According to
the logistic regression model, women (OR=1.72/.582 for men, p<.05) and frequent
religious service attendees (OR=1.288, p<.01) were the only significant demographic
predictors of offline volunteering. Those contacted by a campaign online were nearly
five times as likely as others (OR=4.949, p<.001) to say they volunteered offline. Obama
voters (OR=2.863, p<.01) were almost three times more likely than McCain voters to say
they volunteered offline (See Table 7-3).
7-2.2.3: Contributing money offline to a presidential candidate or campaign. In
the presence of controls, no demographic variables significantly predicted donating to a
presidential campaign through an offline mechanism. The Case 4 model shows that selfidentified Democrats (OR=1.478, p<.05) were more likely to say they donated than
Republicans or Independents during the general election campaign. Again, this might be
a result of the McCain campaign accepting matching Federal funds and therefore unable
to collect donations after McCain accepted his party’s nomination in early-September.
The strongest predictors were high campaign interest (OR=1.990, p<.001) and online
campaign contact (OR=1.869, p<.001) (See Table 7.3).
7-2.2.4: Attending a rally, meeting, or other event in support of a candidate.
African Americans (OR=2.199, p<.001) were more than twice as likely to say they
attended a rally meeting or some other event in support of a candidate. Higher educated
adults (OR=1.764, p<.01) and women (OR= 1.464/0.683 for males, p<.05) were also
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significant predictors of attending rallies. More frequent religious service attendees
(OR=1.145, p<.05) were also significantly more likely than less frequent ones to say they
attended campaign rallies or meetings. The most robust predictor of this offline activity,
again, is online campaign contact (OR=3.092, p<.001). This is further evidence of the
impact of online campaign communications with voter mobilization. Other significant
predictors are highly campaign interested adults (OR=2.172, p<.001), and being an
Obama voter (OR=1.573, p<.05) (See Table 7.3).
7-2.2.5: Wearing a campaign button, placing a bumper sticker or lawn sign in
support of a candidate. African Americans are about twice as likely as non-African
Americans to say they wore a button, displayed a bumper sticker or lawn sign in support
of a candidate (OR=1.923, p<.01). Women were significantly more likely than men to
display their support in this manner (OR=1.285/0.778 for men, p<.05). Politically,
Democrats were more likely than Republicans or Independents to say they wore a button
(OR=1.362, p<.05). The effect of online campaign contact was also the predictor with the
highest probability (OR=3.180, p<.001). And, as I found for most of the other offline and
online activities, high campaign interest was a significant predictor (OR=1.763, p<.001)
(See Table 7-3).
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Table 7-3: Case 4--Predictors of Offline Political Participation
Logistic Regression EXP(B)

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Voter
Constant
N
Correctly Classified
Nagelkerke R Square
Cox & Snell R Square

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,

Attempt to
Persuade someone
to support or
oppose a
candidate
OFFLINE
.839
1.154
.924
.788
1.196
.939
1.071
.896*
1.036
1.064**
1.041
1.027
.809
1.560***
.902
1.340*
.119***

Volunteer for
candidate
OFFLINE

1.309
.582*
.923
1.612
1.135
1.288**
1.609
1.224
1.002
1.103**
1.014
.989
1.162
1.469
4.949***
2.863**
.001***

^Contribute
Money to a
Candidate or
Campaign
OFFLINE
1.102
1.019
.269
1.194
1.365
1.069
1.478*
.864
.948
1.047
1.147***
1.038
.915
1.990***
1.869***
1.001
.004***

Attend
Rally/
Meeting

1.764**
.683*
1.486
2.199**
.851
1.145*
1.315
1.050
1.078*
1.078**
1.041
.909*
.971
2.172***
3.092***
1.573*
.001***

1,925
1,925
1,925
1,925
62.1%
94.1%
88.7%
89.1%
.074
.268
.128
.241
.055
.100
.065
.123
shaded means predictor is also significant in Case 3; ^=Not asked in Case 3

Wear Campaign
Button/
Display Bumper
Sticker/Lawn
Sign
.903
.778*
1.673
1.923**
.965
1.052
1.362*
1.016
1.056*
1.113***
1.042*
1.018
.829
1.763***
3.180***
1.332
.008***
1,925
80.6%
.218
.141
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7-2.3: Predictors of online participation activities
Those most likely to say they engaged in the online participation activities
tended to be better educated, younger, more affluent, and female. Politically, they
benefitted from online campaign contact and were very interested in the presidential
campaign. Online participants’ Internet behavior suggests they spend a lot of time
online, in general, and relied on the Internet as an important campaign source. Better
educated adults were significant predictors for online political discussion, visiting a
campaign web site, viewing a political video online, and forwarding a political email,
audio or video. Younger adults were more likely to say they discussed politics online,
visited a campaign web site, and viewed a political video online. Females were more
likely to say they donated online and forwarded a political email. More affluent adults
were more likely to say they donated online and viewed an online political video.
Online contact significantly predicted all of the measured online activities except
volunteering online. High campaign interest was a significant predictor of online
persuasion, discussing politics online, visiting a campaign web site, viewing an online
political video, and forwarding a political email, audio or video. The more one was
online, the more likely one was to say they performed one of the measured online
activities except for volunteering online and donating online. The remainder of this
section details the significant predictors for the online participation activities.
7-2.3.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a
candidate.
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Consistent with the Case 3 data, there were no significant demographic predictors of
online persuasion, according to the logistic regression model. Rather, those who were
contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=3.850, p<.001) and those highly
interested in the campaign (OR=3.501, p<.001) were most likely to say they tried to
persuade others via an online method to support or oppose a presidential candidate.
Additionally, being online frequently (OR=1.718, p<.01) was also a significant
predictor of this online persuasive behavior (See Table 7-4).
7-2.3.1: Volunteering online to do work for a candidate. The descriptive
analysis shows that better educated adults were most likely to say they worked online
for one of the candidates. With controls, the influence of education on this behavior
disappears. In fact, like online persuasion, there were no significant demographic
predictors for this behavior. Online campaign contact (OR=3.509, p<.05) and using
the Internet as a source for campaign information in the prior seven days (OR=1.447,
p<.01) were significant predictors (See Table 7.4).
7-2.3.3: Contributing money online to a presidential candidate or campaign.
The Case 4 model shows that the demographic profile of those most likely to donate
to a candidate online differs little from prior research on general election campaign
donations. While the Obama campaign promoted the notion (New York Times, July
17, 2008) that its donor base was made up of many small donors, those who say they
made those contributions in the general election, according to the model, tended to be
better off financially than those who did not donate (OR=1.811, p<.01). These
findings appear to conform to the post-election study, noted earlier in this dissertation
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but bears repeating. The Campaign Finance Institute, a non-partisan, non-profit
institute affiliated with The George Washington University, conducted an analysis of
the data from the FEC showing that Obama raised 80 percent more from large donors
than small donors, a much higher rate than his opponents and any prior presidential
candidate. Additionally, the CFI analysis concluded that Obama raised about the
same percentage from small donors (amounts of less than $200) in 2008, than George
W. Bush did in 2004 (Malbin, 2008).
The model also indicates that women (OR=1.845/.524 (men), p<.01) and
those who were better educated (OR=1.794, p<.05) were almost twice as likely as
their counterparts to say they made an online donation. However, it bears restating,
and perhaps it is obvious, but online efforts by the campaigns were truly the primary
driver in choosing to make an online donation. Getting a campaign email made one
eleven times more likely to say they made an online donation than those who did not
get one (OR=11.365, p<.001). Obama voters, again, perhaps because McCain was
barred from accepting donations once he became the party’s nominee, were nearly
four times more likely to say they made an online donation than McCain voters
(OR=3.731, p<.001). Related to contact and support, high campaign interest
(OR=2.468, p<.001) was another significant predictor (See Table 7.4).
7-2.3.4: Discussing politics online. The demographic profile of those who say
they went online to discuss politics and the campaign turned out to be younger and
better educated. Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were two and a half times more
likely than older adults to say they went online to discuss politics and the presidential
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campaign (OR=2.462, p<.001). Highly educated adults, a group more traditionally
involved in campaigns, were nearly twice as likely as less educated to say they
discussed politics and the campaign online (OR=1.826, p<.001). Those who say they
discussed politics and the campaign online were more likely to be contacted by one of
the campaigns online (OR=2.431, p<.001), frequently online (OR=1.962, p<.001),
and highly interested in the campaign (OR=1.396, p<.01) (See Table 7.4).
7-2.3.5: Visiting a campaign web site. Youth, education and online campaign
contact also defined who were more likely to say they visited a campaign web site.
Younger people were twice as likely to say they visited a campaign web site,
according to the Case 4 model (OR=2.062, p<.001). The odds of a college educated
adult to say they visited a campaign web site was 1.503 (p<.01). Those who got an
email from one of the campaigns were four times more likely than those who did not
receive a campaign email to visit a campaign web site (OR=4.029, p<.001). Frequent
Internet users were more likely than less frequent ones (OR=1.316, p<.001) to visit
campaign web sites and high campaign interest was a significant predictor
(OR=1.617, p<.001) (See Table 7-4).
7-2.3.6: Viewing a political video on a site like YouTube. Youth is the most
robust predictor, both demographically and behaviorally, of viewing online political
videos, with odds ratios higher than online campaign contact. 18 to 29 year olds are
just about three times more likely than older adults (OR=2.808, p<.001) to say they
viewed a political video on a site like YouTube during the general election campaign.
Those contacted online by one of the campaigns were just about twice as likely as
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non-contacts to say they viewed online political video (OR=1.854, p<.001).
Demographically, in addition to younger adults, those with higher income
(OR=1.444, p<.01), and more education (OR=1.427, p<.01) were typically more
likely to say they viewed online political video. Other political predictors for going
online to view political videos were high campaign interest (OR=1.488, p<.001),
frequent use of the Internet (OR=1.495, p<.01), and citing Internet as a campaign
source (OR=1.231, p<.001) (See Table 7-4)
7-2.3.7: Forwarding emails, audio or videos to others about one of the
candidates. Demographically, forwarding emails, audio or videos about the
presidential campaign to others was an activity more likely to be reported by females
(OR=1.84/0.543 for males, p<.001) and the more highly educated (OR=1.552,
p<.001). Again, however, this activity is most driven by online campaign contact
(OR=3.193, p<.001), campaign interest (OR=1.739, p<.001), and frequency of being
on the Internet (OR=2.068, p<.001) (See Tables 7-4 and 7-4a).
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Table 7-4: Case 4--Predictors of Online Political Participation (Part 1)
Logistic Regression EXP(B)
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Attempt to
Persuade someone
to support/ oppose
candidate
ONLINE
Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
Obama Voter
Constant
N
Correctly Classified
Nagelkerke R Square
Cox & Snell R Square

1.277
.896
1.284
.648
1.289
1.045
.958
1.029
1.177***
1.065
.990
.976
1.718**
3.501***
3.850***
.858
.000***
1,925
92.3%
.270
.113

Volunteer for
Candidate or
Campaign
ONLINE
.868
.786
.818
1.861
1.029
.928
.945
1.125
1.447**
1.048
1.043
.953
1.629
2.286
3.509*
.914
.000
1,925
98.8%
.200
.024

Contribute Money
to a candidate or
campaign
ONLINE
1.794*
.524**
1.884
.542
1.811**
.871
1.111
1.114
1.161**
1.182***
.988
.951
1.085
2.468***
11.365***
3.731***
.000***
1,925
92.3%
.450
.194
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Table 7-4a: Case 4--Predictors of Online Political Participation (Part 2)
Logistic Regression EXP(B)
Discuss
politics
ONLINE

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
Obama Voter
Constant
N
Correctly Classified
Nagelkerke R Square
Cox & Snell R Square
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

1.826***
.952
2.462**
1.042
1.216
1.012
1.038
1.055
1.156***
1.074**
.975
1.033
1.962***
1.396**
2.431***
.871
.010***
1,925
81.4%
0.271
0.172

Visit
Campaign
Web site

1.503**
.925
2.062**
.908
1.275
1.013
.870
1.058
1.245***
1.033
.950*
1.023
1.316*
1.617***
4.029***
1.316
.011***
1,925
78.7%
.379
.268

Viewed
Political
Video on
Sites Like
YouTube

Forward
Political
Emails,
Audios, or
Videos to
Others

1.427**
.982
2.808***
.687
1.444**
1.058
.784
1.150*
1.231***
1.054*
.996
.960
1.495**
1.488***
1.854***
1.280
.016***
1,925
75.5%
.300
.211

1.552***
.543***
.857
1.094
1.262
1.022
.942
.907
1.155***
1.076**
1.003
.997
2.068***
1.739***
3.193***
.809
.020***
1,925
77.4%
.327
.230
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7-2.4: Online index and offline index: predictors

Combining the measured participation activities into online and offline
participation indexes yield a set of results fairly consistent with many of the individual
participation activities. Even with controls in place, education continues to be a
significant predictor for online participation (b=.287, p<.01), but not for offline
participation. Similarly, gender and age are significant only as predictors of online
behavior as reflected by the index. Being female is a significant predictor (b=-.152,
p<.01). Somewhat consistent with the models for the individual online activities, those
age 18 to 29 are more likely than older adults to say they engaged in at least one of the
online activities (b=.479, p<.001). The other significant demographic variable predicting
online participation was income. More affluent adults (b=.241, p<.01) were more likely
to say they performed an online activity. Race is the only significant demographic
predictor for the offline index according to the OLS model. African Americans were
more likely than non-African Americans to say they performed at least one of the offline
activities (b=.298, p<.001).
Among the political control variables, online campaign contact (b=1.057, p<.001
was a robust significant predictor of online participation. Heavy use of the Internet
(b=.402, p<.001) and campaign interest (b=.296, p<.001) were significant predictors of
online participation as was using the Internet as a source of campaign information
(b=.142, p<.001).
Online campaign contact (b=.474, p<.001) and campaign interest (b=.247,
p<.001) were also strong predictors of offline participation. Other significant predictors
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of offline participation among the political controls were, being an Obama voter (b=.179,
p<.01), and being a Democrat (b=.166, p<.001) (See Table 7-5).

Table 7-5: Case 4--Predictors of Online Political Participation and Offline
Political Participation: OLS Regression

Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Voter
Constant
N

Online Participation
Index
.287***
-.152**
.479***
-.108
.241**
.014
-.016
.056
.142***
.053***
-.013
-.004
.402***
.296***
1.057***
.066
-1.056***
1,924

.005
-.063
.055
.298**
.060
.024
.166**
-.009
.022*
.051***
.033***
-.001
-.086
.247***
.474***
.179**
-.552***
1,924

R Square

.423

.196

R Square Change

.311***

.161***

*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Offline Participation Index
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7-3: Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both
Thus far, this study has detailed the frequency of participation across activities
and found that the reporting frequency was much higher in Case 4 than in Case 3. The
data also showed that, like in other cases, the biases of the past were reinforced but there
was also evidence that groups marginalized in the past became more active and
participatory than in prior elections. While there has been no direct linkage to the
effectiveness of the Internet in this regard, the role co online campaign contact cannot be
discounted. However, a better test of mobilization and reinforcement involves testing the
logistic models with interactions between Internet frequency and the significant
demographic variables produced by the initial logistic and OLS regression models.
The logistic models produced a significant interaction between frequent Internet
use and gender for predicting volunteering to work for a presidential campaign
(OR=.824, p<.05, b= -.188), thus providing evidence for H1a (mobilization).
Additionally, the model produced significant interactions between frequent Internet use
and education for predicting online political discussion (OR=.875, p<.05, b=-.136),
viewing a political video on a site like YouTube (OR=.876, p<.05, b= -.137), and
forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others (OR=.876, p<.05, b= -.136). These
interactions provided support for hypotheses 2c and 2d (See Table 7-6).
In order to see the effects of the interactions more clearly, one must observe the
graphical figures. In one instance where the interaction was significant, the graphical
figure (7-1) points to evidence of mobilization, while the other figures provide evidence
for both mobilization and reinforcement (See Figures 7-2 through 7-4).

215
Table 7-6: Case 4: Testing for Mobilization and Reinforcement--Significant Interactions: (Exp(B)(b coefficient)
Volunteering to work for
a presidential campaign
with Interaction (Internet
Frequency X Gender
(Male))
Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
Obama Voter
Political Knowledge (Delli Carpini/Keeter)
Online Frequency X Gender (Male)
Online Frequency X Education (Col Grad/ higher)
Constant
N
Correctly classified
Nagelkerke R Square
Cox Snell R Square
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

1.122
.663 (b=-0.374)
.886
1.817*
1.097
1.244*
1.472
1.212
1.051
1.101**
1.020
.981
1.177
1.554*
4.772***
2.409**
1.164
.824* (b=-0.188)
NA
.000
1,925
93.0%
.285
.117

Online Political
Discussion: with
Interaction (Internet
Frequency X
Education (Coll grad
or higher))
1.911***
.914
2.575**
1.094
1.219
1.014
1.051
1.060
1.150***
1.073**
.974
1.036
2.172***
1.379**
2.383***
.867
1.125
NA
.875* (b=-0.136)
.008
1,925
80.8%
.276
.175

Viewing A Political
Video on a Site Like
YouTube (Internet
Frequency X
Education (Coll grad
or higher))
1.363*
.906
3.064***
.739
1.434**
1.065
.787
1.164*
1.225***
1.053*
.991
.961
1.609***
1.453***
1.816***
1.283
1.268**
NA
.876* (b= -0137)
.011
1,925
76.5%
.310
.218

Forwarding Political
Emails (Internet
Frequency X
Education (Coll grad
or higher))
1.490**
.500***
.899
1.180
1.253
1.027
.956
.912
1.149***
1.075**
.998
.998
2.227***
1.710***
3.136***
.810
1.251**
NA
.876* (b=-0.136)
.014
1,925
77.2%
.336
.236
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7-3.1: Gender by high internet use predicting volunteering to work for a presidential
campaign without regard to online or offline work
Figure 7-1 shows greater evidence for mobilization than for reinforcement in the
interaction between gender and Internet use predicting volunteering to work for a
presidential campaign. The more frequently females were online the more likely they
were to say they volunteered to work for a presidential campaign. Males who were
online frequently were only slightly more likely to say they volunteered to work for a
presidential campaign (See Figure 7-1). Therefore this provides support for Hypothesis
1a—using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged citizens. Research by
Converse et al.’s in their landmark voting study (1960) and others including Verba et al.
(1995) pointed to a slight gender gap in participation. These findings suggest that the
Internet mobilized women to become more participatory during the general election
period.
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Figure 7-1 Case 4 Interaction-Gender (Male) by High Internet Use Predicting Volunteering to Work for a Campaign
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7-3.2: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting online political
discussion
The interaction between frequent Internet use and education produced evidence
for both mobilization and reinforcement in predicting online political discussion. Those
who have earned at least a college degree but frequently on the Internet are more likely to
say they discussed politics online than those who reported being online less frequently.
A similar pattern exists for those with less education, but the starting point is at a lower
point (See Figure 7-2). Hypotheses 2c and 2d are supported by these data. The Internet
will mobilize previously disengaged citizens to participate online (H2c) and using the
Internet will reinforce the online participation of already engaged citizens (H2d).

219
Figure 7-2: Case 4 Interaction-Education (College Grad or higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Online Political
Discussion
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7-3.3: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting viewing
political video on sites like YouTube
Interacting education and frequency of Internet use produces significant outcomes
for predicting viewing political video on sites like YouTube in much the same way it
predicts online discussion and as I will present below, forwarding emails. The more
frequently one is online, the more likely they are to say they viewed view political
videos. The patterns are similar for both those with and without college degrees (See
Figure 7-3), thus, this is more evidence in support of Hypotheses 2c and 2d.
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Figure 7-3: Case 4 Interaction-- Education (College Grad or Higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Viewing Political Video on
Sites Like YouTube
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7-3.4: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting forwarding
political emails, audio, or video to others
While the interactions between education and frequency of Internet use are
significant, and the figure points to instances of mobilization and reinforcement, the gap
between college graduates and non-college graduates nearly intersects. This closing of
the gap is evidence of a mobilizing effect whereby, less educated citizens who are
frequently online are more likely than less online active ones to participate in this
activity, but they are almost as likely as higher educated citizens to do so (See Figure 74). While not clear-cut, the evidence weighs more heavily toward mobilization (H2c)
than reinforcement (H2d).
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Figure 7-4: Case 4 Interaction--High Education by High Internet Use Predicting Forwarding Political Emails/Audio/Video
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7-4: Case 4--Summary of Findings
Case 4 examined the general election period retrospectively during the week
following the presidential election. Those sampled were part of a panel that completed
the survey in the two months prior to the election, but they had no exposure to
participation questions before the post-election wave.
Descriptive analysis of Case 4 shows a significantly greater level of engaging in
participation activities, as compared to Case 3. Yet, despite this difference, the patterns
are generally the same for total participation. Again, this is likely an artifact of question
wording.
Similar to the Case 3 descriptive analysis, without statistical controls, those with a
higher level of education and more income were more likely to engage in most of the
measured participation activities. Younger adults were more likely to engage in several
online activities, and African Americans were more likely engage in most offline
activities than non-African Americans.
Different demographic variables were more predictive of participation behavior
depending on whether the activity was performed online or offline. Those advantaged in
the past (higher educated and more affluent) were more likely to continue to be
advantaged in the logistic models. However, young adults were significant predictors of
several online activities. Race (African American) and gender (female) were significant
predictors for most offline activities. As seen in prior cases, online campaign contact
and campaign interest were consistently significant predictors for nearly all activities.
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Multivariate analysis also affirmed that biases were present in some of the online
and offline activities. Those with greater levels of education were more likely to engage
in online discussion, visiting campaign web sites, and viewing video. They were also
more likely to attend campaign rallies. Age (18 to 29 year olds) continued to be a good
predictor of several online activities, but African Americans did not emerge as a predictor
group in Case 4, whereas in Case 3 African Americans were often seen as significant
predictors. Politically, campaign contact, interest, and frequent internet use were reliable
predictors of online behaviors. Interest and online contact were also significant
predictors of offline behavior—these were consistent with Case 3. It is unclear what
explains the disparity between the two cases—question wording, time-frame of data
collection, or rolling cross-section versus panel designs. More research needs to be done
to determine the cause of the differences. Tables 7-7 and 7-8 provide a summary of the
significant predictors for each activity.
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Table 7-7: Case 4 Top Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation (Up to 6)
(A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the
odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.)
Persuade
someone to vote
offline
Education (College Grad+)
Gender (male)
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)
Campaign Interest
Contacted by Campaign Online
Obama Voter

Volunteer for
candidate
offline

Donate Money
Offline

X-

Attend
Rally/
Meeting

Wear
Campaign
Button

X+
X-

X-

X+

X+

X+
X+

X+
XX+
X+

X+
X+

X+
X+

X+
X+

X+
X+
X+

X+
X+
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Table 7-8: Case 4—Top Significant Predictors of Online Political Participation (Up to 6)
Attempt to
Persuade
someone to
support/ oppose
candidate
ONLINE

Volunteer
for
Candidate or
Campaign
ONLINE

Contribute
Money to a
candidate or
campaign
ONLINE

Discuss
politics
online

Visit
Campaign
Web site

Viewed
Political
Video on
Sites Like
YouTube

Forward
Political
Emails,
Audios, or
Videos to
Others

X+
X+
X+
Education (College Grad+)
X+
XGender (male)
X+
Age (18-29)
Race (African American)
X+
X+
Income ($100K plus)
Religiosity
Party (Democrat)
Ideology (liberal)
X+
X+
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
X+
X+
X+
Online Frequency (Several hours/day/ more)
X+
X+
X+
X+
Campaign Interest
X+
X+
X+
X+
X+
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
X+
.
Obama Voter
(A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the
odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.)
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The models with interactions showed evidence of mobilization, and mobilization
and reinforcement. High levels of education interacting with frequency of Internet use
provided evidence for mobilization for online political discussion, viewing political video
on sites like YouTube, and forwarding emails, audio, or video about the campaign to
others. The Internet also appears to mobilize women to engage in volunteering to work
for one of the campaigns.
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CHAPTER 8: MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT
In the previous four chapters, one of the constants in the findings on mobilization
and reinforcement has been the strong predictive quality of online campaign contact for
nearly all of the measured participation activities. Online campaign contact consistently
produced the most robust odds ratios and highest coefficients, meaning that those who
were contacted online by any campaign were most often more likely to say they
participated in some way. Certainly, one of the limitations of survey research is the
difficulty in determining the causal direction between participation and contact, but it is
clear that contact is an important element of participation, and worthy of further review.
As part of the original research plan, I sought to measure the impact of campaign contact
on participation. Campaign contact is stated throughout this dissertation and has long
been theoretically important. It is through direct and indirect methods of recruitment and
activation, which campaigns build up their organization and base of support (Rosenstone
and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). A more effective activation effort leads to greater
success in the electoral outcome. Social networks help get the word out, therefore
multiplying the effects of mobilization. Campaigns use the Internet in an attempt to
maximize voter outreach in terms of monetary contributions and support. Online
recruitment gets the message out to the strongest supporters, with the hope of spurring
them into action and helping them to expand this message to those who may be interested
but up until the point of contact were uncertain how to act. The final research question to
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be addressed is the extent to which mobilization or reinforcement is dependent on the
effectiveness in how the candidates and their campaigns utilize the Internet.
Results of three related hypotheses are presented in this chapter:
H3a: Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized to participate than
those contacted offline
The popular perception (supported by some evidence) that in the 2008
presidential primaries Barack Obama was more effective than Hillary Clinton in using the
Internet as a mobilizing tool, the Obama campaign may have been more likely to send out
online messages to potential supporters, than the Clinton campaign was to their potential
supporters. Given this perception, I further hypothesize
H3b: Voters for Obama in the primaries were more likely to have been contacted
online by the Obama campaign than were voters for Clinton by the Clinton
campaign in the primaries.
H3c: The Obama campaign online contact would more likely lead to political
participation than the Clinton campaign online contact.
8-1: Methods: Hypotheses 3a-c
I purposely designed sections of the NAES survey during the period covered by
Case 2, July 2, 2008 through August 4, 2008, to address hypotheses 3a-c. The
instrument included a series of retrospective questions about the campaign contact
activities of the Obama and Clinton campaigns during the primaries and caucuses:
•

Whether either campaign contacted respondent

•

Whether the respondent was contacted online or offline
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•

Frequency of contact by either Clinton or Obama (Online or Offline)

•

Whether either campaign asked in the contact to contact others

•

Whether respondent acted on that contact

•

Frequency of contributing to either Clinton or Obama during primaries
and caucuses and the general amount donated.

The analysis followed two steps. First, in order to test hypotheses 3a and 3c, I
constructed several OLS regression models to determine if campaign contact activated
political participation. I ran several regression models addressing this hypothetical claim
that those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted offline.
I then ran several more regression models addressing the claim of hypothesis 3b, that
those contacted online by Obama were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted
online by Clinton. The key dependent variables for both hypotheses 3a and 3c were
political participation (without specifying offline or online), offline political
participation, and online political participation. There would be support for H3a if the
positive coefficients are greater for online contact variables than for offline contact.
Support for H3c would exist if the positive coefficients are greater for the Obama contact
variables than for the Clinton contact variables.
Second, to test H3b, I conducted a straightforward descriptive analysis showing
the types of offline and online participation activities respondents performed during the
primaries. In addition, I ran bivariate analyses showing the frequency of campaign
contact by the Clinton and Obama campaign and analyses tying campaign contact with
the participation activities (See Chapter 3 for the complete details of the methodology).
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8-2: Testing Hypotheses 3a –c
8-2.1: Testing Hypotheses 3a: Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized
than those contacted offline
I found support for hypothesis 3a when examining the coefficients of the contact
type variables without distinguishing from the candidate source of the contact.
Regardless of the source of the message, either from Obama or Clinton, if that message
was sent online, then it was significantly more likely to lead to either online or offline
political participation than a message sent offline (See Table 8-1).
Table 8-1: Case 2--Hypothesis 3a Test Using OLS Regression—Impact of Online Contact
on Political Participation

Online
Contact By
Either
Obama or
Clinton
(B)(SE)
Offline
Contact By
Either
(B)(SE)
Combined
offline/online
Contact by
Either
(B)(SE)

Offline Political
Participation
(N=1,998)
.529***^
(.075)

Online Political
Participation
(N=1,999)
.532***+
(.066)

Combined Political
participation
(N=1,999)
1.062***+
(.108)

.339***
(.045)

.170***
(.040)

.509***
(.066)

.360***
(.044)

.248***
(.039)

.609***
(.064)

***B coefficient is significant
+Online contact is significantly greater than Offline Contact and Combined Offline/Online Contact at the
.05 level
^ Online Type of contact is significantly greater than Offline Contact at the .10 level
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8-2.2: Testing for hypothesis 3b: Voters for Obama in the primaries were more
likely to have been contacted online by the Obama campaign than were voters for
Clinton by the Clinton campaign in the primaries.
Relative to the population, very few respondents reported receiving any contact from
either campaign during the primaries and caucuses. However, data show that the Obama
campaign (15%) contacted significantly more respondents than the Clinton campaign
(12%) during the primaries and caucuses. The difference, though, is small, but
significant, nevertheless. Despite the media emphasis on online communication, the vast
majority of those contacted by either Obama or Clinton were done so offline (mostly by
telephone) rather than online. While the Obama (12.7%) and Clinton campaigns (11.2%)
contacted respondents offline at roughly the same rate during the primaries, the Obama
campaign was slightly more likely to do so than the Clinton campaign via online methods
(3.7% vs. 1.5%) (See Table 8-2). Since the difference is significant, then the data support
hypothesis 3b, since more people stated they were contacted by the Obama campaign,
online, than by the Clinton campaign, online.
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Table 8-2: Case 2--Obama and Clinton Campaign Contact Activities during the
Presidential Primaries
(Among All)
Contacted Contacted
Contacted Offline
(n=2,217) Online
(n=2,217)
(n=2,217)
Total
Total
Total Telephone In-Person
Regular Mail
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Hillary
Clinton
Barack
Obama
John McCain
Other
Not Sure
Not
Contacted

12.0

1.5

11.2

9.6

1.0

2.9

15.0*

3.7*

12.7

9.6

2.0*

3.7

10.1
4.1
3.2

NA^
NA^
NA^

NA^
NA^
NA^

66.7

NA^

NA^

*p<.05; ^Survey only measured type of contact from Obama and Clinton

Taking this analysis one step further, it becomes more evident that the Obama
campaign was more likely to contact its supporters online than the Clinton campaign was
to contact its supporters online. Table 8-3 displays the mode of campaign contacts
among those who said they voted for either Obama or Clinton during the primaries.
While the number of Obama voters and Clinton voters contacted by each of the
campaigns is about equal, the proportion of Obama supporters who were contacted online
exceeds the proportion of Clinton supporters contacted online by a ratio greater than 2 to
1. The Clinton campaign was much more likely to rely on direct mail than the Obama
campaign.
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Table 8-3: Case 2—Type of Campaign Contact by the Obama and Clinton Campaign
Contact during the Presidential Primaries
(Among those who were contacted by one of the campaigns and voted for either Clinton
or Obama)
Contact Method

Telephone
In-person
Mail
Email or other online
method
Other/
*p<.05, **p<.10

Clinton Voters who were
contacted by Clinton
Campaign (N=103)
%
74.0**
6.7**
31.7*
17.3*

Obama Voters who were
contacted by Obama
Campaign (N=95)
%
62.9
17.5
20.6
40.2

1.0

2.0

The frequency of contact by each of the campaigns was moderately high.
Respondents contacted by the Obama campaign reported slightly more frequent contacts
than those contacted by the Clinton campaign. However, the differences are not
statistically significant. A plurality of those contacted either by the Clinton (43.3%) or
Obama campaigns (41.6%) said they were contacted less often than one time per month
(see Table 8-4). Among eventual Obama and Clinton primary voters, the differences are
stark and significant. Those who said they voted for Obama in the primaries were twice
as likely to be contacted several times a week as those who said they voted for Clinton
(37.9% compared with 16.5%) (See Table 8-5).
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Table 8-4: Case 2--Frequency of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton Campaigns
during the Primaries and Caucuses
(Among those who said they were contacted either by the Clinton or Obama campaigns)
Frequency of Contact

Clinton Contact
(n=263)
(%)
22.1

Obama Contact
(n=329)
(%)
27.4

Every other week

10.3

7.9

One or two times a month

19.4

18.8

Less than once a month

43.3

41.6

Don’t know

4.9

4.3

Once a week or more often

Table 8-5: Case 2--Frequency of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton Campaign
during the Primaries and Caucuses
(Among Clinton and Obama primary voters who said they were contacted by either the
Clinton or Obama campaigns)
Frequency of Contact

Clinton voters
contacted by
Clinton
Campaign
(n=103)
(%)
16.5

Obama voters
contacted by Obama
Campaign

Every other week

10.7

9.5

One or two times a month

24.3

14.7

Less than once a month

42.7

34.7

Don’t know

5.8

3.2

Once a week or more often

(n=95)
(%)
37.9
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Frequency of contact was much greater for online contacts than offline contacts
by both campaigns. This is likely due to the ease and cost of sending online messages as
opposed to making more expensive and time consuming telephone calls and direct mail
pieces. Despite the very small sample size, differences were statistically significant. The
Obama campaign more frequently sent out online contact messages than the Clinton
campaign, thus providing more support for H3b (See Tables 8-6 and 8-7).

Table 8-6: Case 2--Frequency and Type of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton
Campaigns
(Among those who said they were contacted by either the Clinton or Obama campaigns)
Frequency of Contact

Once a week or more often

Clinton Contact
(n=263)
(%)
Online
Offline
Contact
Contact
(N=33)** (N=248)
60.6*
21.0

Obama Contact
(n=329)
(%)
Online
Offline
Contact
Contact
(N=82)** (N=282)
73.2*
18.8

Every other week

9.1

9.7

8.5

8.5

One or two times a month

9.1

19.8

9.8

20.2

Less than once a month
Don’t know
**Small Sample Size, *p<.05

15.2
6.1

45.2
4.4

6.1
2.4

48.2
4.3
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Table 8-7: Case 2--Frequency and Type of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton
Campaigns
(Among Clinton and Obama primary voters who said they were contacted by either the
Clinton or Obama campaigns)
**Small Sample Size, *p<.05
Frequency of Contact

Once a week or more often

Clinton voters
contacted by
Clinton Campaign
(n=103)
(%)
Online
Offline
Contact
Contact
(N=18)** (N=95)
66.7
13.7

Obama voters
contacted by Obama
Campaign
(n=95)
(%)
Offline
Online
Contact
Contact
(N=39)** (N=71)**
76.9
21.1

Every other week

5.6

10.5

7.7

11.1

One or two times a month

11.1

25.3

10.3

18.3

Less than once a month
Don’t know

5.6
11.1

46.3
4.2

0
5.1

47.9
1.4

8-2.4: Testing hypotheses 3c: Those contacted online by the Obama campaign were more
likely to be mobilized than those contacted by the Clinton campaign
The test of the hypothesis 3c, that the Obama online contact would be more likely
to lead to political participation than Clinton contact was not supported by the results of
the OLS models. Examining the coefficients produced by the models for Obama online
contact, Obama offline contact, and Obama contact without distinguishing between
online and offline were not statistically different from the coefficients produced from the
models with Clinton contact (See Table 8-9). The Clinton coefficients were slightly
higher in all cases, but not significantly so. This suggests that contact by Obama was just
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as likely to lead to political participation as contact by Clinton. More specifically,
although fewer respondents reported online contact from the Clinton campaign, those
who were contacted were just as likely to participate as those contacted online by the
Obama campaign. In the previous section, I noted support for the hypothesis that the
Obama campaign was more likely to contact its supporters online than the Clinton
campaign was. This finding about the equal effectiveness of each campaign’s online
contact suggests that if the Clinton campaign was able to reach more of its potential
supporter online, then, perhaps the race would have been closer. On the flip side, the
Clinton campaign may have known that its supporters were less connected online so it
concentrated more on its offline techniques—telephone and direct mail.
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Table 8-8: Case 2--Hypothesis 3c Test Using OLS Regression—Impact of Obama Online
Contact versus Clinton Contact on Political Participation

Obama
Online Contact
(B) (SE)
Clinton
Online Contact
(B)(SE)
Obama
Offline Contact
(B)(SE)
Clinton
Offline Contact
(B)(SE)
Obama
Contact
Either offline or
online
(B)(SE)
Clinton
Contact
Either offline or
online
(B)(SE)

Offline Political
Participation
(N=1,998)
.569***
(.097)

Online Political
Participation
(N=1,999)
.600***
(.085)

Combined Political
participation
(N=1,999)
1.169***
(.139)

.689***
(.146)

.629***
(.128)

1.318***
(.21)

.354***
(.053)

.102*
(.047)

.456***
(.077)

.299***
(.057)

.215***
(.050)

.514***
(.082)

.353***
(.051)

.197***
(.045)

.550***
(.074)

.307***
(.055)

.230***
(.049)

.537***
(.079)

***B coefficient is significant

8-3: Summary
The data from this analysis found support to hypotheses 3a and 3b. Online
contact was more likely to lead to political participation than offline contact generally.
The Obama campaign was more likely to contact its supporters and potential supporters
using online methods than was the Clinton campaign. Yet, online contact from the
Clinton campaign to its supporters was just as likely to lead to political participation as
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online contact from the Obama campaign. The question remains open whether the
Clinton campaign’s greater use of offline methods hurt or helped her chances to win the
nomination since self-identified Clinton primary voters were just as likely as selfidentified Obama primary voters to get any type of campaign contact. However, because
causal direction cannot be clearly determined, it might also be that those contacted online
were already engaged in the campaign.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
9-1: Discussion and Conclusions
This study has been an attempt to clarify the role of the Internet as a mobilizing or
reinforcing mechanism for political participation. As I stated in the introduction, the
research has set out to go beyond the extant literature on the impact of the Internet on
mobilization and reinforcement adding to the general debate by doing the following:
a.

testing the reinforcement versus mobilization theories related to the impact
of the Internet on political participation;

b.

refining these theories by testing whether mobilization or reinforcement
occurs differently online versus offline;

c. testing whether mobilization and/or reinforcement effects are different for
particular demographic groups such as young adults, women, and minorities;
d. and exploring the extent to which mobilization and reinforcement are
contingent on the activities of individual campaigns.
In this dissertation, I have provided evidence to support each of the mobilization
and reinforcement hypotheses using data from the 2008 NAES. While one could argue
that the strongest case for the Internet as a mobilizing mechanism would be made if a
clear pattern of mobilized groups emerged across the four cases for similar activities,
evidence from this dissertation does point to a pattern of the Internet mobilizing less
educated groups and reinforcing better educated groups in Cases 2 through 4 (See Tables
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9-1 and 9-1a). The evidence suggests that increased Internet usage raises the probability
of participation for less educated people and at the same time provides reinforcement for
those who are better educated. Among the instances of mobilization, reinforcement, or
both as displayed in Tables 9-1 and 9-1a, most demonstrated a positive interaction
between Internet frequency and education or income. The net effect shown by the
graphic presentations in the prior chapters indicates that the disadvantaged are closing the
gap, slightly. The evidence of mobilization and reinforcement involving both education
and income suggests that improved access to the Internet will continue to increase
political participation for all citizens. As long as the digital divide remains wide,
however, then mobilization effects of the Internet will remain limited. As the results
presented in Chapter 2 demonstrate, the digital divide undoubtedly remains, therefore the
challenge of increased mobilization continues to be substantial. Where the Internet is
closing the gap in participation, is by age. As the evidence in Case 3 suggests, increased
Internet usage nearly erases any gap between younger and older users.
By and large, the Internet both mobilizes and reinforces political participation,
which truly fulfills the promise of hope for any technology. Yet, while the evidence
points to somewhat of a pattern of interaction between educational attainment levels and
the Internet, the data do not demonstrate consistency across the cases by activity. This
lack of consistency could be due to the methodology, question wording, or time of
interview. The activities measured varied from case to case, the time periods were
different , and the measurements moved from a contemporaneous prior seven day
measure to a retrospective the campaign measure. Each of these factors might have
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contributed to the lack of a consistent pattern of mobilization and reinforcement. While
this raises additional questions which cannot be easily resolved with the available data,
the findings do illustrate that Internet use in certain instances is more likely to motivate
certain groups to engage in participation activities, especially by education and income.
The Internet has changed the nature of participation in the sense that much of
what traditionally occurred offline, now takes place online. The levels of traditional
participation continue to be low, but the absolute amount has increased with the inclusion
of such activities as viewing political videos on YouTube, engaging in online discussion,
visiting campaign web sites, donating money online and forwarding emails, videos, and
audios to those in ones social network as a means of persuasion.
The matrices in Tables 9.1 and 9.1a summarize where mobilization,
reinforcement or both took place among which groups and within each case. Across the
cases, reinforcement, mobilization, or both occurred most often with Internet frequency
interacting with education and income. Age interacted with Internet use in Case 3, but
rather than increasing the participation activity of younger people, the Internet mobilized
older people to engage in activities. As this research has noted in prior sections, African
Americans were more likely to participate in activities in greater proportions than in prior
elections. However, the Internet did not act as a mobilizing mechanism for particular
activities, among this group. Rather, in Case 3, results showed that the AfricanAmericans were mobilized to participate when the dependent variable in the model was
the combined participation index.
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In Case 1, there was no evidence of mobilization or reinforcement. This case was
the weakest of the four because it lacked an Internet measure which differentiated
respondents by frequency or type of use and because the number of offline activities
measured were limited to just three.
In Case 2, the evidence reveals that the more frequently the less educated were
using the Internet, the more likely they were to say they donated offline (but not online),
and visited a campaign website. While better educated adults also were more likely to
say they visited a campaign website the more often they were online, they were less
likely to say they donated offline the more frequently they were online. This is not a
surprising result for those with higher education, because the expectation is that they will
likely contribute online while they are online. For the less educated however, being
online frequently is associated with the act of giving offline. The data does not provide
me with a means to further explain this positive interaction.
The Case 2 analysis shows, also, that the more frequently one is online the more
likely they are to engage in forwarding campaign related emails, audio, or video to
others. Without the Internet, this and other online activities are impossible. Data show
the greater frequency of Internet use, this activity narrows the gap between more and less
affluent people regarding this behavior. It is a behavior that requires relatively little
effort—reading, listening or viewing an online piece and forwarding it to others. This
behavior is a way of influencing other people, not by talking to them directly, but
providing them with evidence that may support their position. In addition, the activity
affirms the idea of utilizing social networks to engage in this influence. An email or
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video clip generated by a campaign or interest group supporting a candidate is sent to the
strongest level of supporters with the hope that forwarding will take place. The evidence
suggests that the campaigns or their supporting organizations have been somewhat
successful in expanding the types of people who are engaged to include people across all
income groups. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) write about utilizing social networks,
“the basic idea is simple: to give weight to requests for assistance by presenting them
through people to whom it is difficult to say ‘no’” (p. 176).
Case 2 also provided evidence that the Internet mobilized those with lower
income to participate online, in general, while also acting as a reinforcing mechanism for
the more affluent. The combined online index result implies that the Internet acts as a
mobilizing and reinforcement income for all online activities, but the results of the
analysis of each individual activity reveal that this is not the case. In fact, it is more
telling that the Internet mobilizes and reinforces for some activities and not all. This
argues, therefore, for continuing with a model that tests for mobilization and
reinforcement for individual activities in addition for a model which tests for an
aggregate index of participation.
In Case 3, age played a significant role when interacting with frequency of
Internet use for activities involving persuasion and information gathering. Studies have
shown that younger people online are more likely to utilize online tools to participate
(e.g., Pew, 2009) and our research has borne this out. However, there is little evidence to
show that young people involved are not formerly inactive, uninterested actors. Evidence
from Case 3 suggests that the Internet motivates older people to persuade someone to
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support or oppose a candidate regardless of whether it was done online or offline, and to
persuade someone offline to support or oppose a candidate. In both these instances,
therefore, I have concluded that the Internet is a reinforcing tool. The Internet both
mobilizes and reinforces people to view a political video on a site like YouTube since
both younger and older groups increase their likelihood, the more they are online.
In Case 4, the Internet mobilized those with less education and reinforced those
with higher education for online political discussion, viewing political videos online, and
forwarding political materials online. However, there was no evidence to support the
Internet mobilizing lower educated and reinforcing higher educated groups to participate
online using the combined model. Further, there was no evidence of the Internet
mobilizing or reinforcing these groups to engage in these activities in Case 3 which
measured participation during a segment of the general election.
The Internet, in Case 4, also mobilized women to volunteer for a political
campaign. Internet use had no effect on mobilizing males, but clearly increased the
likelihood of females volunteering for a campaign. Research by Converse et al.’s in their
landmark voting study (1960) and others including Verba et al. (1995) pointed to a slight
gender gap in participation. These findings suggest that the Internet mobilized women to
become more participatory during the general election period.
The evidence I presented in support of the mobilization hypotheses affirms
DiGennaro and Dutton (2006). The Internet did have a significant impact on “broadening
political participation by lowering the cost of involvement, creating new mechanisms of
organizing groups and opening new channels of information that bypass traditional media
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gatekeepers” (p. 209). However, at the same time, the Internet continued to reinforce the
demographic groups which most enjoyed an advantage in the past. The participation gap
between the advantaged and disadvantaged is narrowing and will likely continue to do so
in future elections as the Internet becomes even more central to the campaign process.
As the digital divide narrows, increased participation will occur thus narrowing the gap
between the advantaged and disadvantaged more rapidly.
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Table 9-1: Interaction Matrix Displaying Significant Interactions Within Each Case for
Each Participation Activity—Offline and Online Activities
OFFLINE Activities during the campaign

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

Case 4

Internet
Freq
X Age (R)

Attempt to persuade someone OFFLINE to support or
oppose a candidate
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates
OFFLINE
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates OFFLINE

Internet
Freq
X Educ
(M)

Attend political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or
things like that in support of a particular presidential
candidate OFFLINE
Wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign
sticker on your car or place a sign in your window or in
front of your house.
ONLINE activities during the campaign
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose one of
the presidential candidates ONLINE
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates
ONLINE
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates ONLINE
Internet Freq
X Educ
(B)

Discuss politics online

Visited Web site of a presidential campaign or political
party

Internet
Freq
X Educ
(B)
Internet
Freq
X Age
(B)

Viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential
candidates or campaign

Forwarded emails, audio or video about presidential
candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers
or other people you know
M=Mobilization, R=Reinforcement, B=Both Mobilization and Reinforcement

Internet
Freq
X
Income
(B)

Internet Freq
X Educ
(B)
Internet Freq
X Education
(B)
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Table 9-1a: Interaction Matrix Displaying Significant Interactions Within Each Case for
Each Participation Activity—Without Regard to Offline or Online and for Combined
Indexes
Participation Activities

Case 1

Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose a
presidential candidate

Case 2

Case 3
Internet
Freq
X Age (R)

Internet Freq
X Gender
(female)
(M)

Done any work for one of the presidential candidates

Contribute money to campaigns or candidates
Combined Online and Combined Offline Index
Online Index

M=Mobilization, R=Reinforcement, B=Both Mobilization and Reinforcement

Case 4

Internet Internet
Freq
Freq
X Race (B)
X
Income
(B)
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The analyses I presented to determine the demographic predictors of participation
partly refute Margolis and Resnick’s (2003) claim that the Internet will not empower the
powerless because those who are powerful outside of cyberspace are taking those
advantages with them in the Internet. The results from the 2008 NAES survey showed
that these biases to the advantaged were diminished but did not disappear once the
analysis controlled these variables for other factors. There will always be a high level of
political participation by better educated, better informed, and more affluent voters.
However, with controls, the strength of the education and income predictors diminished
and can be explained by many factors including Internet use, campaign contact, and level
of campaign interest.
Further, findings showing that African Americans were more likely to participate
online are evidence of the refutation, but the advantaged and powerful still benefit from
the role the Internet plays. The uniqueness of this election with the presence of the first
African American party nominee and the first woman as front-runner in the primaries
likely energized certain segments of the population such as African Americans and young
adults, more so than other groups. The evidence supported this claim in 2008. However,
the data also show that the Internet and other ICTs aided in this level of participation in
several instances.
Demographic predictors were not consistent throughout the four cases analyzed,
but it is clear that young adults are more likely than others to engage in online activities
and offline activities. Religious service attendance was a significant predictor of
volunteering to work on a campaign, offline, in three of the four cases. This result
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affirms Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), and Verba et al. (1995), also (See Tables 9-2 and
9-3).
Looking further at the predictors of political participation, either online or offline,
the analysis revealed a clear and consistent pattern for online campaign contact and high
levels of campaign interest as significant predictors of participation in all cases and for
nearly all measured activities. This pattern supports much of the prior research on
reinforcement, but especially, it is entirely consistent with Verba et al (1995) and
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). Campaigns are most likely to contact their strongest
supporters and those most likely to come out to vote. Therefore, the finding that those
who are most likely to participate in many activities are those with the greatest level of
campaign interest is not very surprising. However, there are two important points to be
made about the effect of campaign interest and online campaign contact. First, in
Boulianne’s (2009) meta-analysis, she asserts that when political interest is combined
with Internet use in models predicting engagement, the effect of Internet use “does not
have a substantial impact on engagement” (p. 193) since only 35 percent of studies
analyzed significantly predicted engagement when controlling for political interest. Our
research would fall within those 35 percent of studies. Second, those who have been
contacted online by one of the campaigns, while controlling for level of campaign
interest, are also significant predictors. Online campaign contact is not just significant as
a predictor for online participation activities, but also significant for some offline
activities.
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Only one media variable emerged as a consistent predictor of online
participation—using the Internet as a source for campaign information. The more
frequently one used the Internet for that purpose, the more likely one would be to
participate in several online activities in nearly every case. Perhaps their Internet use for
campaign information is just one element in their general participation behavior and
using the Internet for this purpose in and of itself may be a participation behavior. To a
certain extent, this finding is consistent with Boulianne’s (2009) meta-analysis which
found that using the Internet for information about public affairs produces positive and
significant effects on participation or engagement.
As I have stated before in this dissertation, the 2008 campaign was one the most
unique in history. Media reported that Obama supporters were energized during the
campaign causing me to account for candidate support in my model. As a control
variable, Obama support/vote was a significant predictor for a few participation activities
across several cases. Even though the campaigns were important factors in encouraging
participation, campaign support did not lead to the disappearance of other variables
disappearing as predictors. Youth and Obama support can both significantly predict
online political discussion, for example.
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Table 9-2: Summary of Cases in Which Variable was a Significant Predictor of Offline Political Participation with an Odds Ratio of
1.15 or Greater
Attempt to
Persuade
someone to
support or
oppose
candidate
OFFLINE

Volunteer
for
candidate
or
campaign
OFFLINE

Donate to
candidate or
campaign
OFFLINE

Attend Rally/
Meeting

Wear Campaign
Button/Bumper
Sticker/Lawn Sign

(Cases 2,3,4)
(Cases 1-4) (Cases 1-4) (Cases 1,2,4) (Cases 2,3,4)
24
1,2
Education (CollGrad+)
2-,4443
Gender (male)
3,4
3,4
3
1,2,3
Age (18-29)
2,3
3
Race (African American)
1,2,4
3
Income (100K +)
3
Religiosity
3,4
4
1
1,3
Party (Democrat)
2
2,3
Ideology (liberal)
2
3
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days
2
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days
2,3
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days
1,3,4
1
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day)*
2,3,4
2,3,4
1,2,4
4
1,2,3,4
Campaign Interest
2,3,4
2,3,4
4
2
Contacted by Campaign Online
2,3
2,4
1-,2,3,4
Obama Supporter/Voter**
*Internet Access in Case 1, **Obama supporter in Cases 1 and 3, Obama Primary Voter in Case 2, Obama general election voter in Case 4
Key: Each number represents Case where variable was significant predictor (OR>1.15/<0.87). A negative symbol following the Case number indicates
the Odds Ratio is less than.87. For example, “Gender (male)” for “Donate to candidate OFFLINE…” shows 4-, meaning that females were more likely
than men to engage in this behavior for case
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Table 9-3: Summary of Cases in Which Variable was a Significant Predictor of Online Political Participation with an Odds
Ratio of 1.15 or Greater
Attempt to
Persuade
someone to
support/
oppose
candidate
ONLINE

Volunteer
for
Candidate
or
Campaign
ONLINE

Contribute
Money
to
candidate
or
campaign
ONLINE

Discuss
politics
ONLINE

Visit
Campaign
Web site

Viewed
Political
Video on
Sites
Like
YouTube

Read or
post to a
blog about
campaign

Forward
Political
Emails,
Audios, or
Videos to
Others

(Cases 1-4)

(Cases 14)

(Cases
1,2,4)
1,2

(Cases
1,3,4)
4
3-,41,3
34

(Cases
1-4)
2

(Cases
1,3,4)
4
1,3
1,3,4
1,3
3

(Cases 1,3)

(Cases
1-4)
4
1-,2-,3-,4-

Education (College Grad+)
3
Gender (male)
1,3
1,2,3
1
Age (18-29)
3
1,3
Race (African American)
1,2
Income ($100K plus)
1
1
Religiosity
2
1
Party (Democrat)
3
Ideology (liberal)
1,2,3,4
1,3
1,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,3,4
1,2,4
1,3,4
1,2,3,4
Internet for campaign info past 7 days
4
Talk Radio for Campaign past 7 days
Newspaper for campaign past 7 days
TV News for campaign info past 7 days
2,3,4
3
3,4
2,3,4
3,4
2
4
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)*
1,2,3,4
1,3
1,3,4
1,2,3,4
1,3,4
2,4
1,2,3,4
Campaign Interest
1,3,4
1,3
3,4
1,2,3,4
1,3,4
1,2,4
1,3,4
1,3,4
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE
2,31
2,3
2,4
Obama Supporter/ Voter**
*Frequency not measured in Case 1, **Obama supporter in Cases 1 and 3, Obama Primary Voter in Case 2, Obama general election voter in Case 4
Key: Each number represents Case where variable was significant predictor (OR>1.15/<0.87). A negative symbol following the Case number indicates
the Odds Ratio is less than.87. For example, “Gender (male)” for “Forward political emails…” shows 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, meaning that females were more
likely than males to engage in this behavior for cases 1-4.
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The study design examines participation from two perspectives. First, the
analysis focused on measuring the impact of the Internet of individual participation
activities. The theoretical rationale for this approach was that predictors of participation
and the impact of the Internet on mobilizing disadvantaged demographic groups would
vary from activity to activity. However, in general, prior research has examined
participation as an aggregate model with all disparate activities combined into a single
participation index. My research did not completely depart from this method and is
useful in drawing comparisons to the extant research. Determining predictors of
individual participation activities turned out to be the proper decision since the data
showed that there were different influences to various predictors. However, the best
predictors for the aggregated online and offline indexes in each case were generally
consistent within each case, but not perfectly consistent. This suggests that future
research should follow a disaggregated model, but it would not harm the study to also use
an aggregated index. I do not recommend employing only an aggregated model since the
nuance in determining predictors of online and offline participation and finding evidence
of mobilization will be lost.
The multivariate analysis determining the predictors of participation pointed to
online campaign contact as a significant predictor for many types of participation
activities. Hypotheses 3a-c was a specifically targeted systematic test of the impact of
campaign contact on political participation. Most important, regardless of candidate,
online contact was more likely to predict participation than offline campaign contact.
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However, causal direction is unclear. Were those contacted online more likely to
participate because of the contact or because they were already interested?
As predicted Obama was more likely to contact supporters online than the Clinton
campaign was to contact its supporters. However, it was more common for both
campaigns to contact supporters and potential supporters using offline methods.
Perhaps more surprising was that H3c was not supported. Contrary to what was
hypothesized, those contacted online by Obama were not more likely to participate than
those contacted online by Clinton. Looking back to the 2008 campaign, this conclusion
suggests that if the Clinton campaign was able to reach more of its potential supporters
online, then, perhaps the election would have been closer. Conversely, the Clinton
campaign may have known that its supporters were less connected online so it
concentrated more on its offline techniques. Going forward, the implication is that online
campaign contact is the direction which all campaigns must move in order to succeed, but
to not abandon offline techniques, which as senior Obama campaign staffers discussed in
the 2008 Annenberg Election Debriefing, was still the most effective organizing tool.
However, it was the initial online contact that served as the “net” that brought them into
the campaign in the first place (Jamieson, 2009).
The implication for communications scholars, political scientists, and political
campaigns is that online communication is indispensible tool for motivation and
engagement. In the future, political campaigns will be developing more sophisticated
methods of reaching potential supporters online and communication and political scholars
must closely follow these methods in order to measure their impact in future studies.
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9-2: Limitations
This study has gone beyond the extant research by recognizing that the Internet
serves as a mechanism for both mobilization and reinforcement, particularly in
motivating previously uninvolved actors into political engagement, in addition to
reinforcing those who the political system has favored. The art of offline political
persuasion continues to thrive and survive, but it is further enhanced by online
communication methods from the campaigns, its supporters, and the social networks that
exist or emerge around a candidate or campaign. These methods will continue to grow
and researchers must design methods which capture these new methods or if at all
possible, anticipate new methods as they happen. This study was designed before the
beginning of the 2008 campaign and much of the focus has been on more established
online methods focusing on the Internet. Specific attention was not paid to such methods
as texting or Twitter (though that method was barely used in the campaign). Further, due
to space limitations, there were no measures of social network use such as Facebook or
MySpace. This section details the limitations of this study, including fast changing
technologies, but also other issues to consider.
First, the 2008 election was unique in the sense there was a convergence of
several factors hitherto not seen in any national election—extensive use of online tools,
an African American nominee for president, a female presidential candidate who was
considered the front-runner going into the early primaries, a female vice presidential
nominee, and a collapsing national economy. The question remains to be answered about
whether these findings can be replicated in future elections. Every election is different
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and as stated above, technologies progress and campaigns find different approaches to
mobilize and engage supporters. Nevertheless, the uniqueness of the 2008 election may
have drawn new participants, but the Internet helped provide the tools for participation—
not just for those already interested but those who may not have done so otherwise.
Second, there is the issue of indeterminate causal direction. This is a problem for
all surveys. For example, it is not entirely clear whether online campaign contact
contributed to more engagement, or were those already engaged more likely to sign up to
receive online campaign messages and requests. The data show a very strong
relationship between online contact and participation. While more study is needed on the
specifics of how the Internet affects participation, and on the impact of unique aspects of
each campaign, my research, overall, suggests that the Internet is a new driver of political
participation.
Third, related to the design of the instrument are several limitations. Question
wording varied from case to case for some items thereby preventing a systematic
comparison across the cases. However, the variation in the wording was beneficial in
showing the impact of the Internet in four nearly distinct studies. Some items were
excluded from the cases because of space limitations and human error. In Case 3, due to
an oversight, there was an error in the wording related to method of campaign donations.
As a result, I could not present findings comparing means of donating during the general
election period. I was able to do so retrospectively in Case 4, however.
The nature of the campaign season was a limitation, as well. During the primary
campaign period, measured by Case 1, and the general election period, measured by Case
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3, participation behavior was asked in a contemporaneous fashion, albeit with a past
seven day recall. In the post-primary and post-general election cases, which measured
behavior retrospectively, extemporaneous wording was used, asking respondents to recall
behavior carried out up to four months before. The use of contemporaneous and
extemporaneous measures may have produced variant results. Yet, these methods are
instructive about how people respond to contemporaneous and extemporaneous
questions. For example, reported participation behavior was much lower during the
contemporaneous periods asking only about the prior week’s behavior when compared
with the post-primary and post-general election behaviors.
The measure of Internet frequency was very useful in this study, allowing me to
draw conclusions about the mobilizing effects of the Internet. However, there are a
number of ways that Internet use can be effectively measured. Eszter Hargittai believes
that Internet frequency as employed in this study is a poor proxy for Internet use. Instead
she recommended a nuanced measure of Internet efficacy as a more accurate proxy. I
had a private conversation with Hargittai after my data collection was completed, but did
consider Internet literacy and efficacy in my original design. Unfortunately, space
constraints prevented me from placing it on the survey. Future studies will employ both
an Internet literacy/efficacy question as Hargittai recommends in her work (2005 and
2009) and the self-reported Internet frequency measure utilized in this research.
9-3: Future Directions
Rapid changes in technology will likely alter both the design and direction of
future research. Just since the election, the growth of Twitter, the messaging social
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networking tool has far exceeded the level of use during the election. It is impossible to
predict which online techniques will be the new effective mechanisms for campaign
contact, communication, and learning. Television and the Internet are converging. In
this election, the NAES did not disaggregate TV viewing or newspaper reading online
compared with offline. In 2012, the distinctions may become entirely blurred or vanish
completely. Despite these fast-moving changes, I believe this research is structured in
such a way as to serve as a useful foundation for future research.
Future research would continue to measure changing patterns of participation, but
not rely solely on rolling cross sectional studies. A greater reliance on panel studies, for
example, could lead to a more clearly defined assessment of changes in participation over
the course of the election at the individual level. I recommend continuing tracking
aggregate participation behaviors through a cross-sectional survey, to complement panel
studies. Additionally, land line surveys may become a less effective data collection
method, especially as we track the activities of youth and minorities. The growth in
mobile phone use, especially among these segments, calls for significant changes in how
researchers collect data (Blumberg and Luke, 2007). Therefore, survey researchers must
design future studies to include this segment in a representative way. Scholars and
industry professionals are developing such methods and those which prove most valid
and reliable must be part of any future study. Future research also should extend beyond
reliance of self-report to measure participation behavior. Technologies exist or are
currently being developed to do this, but currently the expense prevents most from
practically including such technologies in large-scale studies. Perhaps, an experimental
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component should be part of a future research plan, where a randomly recruited panel
agrees to allow researchers to track their behaviors but be unaware that researchers are
primarily interested in participatory behavior. Nevertheless, self-report has its flaws and
drawbacks but, perhaps can be utilized with some confirmatory data collected using tools
which monitor online navigation.
Given that my findings demonstrated that online campaign contact was extremely
influential in predicting participation, I think future studies should endeavor to examine
message content and the delivery mechanism by which it is communicated to the
receiver. Online campaign contact not only comes directly from the campaign itself but
also from independent actors working to support and defeat another candidate. For
example, how does a message incorrectly suggesting that Barack Obama is a Muslim
become so quickly diffused throughout the population? Katz writes that diffusion, unlike
persuasion, takes time making its way through the normal channels and networks of a
community (Katz, Levin and Hamilton, 1963; Katz, 2001). The Internet, however, has
changed that calculus by significantly reducing the time a message makes its way through
a community or social network.— The “Obama is a Muslim” email message along with
others, suggesting Obama was not born in the United States, provide excellent example
for future research with regard to short term message diffusion.
In the future, researchers could address the same hypotheses in an election not as
unique as the 2008 presidential election. Perhaps, the focus could be on a mid-term
election in off presidential years such as 2010 or 2014. With the expanded role of the
Internet and other ICTs, it may be more difficult to isolate the effect of the Internet on
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mobilization, yet, one could use similar techniques to what I employed in this
dissertation, namely interactions, along with similar controls.
One must consider, though, that as long as participation levels are low,
researchers will continue to face challenges in measuring, in great detail, how campaign
contact works to mobilize participation, but whatever surveys researchers create could
measure behavior in a multi-step way, how people react to campaign contact. Finally,
future research could distinguish which online methods are most effective in mobilizing
new voters and reinforcing those already interested.
The rapidly changing technological environment calls for nearly continuous
research on the effects of these technologies on participation. As this dissertation has
shown, the technologies are having some impact, and the extent of that impact will likely
expand even further as these technologies become more diffuse and an integral part of
potential voters’ everyday lives.
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APPENDIX A: CASE 1--PRIMARY PARTICIPATION QUESTIONS
I2. In the past week, has anyone from one of the presidential campaigns talked to you
about the presidential election?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

I3. (IF YES-I2(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or
other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online method
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don’t know
9 Refused
ASK I5-I8 and I10-I15 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER
In the past week ,(READ FOR EACH ITEM)
I5
have you talked to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or
against one of the presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
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I5a. (IF YES-I2(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or
other online method? (ADDED—OR OTHER ONLINE METHOD 2/25/08)
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don’t know
9 Refused

I6

have you done any work for one of the presidential candidates?

1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

I6a. (IF YES-I6(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email
or other online method? (ADDED—OR OTHER ONLINE METHOD 2/25/08)
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don’t know
9 Refused

I7.

have you given money to any of the presidential candidates?

1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
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I8
IF YES TO I7 You said that you have given money to one of the presidential
candidates. Please tell me which of the following ways you donated money to the
candidate, in the past week. READ. ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES
1
Through the mail
2
Online donation through the Internet
3
In person at a fundraiser or other campaign event
DO NOT READ
4
Other (SPECIFY)
8
Don’t know
9
Refused

I16A. During the presidential campaign, have you gone to any political meetings, rallies,
speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate.
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

I17A. During the presidential campaign, have you worn a presidential campaign button,
put a campaign sticker on your car or placed a sign in your window or in front of your
house
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ASK ALL
I9 On another subject, do you have access to the Internet at home, at work or someplace
else?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
(Don’t know)
(Refused)
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(ASK I10-I15 only if I9=1) I’m going to read you a list of some things people can do
online. For each one, please tell me if that is something you have done (in the past
week)(During the presidential campaign). (READ ITEMS)
In the past week, (READ FOR EACH ITEM IF NECESSARY)
I10 Did you discuss politics online with people over email, in chat rooms, using message
boards, forums or instant messaging services?
I11.

Have you visited a website of a presidential campaign or political party?

NO I12
I13. Have you viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential candidates or
campaign?
1
2
8
9

yes
no
Don’t know
Refused

I14. Have you read or posted a comment on a blog having to do with politics or a
campaign?
I15. Have you forwarded any emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or
campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know?
1
Yes
2
No
8 don’t know
9 Refused
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APPENDIX B: CASE 2 QUESTIONS--RETROSPECTIVE PRIMARY QUESTIONS
ADDED 7/2/08
ADDED 7/2/08 IN ORDER TO DIFFERENTIATE INTERNET USE
IF I9=1
I9A. On average, which of the following best describes how often you are on the
Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times per
month, every month or so, rarely, never
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Several hours per day
Almost every day
At least once per week
A few times per month
Every month or so
Rarely
Never
Don’t know
Refused

U. RETROSPECTIVE PRIMARY QUESTIONS
ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U1. During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, DID anyone from one of the presidential
campaigns or a group supporting one of the presidential candidates contact you about the
presidential election?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U2. IF YES—U1(1) : Which candidate did the campaign, or group that contacted you support?
(DO NOT READ)
ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES
1
2
3
4
5

Hillary Clinton
Barack Obama
John Edwards
Mike Huckabee
John McCain
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6
7
8
9

Mitt Romney
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
IF RESPONDENT SAID OBAMA IN U2, ASK U3-4 INSERTING OBAMA. IF
RESPONDENT SAID CLINTON IN U2, ASK U3a-4b INSERTING CLINTON.
ELSE SKIP TO U7-U22
U3. How did THE Obama campaign or group supporting the Obama campaign contact you?
Was it (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?
(READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1
2
3
4
7
8
9

Telephone
in-person
regular mail
Email or other online method
(VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U4. How often did you hear from the Obama campaign or group supporting the Obama
campaign during the presidential primary campaign
(READ LIST)
a. by telephone (if U3 = 1)
b. in-person (if U3 = 2)
c. by regular mail (if U3 = 3)
d. by email or other online method (if U3 = 4)
1
2
3
4
8
9

Once a week or more often
Every other week
One or two times a month
Less than once a month
Don’t know
Refused

DELETED 8/5/08
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U3a. How did THE Clinton campaign or group supporting the Clinton campaign contact you?
Was it (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?
(READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1
2
3
4
7
8
9

Telephone
in-person
regular mail
Email or other online method
(VOL)Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U4a. How often did you hear from the Clinton campaign or group supporting the Clinton
campaign during the presidential primary campaign
a. by telephone (if U3a = 1)
b. in-person (if U3a = 2)
c. by regular mail (if U3a = 3)
d. by email or other online method (if U3a = 4)
(READ LIST)
1
2
3
4
8
9

Once a week or more often
Every other week
One or two times a month
Less than once a month
Don’t know
Refused

DELETED 8/5/08
ROTATE SETS U23-25 WITH SETS U26-28
IF U3=4
U23[Campaigns sometimes email supporters to ask them to contact other people to urge them to
support their candidate.] During the presidential primaries, did the Obama campaign email you to
contact other people to ask them to vote for Senator Obama, or didn’t the Obama campaign do
this?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

DELETED 8/5/08
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U24. IF YES U23(1) [During the presidential primary campaign,] as a result of these emails, did
you contact people you know, people you did not know, or both to ask them to vote for Senator
Obama, or did you not contact anyone at all?
1
2
3
4
8
9

People you know
People you did not know
Both
Did not contact anyone at all
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U25. IF U24(1-3) [During the presidential primary campaign,] approximately how many people
did you contact on behalf of the Obama campaign as a result of their emails asking you to do so?
(DO NOT READ)
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9

1
between 2 and 5
Between 6 and 10
between 11 and 20
between 21 and 50
More than 50
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
IF U3a=4
U26[Campaigns sometimes email supporters to ask them to contact other people to urge them to
support their candidate.] During the presidential primaries, did the Clinton campaign email you
to contact other people to ask them to vote for Senator Clinton, or didn’t the Clinton campaign do
this?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
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ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U27. IF YES U26(1) [During the presidential primary campaign,] as a result of these emails, did
you contact people you know, people you did not know, or both to ask them to vote for Senator
Clinton, or did you not contact anyone at all?
1
2
3
4
8
9

People you know
People you did not know
Both
Did not contact anyone at all
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U28. IF U27(1,2,3) [During the presidential primary campaign,] approximately how many
people did you contact on behalf of the Clinton campaign as a result of their emails asking you to
do so? (DO NOT READ)
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9

1
between 2 and 5
Between 6 and 10
between 11 and 20
between 21 and 50
More than 50
Don’t know
Refused

Participation

ASK U7-U22 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER
ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
ASK ALL
During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, (READ FOR EACH ITEM)
U7
DID you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one
of the presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
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ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U8. (IF YES-U7(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other
online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don’t know
9 Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U9.
During the presidential PRIMARY campaign did you do any work for one of the
presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U10. (IF YES-U9(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email or other
online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don’t know
9 Refused

274
ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U11. (IF YES-U9(1)) For which Candidate did you do work?
[MUTLIPLE RESPONSES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Hillary Clinton
Barack Obama
John Edwards
Mike Huckabee
John McCain
Mitt Romney
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U12. During the presidential PRIMARY campaign did you give money to any of the
presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U13. IF YES TO U12. Please tell me which of the following ways you donated money to the
candidate, during the presidential primary campaign. READ. ACCEPT MULTIPLE
RESPONSES
1
Through the mail
2
Online donation through the Internet
3
In person at a fundraiser or other campaign event
DO NOT READ
4
Other (SPECIFY)
8
Don’t know
9
Refused
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ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U14. IF YES TO U12 Which Candidate did you contribute to?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Hillary Clinton
Barack Obama
John Edwards
Mike Huckabee
John McCain
Mitt Romney
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
ROTATE U29-30 WITH U31-32
U29. IF U14(1) (CLINTON) Approximately, how often did you contribute money to Hillary
Clinton during the primary campaign? (DO NOT READ)
1
2
3
4
8
9

once
two times
3-4 times
5 or more times
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U30 IF U14(1) Approximately how much money did you contribute to Hillary Clinton during the
primary campaign?
(DO NOT READ LIST)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
98
99

Fifty dollars or less
$51 to $100
$101 to $500
$501 to $1,000
$1,001 to $1,500
$1,501 to $2,000
$2,001 to $2,300
More than $2,300
Don’t know
Refused
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ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U31. IF U14(2) (OBAMA) Approximately, how often did you contribute money to Barack
Obama during the primary campaign? (DO NOT READ)
1
2
3
4
8
9

once
two times
3-4 times
5 or more times
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/8/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U32 IF U14(2) Approximately how much money did you contribute to Barack Obama during the
primary campaign? (DO NOT READ LIST)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
98
99

Fifty dollars or less
$51 to $100
$101 to $500
$501 to $1,000
$1,001 to $1,500
$1,501 to $2,000
$2,001 to $2,300
More than $2,300
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U15. During the presidential primary campaign, did you go to any political meetings, rallies,
speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate.
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
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ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U16. (IF YES-U15(1)) For which candidate did you attend a rally? [MULTIPLE
RESPONSES?]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Hillary Clinton
Barack Obama
John Edwards
Mike Huckabee
John McCain
Mitt Romney
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U17 During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, did you wear a presidential campaign button,
put a campaign sticker on your car or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?.
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U18. (IF YES-U17(1)) For which candidate did you do that?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Hillary Clinton
Barack Obama
John Edwards
Mike Huckabee
John McCain
Mitt Romney
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused
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ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U19. During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, did you visit a website of a presidential
campaign?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U20. (IF YES-U19(1)) Which candidate’s web site did you visit during the presidential
primary campaign? [MULTIPLE RESPONSE]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Hillary Clinton
Barack Obama
John Edwards
Mike Huckabee
John McCain
Mitt Romney
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U21. . During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, did you forward any emails, audio or
video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people
you know?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
don’t know
Refused
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ADDED 7/2/08
DELETED 8/5/08
U22. (IF YES-21(1)) How often did you forward any emails, audio or video about presidential
candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know during the
presidential primary campaign? (DO NOT READ)
1
2
3
4
5
8
9

Once
2-3 times
4-5 times
5-6 times
7 or more times
Don’t know
Refused
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APPENDIX C: CASE 3--GENERAL ELECTION PARTICIPATION QUESTIONS
IN ORDER TO DIFFERENTIATE INTERNET USE
IF I9=1
I9A. On average, which of the following best describes how often you are on the
Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times per
month, every month or so, rarely, never
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Several hours per day
Almost every day
At least once per week
A few times per month
Every month or so
Rarely
Never
Don’t know
Refused

Political Participation Questions to be asked during the general election period
beginning in August, 2008
ASKED FULL SAMPLE 8/8-8/20
ASKED OF HALF-SAMPLE (A1) BEGINNING 8/21/08
ASKED OF ONE-THIRD SAMPLE (B1) BEGINNING 8/26/08
ADDED 8/8/08
J1. In the past week has anyone from one of the presidential campaigns contacted you about the
presidential election?
(IF CONTACTED BY GROUP SUPPORTING CANDIDATE CODE YES, ALSO)
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J2. IF YES—J1(1) : Which candidate did the campaign that contacted you support? (DO NOT
READ)
ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES
1
2
3
4
7
8
9

John McCain
Barack Obama
Ralph Nader
Bob Barr
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused
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ADDED 8/8/08
IF RESPONDENT SAID OBAMA IN J2, ASK J3 INSERTING OBAMA. IF
RESPONDENT SAID MCCAIN IN J2, ASK J4 INSERTING MCCAIN.
ELSE SKIP TO J5-J22
J3. How did THE Obama campaign contact you? Was it (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by
regular mail, email or other online method?
(READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1
2
3
4
7
8
9

Telephone
in-person
regular mail
Email or other online method
(VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J4. How did THE McCain campaign contact you? Was it (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by
regular mail, email or other online method?
(READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1
2
3
4
7
8
9

Telephone
in-person
regular mail
Email or other online method
(VOL)Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

Participation
ASK J5-J22 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER
ADDED 8/8/08
ASK ALL
In the past week, (READ FOR EACH ITEM)
FORM A1
J5
have you talked to any people and tried to show them why they should vote for or against
one of the presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
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FORM A2
ADDED 8/8/08
J5A. In the past week, have you tried to convince anyone why they should vote for or against
one of the presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J6. (IF YES-J5(1) OR J5A(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email
or other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don’t know
9 Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
ASK ALL
J7.
In the past week, did you do any work for one of the presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
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ADDED 8/8/08
J8. (IF YES-J7(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email or other
online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don’t know
9 Refused
ADDED 8/8/08
J9.
(IF YES-J7(1)) For which Candidate did you do work?
[MUTLIPLE RESPONSES
1
2
3
4
7
8
9

John McCain
Barack Obama
Ralph Nader
Bob Barr
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J10.
In the past week, did you give money to any of the presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J12.
IF YES TO J10 Which Candidate did you contribute to?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES]
1
2
3
4
7
8
9

John McCain
Barack Obama
Ralph Nader
Bob Barr
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused
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ADDED 8/8/08
J13. In the past week, have you gone to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or
things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate.
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J14.
(IF YES-J13(1)) For which candidate did you attend a rally, in the past week?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES?]
1
2
3
4
7
8
9

John McCain
Barack Obama
Ralph Nader
Bob Barr
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J15 In the past week, did you wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on
your car or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?.
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
J16.
(IF YES-J15(1)) For which candidate did you do that?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES]
1
2
3
4
7
8
9

John McCain
Barack Obama
Ralph Nader
Bob Barr
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused
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ADDED 8/8/08; ASK IF I9=1
J17. In the past week, did you visit a website of a presidential campaign?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
ASK IF I9=1
J19.
. In the past week, did you forward any emails, audio or video about presidential
candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
ASK IF I9=1
J20.
In the past week, have you viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential
candidates or campaign?
1
2
8
9

yes
no
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/8/08
ASK IF I9=1
J21. In the past week, have you read or posted a comment on a blog having to do with politics or
a campaign?
1
2
8
9

yes
no
Don’t know
Refused

ADDED 8/11/08
ASK IF 19=1
J22. In the past wee, did you discuss politics online with people over email, in chat rooms, using
message boards, forums or instant messaging services?
1
2
8
9

yes
no
Don’t know
Refused
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APPENDIX D: CASE 4—POST-GENERAL ELECTION PARTICIPATION
QUESTIONS
IN ORDER TO DIFFERENTIATE INTERNET USE
IF I9=1
I9A. On average, which of the following best describes how often you are on the
Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times per
month, every month or so, rarely, never
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Several hours per day
Almost every day
At least once per week
A few times per month
Every month or so
Rarely
Never
Don’t know
Refused

V1. During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you receive email
from either the Obama or McCain campaigns? IF YES Which campaign?
1
2
3
4
8
9

Yes, from Obama campaign
Yes, from McCain campaign
Both, campaigns
No
Don’t know
Refused

Participation
ASK V5-V18 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER
During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, (READ FOR EACH ITEM)
V5.
DID you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or
against one of the presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
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V6. (IF YES-V5(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or
other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don’t know
9 Refused

V7.
During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign did you do any work
for one of the presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

V8. (IF YES-V7(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email
or other online method?
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)
1 Telephone
2 in-person
3 regular mail
4 Email or other online
7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY)
8 Don’t know
9 Refused

V9.
(IF YES-V7(1)) For which Candidate did you do work?
[MUTLIPLE RESPONSES
1
2
7
8
9

John McCain
Barack Obama
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused
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V10. During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign did you give money to
any of the presidential candidates?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

V11. IF YES TO V10. Please tell me which of the following ways you donated money
to the candidate, during the presidential General Election campaign. READ. ACCEPT
MULTIPLE RESPONSES
1
Through the mail
2
Online donation through the Internet
3
In person at a fundraiser or other campaign event
DO NOT READ
4
Other (SPECIFY)
8
Don’t know
9
Refused

V12 IF YES TO V10 Which Candidate did you contribute to?
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES]
1
2
7
8
9

John McCain
Barack Obama
Other (SPECIFY)
Don’t know
Refused

V13. During the presidential General Election campaign, did you go to any political
meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular
presidential candidate.
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
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V14 During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you wear a
presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car or place a sign in your
window or in front of your house?.
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

V15 During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you visit a website
of a presidential campaign?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused

V16. . During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you forward any
emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, coworkers or other people you know?
1
2
8
9

Yes
No
don’t know
Refused

V17. During the presidential General Election campaign, did you view video on sites
like YouTube about the presidential candidates or campaign?
1
2
8
9

yes
no
Don’t know
Refused

V18. During the presidential General Election campaign, did you discuss politics online
with people over email, in chat rooms, using message boards, forums or instant
messaging services?
1
2
8
9

yes
no
Don’t know
Refused
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APPENDIX E: CORRELATIONS BY CASE
Table-E1: Case 1Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities
(1)
(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate
(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign
(3) Online donation to candidate/campaign
(4) Discuss politics online
5) Visited website of campaign
(6) Viewed video about campaign
(7) Read or post about campaign online
(8) Forwarded political email/audio/video
(9) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand.
(10) Offline vol. to work on campaign
(11) Offline donation to a candidate/campaign

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.00
0.15
0.10
0.35

1.00
0.18
0.14

1.00
0.10

1.00

0.21
0.16
0.15
0.32
-0.10
0.03
0.03

0.11
0.08
0.07
0.11
0.01
0.00
0.02

0.20
0.11
0.08
0.10
0.04
0.04
-0.02

0.30
0.30
0.28
0.45
0.09
0.04
0.04

(5)

1.00
0.36
0.24
0.29
0.14
0.08
0.06

(6)

1.00
0.32
0.29
0.12
0.05
0.03

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

(7)

1.00
0.20
0.07
0.02
0.03

(8)

1.00
0.08
0.01
0.04

(9)

1.00
0.05
0.07

(10)

(11)

1.00
0.06 1.00
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Table-E2: Case 2 Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities
(1)

(2)

(5) Forwarded political email/audio/video

1.00
0.16**
0.13**
0.17**
0.28**

1.00
0.23** 1.00
0.10** 0.26** 1.00
0.11** 0.15** 0.31** 1.00

(6) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand
(7). Offline vol. to work on campaign

0.12** 0.02
0.09** -0.01

(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate
(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign
(3) Online donation to a campaign/candidate
(4) Visited website of campaign

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(9) Attend rally/Meeting for candidate

0.10**
0.10**
0.03
-0.01 0.05**
0.08** 0.17** 0.20**

(10) Wear button/Place sign to support
candidate

0.12** 0.09** 0.23** 0.21** 0.14** 0.16** 0.24** 0.17** 0.36** 1.00

(8) Offline donation to a campaign/candidate

0.20** 0.13** 1.00
0.12** 0.05* 0.09** 1.00
0.09** 0.08** 0.14** 0.09** 1.00
0.18** 0.15** 0.18** 0.29** 0.20** 1.00

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Table-E3: Case 3 Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

0.19**
0.07**
0.06**

1.00
0.10**
0.09**

1.00
0.09**

1.00

0.09**

0.05**

0.08**

0.08**

0.32**

1.00

0.17**

0.13**

0.15**

0.14**

0.21**

0.21**

(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate

1.00

(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign

0.08**

1.00

(3) Discuss politics online

0.34**

0.08**

1.00

(4) Visited website of campaign

0.17**

0.10**

0.24**

1.00

5) Viewed video about campaign

0.18**

0.10**

0.29**

0.31**

1.00

(6) Read or post about campaign online

0.14**

0.07**

0.28**

0.19**

0.26**

1.00

(7) Forwarded political email/audio/video
(8) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand.
(9) Offline vol. to work on campaign

0.31**
0.09**
0.04**

0.11**
0.02
-0.01

0.41**
0.08**
0.06**

0.24**
0.13**
0.08**

0.32**
0.10**
0.06**

(10) Attend rally/Meeting for candidate
11) Wear button/Place sign to support
candidate

0.04**

0.14**

0.07**

0.11**

0.10**

0.11**

0.12**

0.20**

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

(10)

(11)

1.00
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Table-E4: Case 4 Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities
(1)

(2)

(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate

1.00

(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign

0.26**

1.00

(3) Online donation to candidate/campaign

0.27**

0.17**

(4) Discuss politics online
(5) Visited website of campaign
(6) Viewed video about campaign
(7) Forwarded political email/audio/video
(8) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand.
(9) Offline vol. to work on campaign
(10) Offline donation to a candidate/campaign
(11) Attend rally/Meeting for candidate
(12) Wear button/Place sign to support
Candidate

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

0.06*
0.15**

1.00
0.14**

1.00

0.10**

0.12**

(10)

(11)

(12)

1.00

0.43**

0.18**

0.26**

1.00

0.27**

0.14**

0.34**

0.36**

0.27**

0.14**

0.28**

0.37**

0.41**

0.39**

0.16**

0.28**

0.47**

0.37**

0.42**

-0.23**
0.09**

-0.04
-0.03

0.05*
0.28**

-0.03
0.14**

0.10**
0.20**

0.08**
0.11**

0.05*

0.05*

- 0.10**

0.06**

0.06**

1.00
1.00

0.03

1.00

0.17**

1.00

0.17**

0.13**

0.28**

0.20**

0.25**

0.20**

0.24**

0.11**

0.45**

0.18**

1.00

0.20**

0.09**

0.27**

0.22**

0.26**

0.17**

0.24**

0.15**

0.37**

0.21**

0.34**

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

1.00
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